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ABSTRACT 
 
Measuring the Measure: A Multi-dimensional Scale Model to Measure Community Disaster 
Resilience in the U.S. Gulf Coast Region. (May 2009) 
Joseph Stephen Mayunga,  
Adv. Dip., University College of Lands & Architectural Studies, Tanzania;  
M.S., International Institute for Geo-Information Science & Earth Observation,  
The Netherlands 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Walter Gillis Peacock 
 
Over the past decades, coastal areas in the United States have experienced exponential 
increases in economic losses due to flooding, hurricanes, and tropical storms. This in part is due 
to increasing concentrations of human populations in high-risk coastal areas. Although 
significant progress has been made in developing mitigation measures to reduce losses in these 
areas, economic losses have continued to mount. The increase in losses has led to a significant 
change in hazard research by putting more emphasis on disaster resilience. While there has been 
a growing interest in the concept of disaster resilience, to date there is little or no empirical 
research that has focused on systematically measuring this concept. Therefore, the main 
objective of this dissertation was to develop a theoretically-driven index that can be used to 
measure disaster resilience in coastal communities.  
This dissertation argues that a comprehensive measure of disaster resilience should 
address issues of relevance to all phases of disaster: mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery. Furthermore, a fruitful approach to measure disaster resilience is to assess various 
forms of capital: social, economic, physical, and human. These capitals are important resources 
  
iv 
for communities to successfully perform disaster phases’ activities.  A conceptual model based 
on disaster phases’ activities and community capitals was developed in which indicators for 
measuring disaster resilience were identified. The model was utilized by first identifying 
activities relevant to each disaster phase and then specifically identifying indicators from each 
form of capital that might be important for carrying out those activities. The selected indicators 
were aggregated and a composite index score was calculated using average method which is 
based on equal weighting.  
The reliability and validity of the index were assessed using Cronbach’s alpha, 
regression analysis, and GIS techniques. The results provided convincing empirical evidence that 
the index is a valid and reliable measure. The application of the measure indicated that disaster 
resilience is an important predictor of flood property damage and flood related deaths in the U.S. 
Gulf coast region. Also, the findings indicated that Florida counties are the most resilient 
whereas counties along the Texas-Mexico border region are the least resilient.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
 Coastal areas in the United States and throughout the world are increasingly becoming 
more vulnerable to a wide range of natural hazards including hurricanes, tropical storms, 
tsunamis, floods, and other coastal hazards. The increase in vulnerability is partly due to the 
rapid population growth in high-risk coastal areas, unprecedented urban development, the 
prospects of global climate change, and sea-level rise (Adger, Hughes, Folke, Carpenter, & 
Rockstrom, 2005; Ahmed & White, 2006; Hanson & Robert, 2005). Studies have shown that the 
increase in human habitation and structural development along the coastlines contribute to the 
destruction of coastal resources such as wetlands that protect coastal areas from hazards e.g., 
hurricanes and tropical storms. In the United States, it is estimated that 150 million people (more 
than 50% of the national population) live in the coastal counties (Crossett, Culliton, Wiley, & 
Goodspeed, 2004). The population of the United States’ coastal counties is projected to increase 
by more than 12 million people by the year 2025 (Crossett et al., 2004). This indicates that more 
people will potentially be at risk.  
 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the global sea-
level has already risen about 10-25 cm over the past 100 years (IPCC, 2001). The IPCC now 
projects that sea-level will rise by 15-95 cm over the next century as a result of climate change 
(IPCC, 2001). Sea-level rise will increase flooding associated with storm surges even if the 
intensity or frequency of extreme weather events does not increase as many models currently 
suggest (US Climate Forum, 1997). A potential consequence of a higher mean sea-level is that  
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coastal storms will likely be more destructive to people and infrastructure because storm surges 
will reach further inland and protective barrier islands may be destroyed (National Assessment 
Synthesis Team [NAST], 2001).  
 Tropical storms such as hurricane Katrina (2005) that devastated the entire Gulf coast of 
the United States are reminders that coastal communities are potentially becoming more and 
more vulnerable to natural hazards than in the past. Hurricane Katrina was recorded as one of the 
deadliest and costliest hurricanes in the history of the United States, killing more than 1,300 
people (FEMA, 2006), leaving hundreds of thousands of people homeless and causing more than 
$250 billion (U.S.D.) in property damage (Birch & Wachter, 2006). The great body of hazard 
literature suggests that, in general, while hurricane related deaths have significantly decreased 
over the past two decades, property damage (even after taking into account the inflation factor) 
has been increasing (Blake, Rappaport, & Landsea, 2007; Gladwin, Lazo, Morrow, Peacock, & 
Willoughby, 2007). Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the trends of property damage and deaths due 
to hurricane hazards in the United States, respectively.  
The graph in Figure 1.1 indicates that the trends in property damage have significantly 
increased in the recent years. The hazard literature points to socioeconomic factors such as 
human population growth, rapid urbanization, and increasing concentration of property in high-
risk areas as contributing factors for increasing losses from hurricanes and tropical storms 
(Gladwin et al., 2007; Mileti, 1999; Smith, 2004). Conversely, the graph in Figure 1.2 suggests 
that the trends for hurricane related deaths has been consistent with the empirical observation 
that, because of improved forecasting and warning systems, deaths have been decreasing over 
the past decades. However, in 2004 and 2005 the trend started taking an upward turn; suggesting 
a potential for more loss of life in the future if protective measures are not taken.  
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Figure 1.1. Estimated property damage from hurricanes for selected years in the United States; 
Damage is adjusted to 2006 U.S. dollars (Source: Blake et al., 2007) 
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Figure 1.2. Estimated deaths from hurricanes for selected years in the United States (Source: 
Blake et al., 2007) 
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 For many years, researchers have focused on understanding the geophysical and 
biophysical characteristics of natural hazards and significant progress has been made in 
developing models that can accurately predict locations and timing of hazard events such as 
hurricanes and tropical storms (Anderson, 2000). However, even if it appears that the knowledge 
of physical aspects of natural hazards has significantly improved over the past decades, property 
damage continues to mount and people continue to die (Anderson, 2000). Studies have shown 
that the impacts of natural hazards are not only a function of geophysical and biophysical 
processes but also of the relationship between humans and the natural system (Burton, Kates, & 
White, 1978). For many years, hazard researchers have agreed that natural disasters are not 
purely natural events. They are a result of the interaction of three systems: (1) the biophysical 
system, which includes the hazardous events, (2) the social system, which includes the 
demographic characteristics of the communities that experience the hazard events, and (3) the 
built environment system, which includes buildings, roads, bridges, and other components of 
built environments (Mileti, 1999).  
 The increase in hazard vulnerability and disaster losses has led to a significant shift in 
hazard research from the emphasis on vulnerability to an emphasis on understanding how to 
make communities more disaster-resilient. The concept of disaster resilience has emerged 
recently and is increasingly growing as a critical concept in hazard research. Generally, the 
concept of disaster resilience reflects the concerns that natural hazards are dynamic phenomena 
that involve not only people as victims but also as contributors. It is human actions such as 
global warming and poor planning that cause disasters. As a concept, disaster resilience is 
relatively new or rather still in its infant stage in disaster management and planning. In many 
cases, because it is still new, there is a limited theoretical understanding of the concept in terms 
of how it should be operationalized. Therefore, this research seeks to improve the current state of 
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knowledge on the concept of disaster resilience with respect to disaster management and 
planning.  
1.2. Problem statement 
 While there has been a growing application of the concept of disaster resilience in the 
hazard literature, a frequently asked question is: Can the concept of disaster resilience be 
measured, and if the answer is yes, then how should it be measured? There is currently little or 
no research that has developed an explicit set of procedures on identifying key indicators that 
can be used to measure and quantify the concept of disaster resilience. Moreover, there is little 
research that has suggested how communities could be compared in terms of their levels of 
disaster resilience, or how to determine whether a certain community is moving in the direction 
of becoming more resilient in the face of hazards. This research seeks to fill in this gap by using 
the United States Gulf coast region as a study area, to explore the utility of the concept of 
disaster resilience in view of improving our current understanding of the concept. The aim is to 
make the concept of disaster resilience operational so that it can support planning, management, 
decision making, and policy formulation.  
1.3. Research objectives  
The overall objective of this study is to empirically operationalize the concept of disaster 
resilience. In view of this overall objective, this study seeks to address the following five specific 
research objectives: 
(1)  To explore the theory, conceptual models, definitions, and applications of the concept of 
disaster resilience. 
(2)  To develop a conceptual framework that can be used to identify disaster resilience 
indicators in coastal communities. 
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(3)  To develop a community disaster resilience index (CDRI) that can be used to compare 
and monitor resilience of coastal communities. 
(4)  To assess the reliability and validity of the proposed community disaster resilience index 
(CDRI). 
(5)  To identify and analyze the spatial patterns and clusters of disaster resilience in the study 
region. 
1.4. Specific research questions 
To achieve the research objectives outlined above, this research attempts to answer the 
following seven specific research questions. 
Specific Question for Objective 1: 
(1) What does the concept of disaster resilience mean and how can it be applied in disaster 
management in particular? 
Specific Questions for Objective 2: 
(2) What are the major components of community disaster resilience and how are they 
related? 
(3) What are the key indicators of a disaster-resilient coastal community? 
Specific Question for Objective 3: 
(4) How can disaster resilience indicators be merged into an overall index as a measure of 
community disaster resilience? 
Specific Questions for Objective 4: 
(5) How valid and reliable is the proposed CDRI as a quantitative measure?   
(6)  To what extent does the CDRI capture the theoretical conception of disaster resilience 
and does it seem to work empirically? 
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Specific Question for Objective 5: 
(7)  Is there any spatial pattern or cluster of disaster resilience in the study region? 
1.5. Significance of the research 
This research is significant in two distinct ways: (1) it addresses the current need in the 
hazard literature of developing a methodology to operationalize the concept of disaster 
resilience. The concept of disaster resilience has shown great potential but also proven to be a 
difficult concept to operationalize. This research provides a model that will be used as a starting 
point in the process of operationalizing this concept, and (2) this research provides a useful 
measurement tool for emergency managers that will improve comparative assessments of 
disaster resilience at county level. Additionally, CDRI as a measure is an important planning tool 
that planners and emergency managers can utilize in a decision making process such as resource 
allocation. 
1.6. Structure of the dissertation 
This dissertation is organized into nine chapters including this introductory chapter 
(Chapter I). Figure 1.3 graphically illustrates the logical flow of the chapters. Generally, Chapter 
I sets the scene for this dissertation by providing the background of the research, the problem 
statement, the objectives, and the research questions. After the introduction chapter, the next two 
chapters focus on building the theoretical foundation of the study, which is based on the 
literature review. Chapter II reviews the literature on the definition of the concept of resilience 
from two perspectives; the fields of ecology and disasters and hazards. The purpose of Chapter 
III is (i) to develop a disaster resilience working definition for this dissertation and (i) to develop 
a conceptual framework in which disaster resilience indicators can be identified.  
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Figure 1.3. Logical flow of the dissertation chapters 
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Finally, the chapter introduces the study region, the unit of analysis, and the data sources for the 
selected set of indicators. 
The purpose of Chapters V and VI is to assess the reliability and validity of the proposed 
CDRI as a measure of disaster resilience. After assessing the reliability and validity of the CDRI, 
the next two chapters (VII and VIII) further examine the validity and utility of the CDRI as a 
measure.  Specifically Chapter VII discusses and presents the CDRI ranking scores by county 
and state, with the aim of identifying which states and counties are more disaster resilient. These 
rankings help to further evaluate the validity and utility of the CDRI. Another way of assessing 
the validity and utility of the CDRI is to visualize the scores spatially using GIS techniques and 
draw some conclusions. The results of the spatial analysis are summarized and presented in 
Chapter VIII. Finally, Chapter IX presents the general discussion of the results, conclusions, 
limitations of the study, and recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
DEFINING DISASTER RESILIENCE 
2.1. Introduction 
As a concept, resilience is applied in many disciplines including hazards, ecology, 
psychology, sociology, geography, psychiatry, and public health (Klein, Nicholls, & Thomalla, 
2003; Manyena, 2006; Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008). It has been 
defined in a variety of ways, and has many different connotations depending on the discipline. 
However, the primary focus of this dissertation is on the concept of “disaster resilience” as 
applied to the field of hazards and disasters. This chapter reviews the literature on disaster 
resilience to form a better understanding of its definition. Generally, the literature review 
provides a theoretical foundation for developing the conceptual framework for measuring the 
concept, which is discussed in Chapter III.  
Arguably, resilience as a concept and/or theory is more widely used in the field of 
ecology than in any other field. Although it is still contested, many researchers argue that the 
concept of resilience originated in the field of ecology (Manyena, 2006). For that reason, this 
study reviews the definitions of resilience from two perspectives; the fields of ecology and 
environmental hazards.  
In addition, as many researchers have already underscored, there is a clear relationship 
between the concept of disaster resilience and social vulnerability in the hazards literature. This 
chapter further discusses the relationship and argues that the concept of disaster resilience is 
more critical than the concept of social vulnerability. Finally, the chapter concludes by 
summarizing the factors that make the concept of disaster resilience more appealing to 
researchers and practitioners. 
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2.2. The concept of resilience in the field of ecology 
 The term resilience is often used in the same vein as the application of the notion of 
bouncing back, which reflects its Latin root “resiliere”; meaning to jump back (Klein et al., 
2003; Paton & Johnston, 2006). In the field of ecology, Holling (1973) is frequently cited as 
probably the first to introduce the concept of resilience after publishing his popular paper entitled 
“Resilience and Stability of the Ecological Systems”. According to Holling (1973), resilience 
determines the persistence of relationships within a system and is a measure of the ability of the 
system to absorb change in the face of extreme perturbation and continue to persist (Holling, 
1973).  
Since the publication of the work of Holling (1973) resilience has become the central 
concept in the field of ecology. Generally, resilience in the ecological literature is defined in two 
different ways (Gunderson, Holling, Pritchard, & Peterson, 2002; Holling & Gunderson, 2002). 
One definition focuses on efficiency, control, constancy, and predictability. This type of 
resilience in the ecological literature is termed as engineering resilience (Gunderson et al., 2002). 
The other definition of resilience focuses on persistence, adaptiveness, variability, and 
unpredictability and is termed as ecological resilience (Gunderson et al., 2002). The engineering 
definition focuses on stability and equilibrium; in this case resilience is measured by the ability 
to resist disturbance or perturbation and the speed of return to the equilibrium point (Pimm, 
1984). The ecological definition emphasizes the condition of non-equilibrium whereby 
instabilities can flip a system into another stability domain (Berkes & Folke, 1998). Resilience in 
this case is measured by the magnitude of disturbances that can be absorbed before the system 
changes its structures by changing the variables and process that control behavior (Berkes & 
Folke, 1998; Gunderson et al., 2002).  
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The first definition implies an assumption of a global stability, i.e., an ecosystem has 
only one equilibrium or steady state. The second definition presupposes the existence of 
alternative regimes, i.e., ecological system can exhibit a shift regime from one regime to another. 
Although many ecologists generally seem to agree with both perspectives (engineering and 
ecological), over the past four decades many additional definitions have emerged (see Table 2.1). 
The multiple definitions surface in the field of ecology generally suggest that (1) resilience is a 
complex concept to define and (2) resilience is still an evolving concept. 
 
Table 2.1. Selected definitions of the concept of resilience from the field of ecology 
 
Author Definition 
Holling (1973) Resilience of an ecosystem is the measure of the ability of an ecosystem to absorb 
changes and still persist.  
Pimm (1984) Resilience is the speed with which a system returns to its original state following a 
perturbation. 
Holling et 
al.(1995) 
Resilience is a buffer capacity or ability of a system to absorb perturbation, or the 
magnitude of the disturbance that can be absorbed before a system changes its 
structure by changing the variables and processes that control behavior. 
Lebel (2001) Resilience is the potential of a particular configuration of a system to maintain its 
structure/function in the face of disturbance, and the ability of the system to re-
organize following disturbance-driven change and measured by size of stability 
domain  
Walkers et 
al.(2002) 
Resilience is a potential of a system to remain in a particular configuration and to 
maintain its feedbacks and functions, and involves the ability of the system to 
reorganize following the disturbance driven change. 
Folke et 
al.(2002) 
Resilience for social-ecological systems is related to three different characteristics: (a) 
the magnitude of shock that the system can absorb and remain in within a given state; 
(b) the degree to which the system is capable of self-organization, and (c) the degree 
to which the system can build capacity for learning and adaptation. 
Walker & Salt 
(2006)  
Resilience is the capacity of a system to absorb disturbances, to undergo changes, and 
still retain essentially the same function, structure, and feedbacks. 
Resilience  
Alliance (2007) 
Ecosystem resilience is the capacity of an ecosystem to tolerate disturbance without 
collapsing into a qualitatively different state that is controlled by different set of 
processes. Thus, a resilient ecosystem can withstand shocks and rebuild itself when 
necessary. Resilience in social systems has the added capacity of humans to anticipate 
and plan for the future.  
Millennium 
Ecosystem 
Assessment 
(2007) 
Resilience refers to the amount of disturbance or stress that a system can absorb and 
still remain capable of returning to its pre-disturbance state 
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2.3. The concept of resilience in the field of hazards and disasters 
Over the past years, many scholars, organizations, and institutions in the field of hazards 
and disasters have emphasized the importance of the concept of disaster resilience in hazards and 
disaster research, policy, and risk reduction programs. The United Nations Commission on 
Sustainable Development (2001) emphasizes disaster risk reduction policies and strategies that 
enable communities to become more disaster-resilient. The increasing support of the concept of 
disaster resilience in the hazard field is also evident in the mitigation literature (see for example, 
Burby, 1998; Godschalk et al., 1999). The work of Mileti (1999) also suggests building a 
disaster resilient community as a new approach to dealing with natural disasters. Other studies 
that support building of disaster resilient communities include the work of Burby et al. (2000), 
which views disaster resilience as a primary goal of disaster management and planning. 
Furthermore, the 2004 world disaster report of the International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies specifically focuses on building resilient communities. 
 More recently, the concept of disaster resilience has increased in popularity, especially 
after the adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of 
Nations and Communities to Disasters. The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) is the key 
instrument for implementing disaster risk reduction adopted by member States of the United 
Nations. Its overarching goal is to build resilience of nations and communities to disasters by 
achieving substantial reduction of losses by 2015 (UN/ISDR, 2005). Since the adoption of the 
HFA, the goal of hazard planning and disaster risk reduction among nations world wide has 
rapidly shifted; the focus now is more on building community disaster resilience rather than 
simply reducing vulnerability of communities (Manyena, 2006).  
Perhaps the most important recent work that supports and has significantly contributed 
to the concept of disaster resilience is the new book titled “Disaster Resilience: An Integrated 
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Approach” by Paton and Johnson (2006). Overall, this publication has presented a basic 
foundation supporting the concept of disaster resilience and its application to the disaster 
management and planning. Twigg (2007) has taken the concept of disaster resilience to a new 
level by proposing the guidelines for identifying basic characteristics of a disaster resilient 
community; however, the work is still in progress. 
Even though the concept of disaster resilience has received supports from many 
respected scholars and international organizations such as the United Nations, one fundamental 
question remains concerning the concept of disaster resilience: What is disaster resilience? This 
section reviews the definition of the concept of disaster resilience and how is applied in the field 
of hazards and disasters. 
 In the hazard and disaster research, Timmerman (1981) is probably the first to introduce  
the concept of resilience using climate change as an example in his paper entitled “Vulnerability, 
Resilience, and the Collapse of Societies” (Clark et al., 1998; Klein et al., 2003). Borrowing the 
concept of resilience from the field of ecology, Timmerman (1981) linked resilience to hazard 
vulnerability and defined resilience as the measure of a system’s or sub-system’s capacity to 
absorb and recover from hazardous event. Following the work of Timmerman (1981), many 
definitions of the concept of disaster resilience have emerged in the hazards and disasters field in 
the last three decades. As in the field of ecology, there is currently no single agreed-upon 
definition of disaster resilience in the field of hazards and disasters. Many authors have defined 
disaster resilience in different ways (see Table 2.2). This is perhaps not surprising because 
hazards and disaster research has been conducted by different researchers from different 
disciplines with different backgrounds. 
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Table 2.2. Selected definitions of the concept of disaster resilience from the field of disasters and 
hazards 
 
Author Definition 
Timmerman 
(1981) 
Resilience is the measure of a system’s or part of the system’s capacity to absorb and recover 
from occurrence of a hazardous event. 
Wildavsky 
(1991) 
Resilience is the capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become 
manifest, learning to bounce back. 
Buckle (1998) Resilience is the capacity that people or groups may possess to withstand or recover from the 
emergencies and which can stand as a counterbalance to vulnerability. 
EMA (1998) Resilience is a measure of how quickly a system recovers from failures.  
Mileti(1999) 
 
Local resiliency with regard to disasters means that a locale is able to withstand an extreme 
natural event without suffering devastating losses, damage, diminished productivity, or 
quality of life without a large amount of assistance from outside the community. 
Comfort et 
al.(1999) 
The capacity to adapt existing resources and skills to new systems and operating conditions. 
Adger(2000) Social resilience is the ability of groups or communities to cope with external stresses and 
disturbances as a result of social, political, and environmental change. 
Paton et 
al.(2000) 
Resilience describes an active process of self-righting, learned resourcefulness and growth — 
the ability to function psychologically at a level far greater than expected given the 
individual’s capabilities and previous experiences. 
Buckle  et 
al.(2000) 
Resilience is the quality of people, communities, agencies, and infrastructure that reduce 
vulnerability. Not just the absence of vulnerability rather the capacity to prevent or mitigate 
loss and then secondly, if damage does occur to maintain normal condition as far as possible, 
and thirdly to manage recovery from the impact. 
Pelling (2003) Resilience is the ability of an actor to cope with or adapt to hazard stress. 
Godschalk 
(2003) 
A resilient city is a sustainable network of physical systems and human communities. 
Walter (2004) 
 
Resilience is the capacity to survive, adapt and recover from a natural disaster. Resilience 
relies on understanding the nature of possible natural disasters and taking steps to reduce risk 
before an event as well as providing for quick recovery when a natural disaster occurs. These 
activities necessitate institutionalized planning and response networks to minimize 
diminished productivity, devastating losses and decreased quality of life in the event of a 
disaster. 
UN/ISDR 
(2005) 
 
Resilience is the capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to 
adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of 
functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social system is 
capable of organizing itself to increase this capacity for learning from past disasters for better 
future protection and to improve risk reduction measures. 
Paton &  
Johnston (2006) 
Resilience is a measure of how well people and societies can adapt to a changed reality and 
capitalize on the new possibilities offered. 
Maguire & 
Hagan (2007) 
Social resilience is the capacity of social entity e.g. group or community to bounce back or 
respond positively to adversity. Social resilience has three major properties, resistance, 
recovery, and creativity. 
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As the list in Table 2.2 indicates, the definitions of resilience in the field of hazards and 
disasters are diverse. However, all definitions have relatively similar but not identical properties. 
For example, from the list of definitions above, it is clear that the term capacity/ability is used by 
most of the authors as a property of resilience. This generally suggests that researchers agree that 
disaster resilience is the capacity/ability of people, a group of people, a community, or a society 
to continue functioning in the face of a disaster. In general, the following key points can be 
drawn from the definitions presented in Table 2.2. 
First, some authors adopt the notion of ecological and engineering resilience from the 
ecological literature. These authors define resilience as the function of a system and its dynamics 
and self reorganizing capacity after a disturbance. In addition, these authors define the concept of 
resilience as a process rather than an end result or outcome.  
Second, some definitions tend to take a long term perspective, which can be linked to 
the notion of bouncing back. For example, most authors define resilience as a long-term recovery 
process after a disaster. The implication is that a resilient system is one that bounces back and 
recovers itself from a disturbance or disaster. This also suggests that a criterion for 
understanding or assessing resilience might be the time it takes to recover or return to normalcy. 
A resilient community in this view would be the one that resumes its previous growth trajectory 
quickly.  
Third, there is the notion of resistance. This implies that the system or units in the 
system will be able to absorb, deflect, lessen or otherwise modify impacts or the consequences of 
the potential impacts. For communities, this implies taking actions prior to an event to strengthen 
its social fabric or physical infrastructure such that potential impacts are reduced. 
Fourth, some authors include the notion of adaptive capacity in their definitions. This 
implies the ability of a community to adapt to new environment following a disaster and the 
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capacity to learn from past disasters. This suggests that the system will modify its structure or 
behavior in order to better address future problems; in the disaster sense, this suggests 
mitigation. 
Fifth, some authors link the concept of resilience to the concept of sustainability. 
Extending the idea of ecologists who argue that resilience promotes sustainable ecosystems, 
some authors considered resilience as a property of sustainability. 
Sixth, in some cases disaster resilience is also understood as the opposite of 
vulnerability. The argument here is that when vulnerability is high resilience will tend to be low 
and vice versa. Several studies have argued that there is a relationship between the concept of 
social vulnerability and community disaster resilience (Paton & Johnston, 2006). The next 
section discusses the relationship between social vulnerability and community disaster resilience 
and the potential limitations of the concept of social vulnerability.  
2.4. Community disaster resilience versus social vulnerability  
In many cases, both community disaster resilience and social vulnerability are central 
pillars in understanding the characteristics of natural hazards, their consequences, and how to 
deal with them (Paton & Johnston, 2006). The theoretical base of the concepts of community 
disaster resilience and social vulnerability has been derived from empirical studies in the past 
two decades (Manyena, 2006). Both concepts community disaster resilience and social 
vulnerability are based on the theory that communities, people or groups of people suffer 
different degrees of death, injury, loss, and disruption from the same type of hazard event. Also 
they may experience different degrees of difficulty, failure, or success during the process of 
recovery (Hewitt, 1983; Peacock, Morrow, & Gladwin, 1997; Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 
2004). While some communities can recover quickly following a disaster event, others take 
longer.  
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A great body of hazards literature suggests that the impacts of extreme natural events on 
a given community are not random but are determined by every day patterns of social 
interactions and organizations, especially access to resources (Lindell, Prater, & Perry, 2007; 
Morrow, 1999; Peacock et al., 1997). In light of this theoretical base, these two concepts are 
similar as ultimately both are geared toward saving lives and minimizing losses. However, 
significant conceptual and methodological differences between these two concepts exist. The 
following discussion highlights some of these differences. 
2.4.1. Social vulnerability 
 The hazards literature suggests that the concept of hazard vulnerability has been in use 
since the late 1970s (Birkmann, 2006; Manyena, 2006). According to Cutter (1996) and National 
Research Council (2006) hazard vulnerability is generally characterized as being a function of 
hazard exposure (the risk of experiencing a hazard event), and physical vulnerability (the 
likelihood of elements of the built environment to sustain various degrees of damage from the 
hazard event). Currently, many definitions of hazard vulnerability exist in the literature. Mitchell 
(1989), for example, broadly defined hazard vulnerability as simply a potential for loss. Cutter 
(1996) has defined hazard vulnerability as the likelihood that an individual or group will be 
exposed to and adversely affected by a hazard.  
  In recent years, there has been increased recognition that to understand hazard 
vulnerability better requires also understanding the social vulnerability component. This implies 
that instead of considering disasters as purely physical occurrences, which require technological 
solutions such events can be understood better in terms of human actions (Bankoff, Frerks, & 
Hilhorst, 2003). Like the concepts of disaster resilience, the definitions of social vulnerability are 
many and diverse. Presently, there is no universally accepted definition of social vulnerability in 
the literature.  
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Wisner et al. (2004) defined social vulnerability as the characteristics of a person or group 
and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from 
the impact of a natural hazard, and that social vulnerability changes with time. Social 
vulnerability is deeply rooted and shaped by the social structures and political processes that 
determine access to resources such as income, education, housing, and political resources such as 
power and autonomy (Cutter, 1996; Morrow, 1999; Wisner et al., 2004). The hazards literature 
has identified several groups of people (vulnerable groups) that are more likely to need special 
attention in emergency situations (Cutter, 1996; Morrow, 1999; Peacock et al., 1997; Wisner et 
al., 2004). Such groups include: the elderly, the physically and/or mentally disabled, renters, 
poor households, households headed by women, ethnic or linguistic minorities, immigrants, and 
children. Other groups include the homeless, illegal aliens, tourists and transients. A large body 
of research demonstrated that these groups invariably suffer most during disasters (Cutter, 
Boruff, & Shirley, 2003; Morrow, 1999; Wisner et al., 2004).  
For the past decades, the goal of social vulnerability has been to develop a better assessment 
method to identify those at risk. However, the current social vulnerability assessment methods 
are still problematic; much research is still needed to improve the current methods as well as our 
understanding on the concept of social vulnerability. Although the concept of social vulnerability 
has been instrumental and achieved a high degree of recognition in disaster management and 
planning, especially in improving community risk reduction programs and guiding policy 
formulation, the concept is still fuzzy (Birkmann, 2006). The concept of social vulnerability still 
faces a number of conceptual and methodological limitations that have yet to be resolved 
including: 
(1) Social vulnerability assessment has focused only on individuals, and fails to recognize 
the complex social networks among members in a community in dealing with disasters. 
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Usually, people do not exist solely as individuals. Social behaviors often result in the 
formation of social groups and social networks (Paton & Johnston, 2006), which 
together can enhance their capacity in dealing with disasters. 
(2)  Social vulnerability assessment has been linear and static in that it has not taken into 
accounts the different dimensions and continuously changing nature of complex social 
and natural systems’ interactions. It is important to consider both the social and physical 
elements in the assessment, because social vulnerability is intrinsically tied to both 
social and physical processes. 
(3) Social vulnerability assessment usually tends to simply analyze vulnerability according 
to peoples’ demographic characteristics, which are typically age, gender, race, and 
ethnicity. These demographic characteristics are not useful to emergency managers in 
developing strategies to reduce risk or enhance capacity or resilience. This is because 
they can not be changed and emergency manager can do little with them (Buckle, 
Marsh, & Smale, 2001). What is important to emergency managers and planners is not 
the kind of group a person belongs to, but the nature of their lifestyle, how they interact 
with each other, and most importantly the social networks they have (social capital). 
(4)  Most of the social vulnerability indicators currently developed in the literature are 
country specific and not universal, which may mean nothing to other countries. For 
example, percent of Hispanic population, as an indicator of social vulnerability in the 
United States, may mean nothing to a country such as Tanzania or Sweden.   
These are some of the basic limitations facing the concept of social vulnerability, which 
have not yet been resolved. However, the fundamental question here is not whether researchers 
or emergency managers and planners can address these weaknesses, but rather the profound 
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question is (particularly in hazard risk reduction) whether the concept can provide relevant 
information that emergency managers and planners can utilize in a decision making process. 
2.4.2. Community disaster resilience  
In contrast with social vulnerability, the concept of community disaster resilience tends 
to take a broader view of the risk spectrum, focusing on a range of issues such as hazards 
adjustments, learning and communications, coping, and adaptation rather than only focusing on 
social and/or economic disadvantages that limit the capacity to cope with disasters. The concept 
of resilience broadly encompasses the inter-relationship between hazards, humans, and natural 
systems, but also focuses attention to the attributes of the systems and their ability to 1) absorb, 
deflect or resist disaster impacts, and 2) when hit, bounce back in a relatively rapid fashion, as 
well as 3) learn from experience and modify its behavior and structure to adapt to future threats. 
Most importantly, it captures the social and cultural networks and political variables that are 
often underestimated in social vulnerability assessments. More specifically, community disaster 
resilience as a concept is growing and seems to be appealing to hazard researchers more than the 
concept of social vulnerability for the numerous reasons including: 
(1) The concept of community disaster resilience reflects the desire to improve the capacity 
of both social and physical systems to respond to and recover from disaster (Tierney & 
Bruneau, 2007).  
(2) The concept of community disaster resilience emphasizes the importance of pre-disaster 
and post-disaster measures that enhance the capacity of communities to reduce losses 
from a disaster (Maguire & Hagan, 2007; Tierney & Bruneau, 2007). 
(3) The concept of community disaster resilience is seen as a desirable attribute of both 
social and physical systems in the face of disaster because it is a contributing factor to 
community sustainability (Klein et al., 2003). 
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(4) Disasters can not be completely predicted, which means that we cannot know exactly 
when, where, and how disasters will occur in the future; the concept of community 
disaster resilience is important because it provides a way of thinking about how to 
explore the options of dealing with uncertainties and unexpected changes (Berkes, 
2007). 
(5) While the notion of labeling an individual or group of individuals as “vulnerable” seems 
to discourage peoples’ efforts in dealing with disasters; the concept of community 
disaster resilience appears to be more proactive and encourages collective efforts in a 
community to deal with disasters. 
(6) Community disaster resilience is a broader concept which encompasses a large part of 
the risk spectrum (Twigg, 2007). It emphasizes the community’s capacities and how to 
strengthen them, and it places less emphasis on the factors which make the community 
vulnerable.  
2.5. Summary 
In this chapter numerous studies have been reviewed in order to assess and understand 
the current state of the definition of resilience in both the fields of ecology and hazards. The 
definitions and various concepts reviewed in this chapter provide a better understanding of the 
concept of resilience, its key components, and how it should be conceptualized and applied in 
hazards and disaster research. An initial working definition of disaster resilience includes the 
ability of a system to absorb, resist or deflect disaster impact and when impacted to relatively 
quickly recover and learn or adapt to future risks. 
Also, the literature review indicates that conceptual and methodological problems still 
exist with regard to social vulnerability assessment methods that need to be addressed. 
Furthermore, the literature review suggests that the concept of disaster resilience has more 
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potential than the concept of social vulnerability in advancing the hazard and disaster research 
agenda. Communities and the way they function during disasters can be viewed as systems 
(Wenger & Parr, 1969) with complex interactions of people and the natural and build 
environments. The concept of disaster resilience seems to be central to understanding these 
interactions within and across communities and how communities respond and function during 
disasters.  
Generally, the literature review provides the theoretical foundation for this research to 
develop a conceptual framework for measuring and quantifying the concept of disaster 
resilience, which is described in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
CONCEPTUALIZING COMMUNITY DISASTER RESILIENCE 
3.1. Introduction 
 The objective of this chapter is to develop a framework in which disaster resilience 
indicators can be identified. To achieve this objective a number of conceptual frameworks or 
models from the literature were critically reviewed in order to identify key elements that can be 
used to measure disaster resilience. Based on that review a disaster resilience working definition 
and a community disaster resilience framework (CDRF) are developed. In this dissertation, the 
CDRF is the critical component in identifying indicators for measuring the concept of disaster 
resilience.  
3.2. Disaster resilience conceptual frameworks 
 Given the fact that the definition of the concept of disaster resilience is still fuzzy, and 
the fact that the dynamic interactions of people and the natural and built environments are 
complex, assessing community disaster resilience is a problematic process. It requires a clear 
understanding of the components of disaster resilience and how they relate to each other. There 
are currently a number of conceptual frameworks or models in the hazards and disasters 
literature that aim to measure or provide a general understanding of the concept of disaster 
resilience. It is important to review these frameworks, especially at this initial stage of 
developing the approach for measuring the concept of disaster resilience because they may 
provide some guidance. In addition, frameworks structurally provide a general overview of the 
main components of the concept and highlight the complex interactions of these components.  
Most importantly, these frameworks can provide a basic structure in which relevant indicators of 
disaster resilience can be identified and potentially measured.  
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For the purpose of this study, four frameworks were reviewed and are discussed in this 
chapter. Briefly, these frameworks are: (1) the sustainable and resilient community framework 
(Tobin, 1999), (2) the sustainable livelihood framework (Chambers & Conway, 1992; Glavovic, 
Scheyvens, & Overton, 2002), (3) the community disaster resilience framework (Maguire & 
Hagan, 2007), and (4) the disaster resilience of place (DROP) model (Cutter et al., 2008). 
 (1) Sustainable and resilient community framework 
Tobin (1999) proposed a framework in which sustainable and resilient communities can 
be assessed. The framework comprises of three theoretical models that can be utilized to 
operationalize the concept of sustainability and community disaster resilience. These models are: 
(i) the mitigation model, (ii) the recovery model, and (iii) the structural cognitive model (see 
Figure 3.1).  
Tobin (1999) argued that planning for sustainable and resilient communities requires a 
comprehensive planning approach that includes mitigation programs to reduce risk and exposure 
to hazards. It also requires post-disaster plans that promote short and long term recovery. In 
addition, it requires careful consideration of structural and cognitive factors that can effectively 
influence programs related to building sustainable and resilient communities. Tobin (1999) 
concluded that these three conceptual models are interrelated and together play a significant role 
in building sustainable and disaster resilient communities. 
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Figure 3.1. Sustainable and resilient community framework (Source: Tobin, 1999) 
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resilient communities; in fact they are as important as hazard mitigation and disaster recovery. A 
great body of research has demonstrated that communities that are not well prepared can not 
effectively respond to disasters (Ronan & Johnson, 2005).  Effective preparedness and response 
activities help to save lives and limit property damage (Mileti, 1999). So, a framework that only 
focuses on developing comprehensive mitigation and recovery programs is not adequate to 
achieve the goal of building sustainable and resilient communities.  
Furthermore, Maguire and Hagan (2007) in their recent work on social resilience 
concluded that the greatest improvement in building sustainable and resilient communities can 
be achieved if all activities of disaster management phases (mitigation, preparedness, response, 
and recovery) are taken into account. The set of activities associated with each disaster phase has 
a role to play in building disaster resilience. By definition hazard mitigation refers to actions 
taken before a disaster to reduce vulnerability, primarily through measures that reduce causalities 
and exposure to damage and disruption or that provide passive protection during disaster impact 
(Lindell & Perry, 1992; Tierney, Lindell, & Perry, 2001). Disaster preparedness generally 
encompasses actions undertaken before disaster impact that enable social units to respond 
actively when disaster does strike (Lindell & Perry, 1992; Tierney et al., 2001). Disaster 
response consists of actions taken a short period prior to, during, and after disaster impact to 
reduce causalities, damage, and disruption and to respond to immediate needs of disaster victims 
(Lindell & Perry, 1992; Tierney et al., 2001). Finally, disaster recovery comprises actions taken 
to repair, rebuild, and reconstruct damaged properties and to restore disrupted community social 
routines and economic activities (Peacock et al., 1997; Tierney et al., 2001). Based on the 
discussion above it becomes clear that without considering all four disaster management phases’ 
activities it is unlikely for a community to achieve the goal of becoming disaster-resilient. 
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(2) Sustainable livelihood framework 
The sustainable livelihood framework was originally developed by Robert Chambers in 
the mid-1980s (Glavovic et al., 2002). The framework was further developed by Chambers and 
Conway (1992). Since that time, the use of the sustainable livelihood framework has been 
growing. Currently, a number of development agencies, donors, Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), Community based organizations (CBOs), and government bodies have 
adopted the livelihood concept (Glavovic et al., 2002). Most importantly, the livelihood concept 
has become a focus of research. The United Kingdom Department for International Development 
(DFID) has been an advocate of applying this framework in various countries, particularly 
developing countries where the level of poverty is high. The goal has been to promote disaster 
risk reduction programs and reduce poverty especially in rural communities. 
Figure 3.2 depicts the sustainable livelihood framework, its main components, and how 
these components fit together. The arrows within the framework denote different types of 
relationships. Although they do not imply causality, they imply a certain level of influence 
(DFID, 1999). The vulnerability context denotes the external environment in which people live 
and through which their livelihoods can be affected by trends and shocks. In the context of 
sustainable livelihood framework, the concept of sustainability is linked to the ability of people 
to cope with and recover from shocks (DFID, 1999).  
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 Figure 3.2. Sustainable livelihood framework (Source: DFID, 1999)
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The asset pentagon is the core of the sustainable livelihood framework (see Figure 3.3). 
It consists of five types of capital: (1) human, (2) social, (3) natural, (4) physical, and (5) 
economic. The sustainable livelihood framework is based on the idea that these five types of 
capital are important assets in building disaster resilience.  
Human capital includes skills, knowledge, good health, and ability to work that help 
people to achieve their livelihood objectives (DFID, 1999). In the context of disaster resilience 
human capital is important because, without human capital such as education communities can 
not be able to utilize other types of capital.  
Social capital comprises the social resources that people can draw upon to support their 
livelihoods (DFID, 1999). It is developed through networks and connectedness, group 
associations and memberships, and relationships of trust. In the context of disaster resilience 
social capital is critical because many researchers have demonstrated that communities with 
higher levels of social capital are relatively wealthier (DFID, 1999; Rupasingha, Goetz, & 
Freshwater, 2006). In other words, there is a relationship between social capital and income. 
Therefore, in the context of disaster resilience, social capital can help people to increase their 
income, which will increase their disaster resilience. 
Natural capital includes natural resource stocks from which resource flows and services 
useful for livelihoods are derived. Such resources include land, forests, water, and minerals. 
Studies have shown that there is a relationship between natural capital and disaster resilience. 
For example, alteration of wetlands is one of the significant contributing factors for increasing 
flood hazards in the United States (Highfield & Brody, 2006). Therefore, improving natural 
capital, for example by protecting coastal resources such as wetlands, will increase disaster 
resilience of communities.  
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Figure 3.3. The asset pentagon of the sustainable livelihood framework 
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because they lack access to financial resources. As a result low income households tend to live 
(but not always) in low quality housing located in high risk areas (Mileti, 1999).  
From the discussion above, it becomes clear that capitals are important elements in 
building community disaster resilience. However, although the sustainable livelihood framework 
highlights the key components required in reducing vulnerability and poverty, the framework 
seems to be very general, which encompasses many variables. Thus, turning it into a practical 
measurement tool for policy and disaster risk reduction programs can be problematic.  
(3) Community disaster resilience framework 
Maguire and Hagan (2007) broadly defined social resilience as the capacity of social 
groups and communities to recover from, or respond positively to, disasters. These researchers 
argued that a resilient community should have the capacity to demonstrate three properties: (i) 
resistance, (ii) recovery, and (iii) creativity. Figure 3.4 presents Maguire and Hagan’s concepts 
of the three properties of social resilience.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Properties of resilience (Source: Maguire & Hagan, 2007) 
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Figure 3.4(a) illustrates the resistance property, which is the community’s effort to 
withstand disasters and their consequences. It is measured as a distance between a community’s 
pre-disaster level of functioning (r) and the threshold (t) (represented by the doted line). A 
threshold is the limit which defines the point, which if crossed; a community will not be able to 
return to its pre-disaster state. Thus, for a highly resistant community, r and t are considerably 
far apart; meaning that it will require a significant disaster impact to push a community to this 
threshold. Conversely, for a less resistant community, the r and t are relatively close to each 
other, which means that even a comparatively small impact may push the community beyond the 
threshold. Figure 3.4(b) illustrates the recovery property, which is the ability of a community to 
bounce back to its pre-disaster level of functioning after a disaster. A more resilient community 
returns to its pre disaster level very quickly, while a less resilient community takes longer to 
recover. Figure 3.4(c) illustrates a creativity property, which is an optimal recovery. Maguire and 
Hagan (2007) argued that  optimal recovery is not just the ability of a community to return to its 
pre-disaster level but also the ability to adapt to new circumstances and learn from the past 
disaster experience. 
Maguire and Hagan (2007) further argued that in order for a community to achieve the 
goal of building disaster resilience, all four disaster management phases’ activities should be 
considered (mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery). That means all disaster phases’ 
activities are important for building disaster resilience. For example, hazard mitigation and 
disaster preparedness activities help communities to build capacity to reduce impacts of future 
disasters. Disaster response and disaster recovery activities are important because they improve 
the capacity of communities to effectively respond to disaster and recover quickly from a 
disaster. 
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While the theoretical framework developed by Maguire and Hagan (2007) provides a 
better understanding of the concept of resilience, to a large extent it fails to clearly itemize the 
specific attributes of each property, especially the attributes of resistance and creativity. In other 
words, the framework fails to define the attributes of resistance and creativity so that emergency 
managers, for example, can utilize them in building disaster resilience. 
(4)The disaster resilience of place (DROP) model 
Recently, Cutter et al. (2008) have developed what they call a disaster resilience of place 
model (See Figure 3.5). In a nut shell, the DROP model has two main components. The first 
component consists of the antecedent conditions (the inherent vulnerability and inherent 
resilience) which are the product of the interactions of the social, natural and built environment 
systems. The hazard impacts are the results of the antecedent conditions, hazard events, and the 
ability to cope and respond. The second component consists of the actions to deal with the 
disaster impacts, which include hazard mitigation, disaster preparedness, disaster response, and 
disaster recovery. The DROP model is still under development and there is currently not much 
discussion of how the model will be operationalized. However, like the framework of Tobin 
(1999) and Maguire and Hagan (2007), the DROP model emphasizes the disaster management 
phases’ activities as key factors for building disaster resilience. 
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Figure 3.5. The disaster resilience of place model (DROP) (Source: Cutter et al., 2008) 
 
To summarize the frameworks discussed above, generally have demonstrated that there 
are two important components that can be used to conceptualize community disaster resilience: 
(1) Disaster management phases’ activities (mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery) 
and (2) community capitals or assets (social, economic, human, physical, and natural). The 
frameworks developed by Tobin (1999), Maguire and Hagan (2007), and Cutter et al., (2008) 
seem to have common characteristics. They all emphasize the importance of disaster 
management phases’ activities in building disaster resilience.  On the other hand, the sustainable 
livelihood framework focuses on community capitals. Although these frameworks provide a 
general understanding of the concept of disaster resilience, they remain highly theoretical in 
nature and can not be easily operationalized for measuring disaster resilience. 
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Based on the review of the conceptual frameworks above and the definitions discussed 
in Chapter II a disaster resilience working definition for this dissertation is developed. 
Furthermore, a community disaster resilience framework in which indicators for measuring 
disaster resilience can be identified is developed. Both the working definition and the framework 
are discussed in the next sections. 
3.3. Working definition of disaster resilience 
For the purpose of this dissertation and given the focus on human communities, disaster 
resilience is defined as: 
the capacity of communities and their built environments to mitigate, prepare for, 
respond to, and recover quickly from disasters, and adapt to new circumstances while 
learning from past disasters. 
This definition is linked specifically to the overall research objective of this dissertation. The 
definition is considered broad enough to encompass most of the potential meanings of disaster 
resilience as discussed earlier; yet is considered narrow enough to achieve the overall research 
objective of this dissertation. 
First, this definition is built on the notion of disaster phases’ activities (Mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery), which plays a pivotal role on preventing and reducing 
impacts of natural disasters. Second, this definition puts social systems and their built 
environments at the center; meaning that it emphasizes their ability to deal with disasters and 
learn from them. Furthermore, this dissertation argues that the ability of a community to deal 
with disaster is based on the quality and quantity of community capitals (social, economic, 
physical, human, and natural). The learning component is a very critical aspect in this definition 
because studies have shown that disasters can be avoided if they are understood and the lessons 
from them are learned and applied.  
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It is quite clear that if we do not learn from past disasters we can not prevent or avoid the 
future ones. Third, the definition focuses specifically on the capacity of communities because, 
although in many cases the responsibility of dealing with disaster problems is at the national 
level, in the United States this responsibility is largely given to local communities (Wenger & 
Parr, 1969). Moreover, disasters are local phenomena, which make local communities the central 
points of both immediate disaster impacts and initial emergency response. Therefore, local 
communities are critical in saving lives. 
3.4. Community disaster resilience framework (CDRF) 
This dissertation combines the two notions of the frameworks discussed in the previous 
section and develops a composite framework, which includes both the disaster management 
phases’ activities and the community capitals.  However, because this dissertation focuses more 
on social systems rather than physical systems, natural capital is not included in the framework. 
This is because natural capital is considered more as part of the physical systems rather than 
social systems. Therefore, only four community capitals are used in this study (social, economic, 
physical, and human, see Figure 3.6). It is important to note that excluding natural capital does 
not mean that it is less important in building disaster resilience. As mentioned previously, natural 
capital such as wetlands play an important role in protecting costal communities.  
As illustrated in Figure 3.6, the proposed CDRF has two main components; disaster 
management phases’ activities (mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery) and 
community capitals (social, economic, physical, and human).  
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Figure 3.6. Community disaster resilience framework (CDRF) 
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Disaster Management 
Phases’ Activities 
Community Disaster Resilience 
Community 
Capitals 
Social capital 
Economic capital 
Physical capital 
Human capital 
 
Hazard mitigation 
Disaster preparedness 
Disaster response 
Disaster recovery 
 
  
39 
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
    
Figure 3.7. Schematic diagram of the CDRF showing the relationship between community 
capitals and disaster phases’ activities 
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The next sections discuss in detail the two components of the CDRF, i.e., the various 
activities undertaken in each phase and the properties of each community capital and how they 
contribute to building disaster resilience. 
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3.4.1. Disaster management phases’ activities 
This section describes the activities undertaken during the four disaster management 
phases: hazard mitigation, disaster preparedness, disaster response, and disaster recovery.  
 (a) Hazard mitigation 
Hazard mitigation is defined as those advance actions taken to reduce or eliminate the 
long term risk to human life and property from natural hazards (Godschalk et al., 1999; Lindell 
& Perry, 1992). Hazard mitigation activities often focus on preventing disasters before they 
happen or reducing the likelihood of their occurrence. Such activities are termed either structural 
or nonstructural, depending on whether they affect buildings or land use (Godschalk et al., 1999; 
Mileti, 1999). These activities include: (i) strengthening buildings and infrastructure exposed to 
hazards by means of building codes, engineering design, and construction practices to increase 
the resilience and damage resistance of structures, as well as building protective structures such 
as dams, levees, and seawalls (these actions are termed structural mitigation measures), (ii) 
avoiding hazard prone areas by directing new development away from known hazards locations 
through comprehensive plans and zoning regulations (these actions are termed nonstructural 
mitigation measures), and (iii) maintaining protective features of the natural environment by 
protecting sand dunes, wetlands, vegetation cover, and other ecological elements that absorb 
and/or reduce hazard impacts, helping to protect exposed buildings and people (these actions are 
also termed non-structural mitigation measures). 
(b) Disaster preparedness 
Disaster preparedness activities are those that are undertaken to protect human lives and 
property in conjunction with threats that cannot be controlled by means of mitigation, or from 
which only partial protection can be achieved (Lindell & Perry, 1992). Such activities are based 
on the place where disaster impact will occur and the plans, procedures, and resources need to be 
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prepared in advance to support a timely and effective response to the threat (Lindell & Perry, 
1992). Lindell and Perry (1992) further pointed that there are two categories of activities of 
disaster preparedness: (i) activities that are related to warning the affected populations and 
emergency managers, such as the timing, and extent of the disaster magnitude, and (ii) activities 
that are designed to enhance the effectiveness of emergency operations. These activities include: 
developing plans for activation and coordination of emergency response organizations, devising 
standard operating procedures to guide organizations in the performance of their emergency 
functions, and training personnel in the use of those procedures. Disaster preparedness activities 
also include conducting drills and exercises, stockpiling resources such as protective equipment 
for emergency workers and medical suppliers for the injured, and assembling of community 
resources for use as needed in an emergency. 
(c) Disaster response 
Disaster response activities are those conducted during the time period that begins with 
detection of the event and ends with the stabilization of the situation following the impact 
(Lindell & Perry, 1992). Disaster response activities often focus on protecting the affected 
population, attempting to limit the damage from the initial impact, and minimizing damage from 
the secondary impacts (Mileti, 1999). According to  Lindell, Prater and Perry (2007) such 
activities include: (i) securing the impacted area, (ii) warning the population, (iii) evacuating the 
threatened area, (iv) conducting search and rescue for the injured, (v) providing food and 
emergency medical care, and (vi) sheltering evacuees and other victims. 
(d) Disaster recovery 
Disaster recovery comprises actions taken to repair, rebuild, and reconstruct damaged 
properties and to restore disrupted community social routines and economic activities (Tierney et 
al., 2001). In addition Peacock et al. (1997) have defined community recovery as a process in 
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which groups and organizations making up the community attempt to re-establish social 
networks to carry out the routines of daily life. Disaster recovery requires that people’s lives 
within the community be restored to normal.  
Often disaster recovery activities begin after the disaster impact has been stabilized and 
extends until a community has returned its normal activities (Lindell & Perry, 1992). The 
disaster literature categorizes disaster recovery into two phases based on time frame: (1) short 
term recovery (relief and rehabilitation) and (2) long term recovery (reconstruction). Relief and 
rehabilitation activities usually include: (i) restoration of access to impacted areas, (ii) re-
establishment of economic activities (commercial and industrial), (iii) provision of housing, 
clothing, and food for the victims, (iv) restoration of critical facilities within the community such 
as water, power, and other community services, and (v) restoration of essential government or 
community services. Usually, reconstruction and rebuilding activities include: (i) rebuilding of 
major structures, e.g., buildings, roads, bridges, and dams, and (ii) revitalizing the economic 
system. 
3.4.2. Community capitals  
In recent years the major forms of capital (social, economic, physical, and human) have 
been recognized as important factors in building community capacities to deal with disasters 
(Callaghan & Colton, 2007; Dynes, 2002; Haque & Etkin, 2007; Walter, 2004). The hazard 
literature suggests that the sustainability and/or resilience of a community depends on its ability 
to access and utilize the major forms of capital (Beeton, 2006; Walter, 2004). The following 
discussion summarizes the four major forms of capital and how they can contribute to building 
community disaster resilience. 
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(a) Social capital  
Currently many definitions of social capital exist in the literature (See for example, 
Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1995; Putnam, 2000). Putnam (1995) has defined 
social capital as the features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. Although social capital has been 
defined in a variety of ways, there is a common emphasis on the aspect of social structure, trust, 
norms, and social networks that facilitate collective actions (Green & Haines, 2002). In the 
context of community disaster resilience, social capital reflects social cooperation or community 
connectedness, which provides an informal safety net during disasters and often helps people to 
access resources (Walter, 2004). For instance, community ties and networks are beneficial in 
building disaster resilience because they allow individuals to draw on the social resources in 
their communities and increase the likelihood that such communities will be able to adequately 
address their disaster concerns (Dynes, 2002; Walter, 2004). Similarly, social networks such as 
friends, relatives, and coworkers are important in building disaster resilience because they 
provide resources that can assist households during disaster response and recovery (Dynes, 2002; 
Lindell & Prater, 2003). Also social bonds have shown to influence adoption and 
implementation of hazard adjustment (Mileti, 1999). Furthermore, research has demonstrated 
that in circumstances where characteristics of social capital or connectedness are lacking in a 
community, members of that community tend to have less capacity in terms of networks for 
dealing with disasters (National Research Council, 2006; Walter, 2004). 
(b) Economic capital 
Fundamentally, economic capital denotes financial resources that people use to support 
their livelihoods (DFID, 1999; Smith, Simard, & Sharpe, 2001). It includes savings, income, 
investments or businesses, and credit. The importance of economic capital in building 
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community disaster resilience is perhaps straightforward in the sense that economic resources 
increase the ability and capacity of individuals, groups, and communities to absorb disaster 
impacts and speed up the recovery process. People with access to financial resources recover 
more quickly from disasters (Mileti, 1999; Walter, 2004). Also access to credit and hazard 
insurance are associated with the level of household preparedness and ability to take protective 
measures (Lindell & Prater, 2003). The hazards literature suggests that a more stable and 
growing economy will generally enhance community disaster resilience, while an unhealthy or 
declining economy is an indication of increasing vulnerability (Buckle et al., 2001; Walter, 
2004). 
(c) Physical capital 
Physical capital refers to the built environment, which comprises residential housing, 
commercial and industrial buildings, public buildings, and dams and levees. It also includes 
lifelines such as electricity, water, sewer, transportation, telecommunication facilities, as well as 
critical facilities such as hospitals, schools, fire and police stations, and nursing homes (DFID, 
1999; Walter, 2004). The hazard literature suggests that physical capital is one of the most 
important resources in building a disaster-resilient community; because physical infrastructure 
such as roads, bridge, dams and levees as well as communication systems are essential elements 
for proper functioning of a community (Walter, 2004). Furthermore, critical facilities play an 
important role in ensuring that people have resources and support arrangements during disaster 
response and recovery. In general, lack of physical infrastructure or critical facilities may have a 
direct negative impact on a community’s capacity to prepare, respond, and recover from 
disasters. 
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(d) Human capital 
Economists have defined human capital as the capabilities embodied in the working-age 
population that allow it to work productively with other forms of capital to sustain the economic 
production (Smith et al., 2001). Sometimes human capital is simply referred to as labor force or 
the ability to work. However, two main components of human capital are frequently mentioned 
in the literature; education and health of the working population group (DFID, 1999; Smith et al., 
2001; Walter, 2004). Education which includes knowledge and skills that are accumulated 
through forms of educational attainment, training, and experience, is an essential component of 
human capital. Health of the working-age population is another important component of human 
capital. Health is considered as a critical component of human capital because an unhealthy 
population can not be able to harness other forms of capital (Smith et al., 2001). As a result a 
community can not fully engage in the process of building community disaster resilience.  
For instance, knowledge and skills of local people on types of hazards, hazard history, 
and hazard risk in their community can be an important asset in building community disaster 
resilience. In general, the literature suggests that human capital in a form of knowledge, skills, 
health and physical ability determines an individual’s level of disaster resilience more than other 
capitals (Walter, 2004). 
3.5. Summary 
This chapter has reviewed five conceptual frameworks with the aim of identifying 
important components of disaster resilience.  Although these frameworks differ in disciplinary 
origin they offer a new way of thinking that helps to understand the concept of disaster 
resilience. Based on the literature review a disaster resilience working definition and a 
community disaster resilience framework (CDRF), which is a key aspect to identifying disaster 
resilience indicators, were developed. The CDRF has two components; disaster management 
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phases’ activities and community capitals. The literature suggests that the link between these two 
components is strong and clear and the importance of these components in building community 
disaster resilience is comprehensible. Using the CDRF as an analysis tool, the next chapter 
identifies disaster resilience indicators and develops a general approach to aggregate them to 
create the sub-indices and the overall CDRI. 
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CHAPTER IV 
GENERAL APPROACH FOR MEASURING DISASTER RESILIENCE 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter first discusses the use of indicators and indices as a general approach to 
measure disaster resilience. It highlights the importance and application of indicators and indices 
and the problems associated with creating and using them. Second, the chapter outlines a 
theoretical framework in which indicators for measuring disaster resilience were selected. Third, 
the chapter summarizes and describes the final selected set of indicators. Fourth, the chapter 
discusses the procedures employed in aggregating the indicators to calculate the sub-indices and 
the overall CDRI scores. Finally, the chapter introduces the study region, the data sources, and 
the unit of analysis. 
As Chapter III indicates, disaster resilience is a multidimensional concept that 
encompasses many factors. Thus, developing a comprehensive approach to measure disaster 
resilience, which reflects its dimensions is undoubtedly challenging. There is currently no 
established methodological approach in the hazard literature to measure disaster resilience. 
Therefore, this research develops a measure of community disaster resilience following the basic 
logic of index construction. As discussed in Chapter III a comprehensive measure of disaster 
resilience should address issues of relevance to all four phases of disasters: mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery. Furthermore, the literature on disaster resilience suggests 
that a fruitful approach for measuring disaster community resilience is to assess various forms of 
community capital domains. As noted in the previous chapter, this research considers four major 
forms of capital: social, economic, physical, and human. This chapter discusses how these four 
capital domains are employed to assess disaster resilience with respect to the four phases of 
  
48 
disaster management and how these in turn will be combined to form a community disaster 
resilience index (CDRI). 
4.2. Indicators and indices 
The use of indicators and indices in social science research is not a new endeavor; it 
goes back as far as the early twentieth century (Birkmann, 2006; Cutter et al., 2003; King & 
MacGregor, 2000). In the field of economics for example, indicators had been in use since the 
1940s (Birkmann, 2006). As a result economic indicators such as gross domestic product (GDP) 
and employment rates are widely used in many fields as measures of economic development 
(Birkmann, 2006). 
For the past several decades, the use of indicators and indices has been significantly 
increasing in many fields including hazards and disasters. In the hazard and disaster research, 
there are currently a number of indices, which are increasingly being used in both research and 
policy formulation. Some of these indices include; the Earthquake Disaster Risk Index (EDRI) 
developed by Davidson (1997), the Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) developed by Cutter et al. 
(2003), the Disaster Risk Index (DRI) developed by United Nations Development Program 
[UNDP] (2004), the Social Vulnerability Index to Climate Change for Africa developed by 
Vincent (2004), and the Prevalent Vulnerability Index (PVI) developed by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (2005). These indices play an important role as planning and management 
tools, for example, in facilitating resource allocation. 
Indicators have been defined by different researchers in different ways for different 
purposes. There is no universally accepted definition of an indicator. For example, Chevalier et 
al. (1992) defined an indicator as a variable hypothetically linked to a phenomenon studied, 
which in itself cannot be directly measured. According to Wong (2001) an indicator is simply  a 
proxy measure of some abstract, multidimensional concepts. Generally, an index is composed of 
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several different indicators combined together using some mathematical formulae to give a 
single value called an index (Babbie, Halley, & Zaino, 2003; Simpson, 2006). Indices are 
powerful tools because of their ability to summarize more complicated technical data into a 
simpler way that both experts and non-experts can easily understand (Birkmann, 2006; 
Freudenberg, 2003). Indices can also be viewed as means of modeling a complex reality into a 
single construct (Vincent, 2004). 
Even though the use of indices in the hazard and disaster research is growing, indices 
face a number of conceptual and methodological limitations. Literature suggests that indices 
should be used with great caution because they can be misleading (Freudenberg, 2003; Nardo et 
al., 2005). Some of the advantages and disadvantages of using indices are summarized in Table 
4.1.  
 
Table 4.1. Advantages and disadvantages of indices 
Advantage Disadvantage 
(1) Indices can be used to summarize 
complex or multi-dimensional issues, in 
view of supporting decision-makers. 
(1) Indices may send misleading, non-robust policy 
messages if they are poorly constructed or misinterpreted. 
Sensitivity analysis can be used to test composite 
indicators for robustness. 
(2) Indices provide the big picture. They can 
be easier to interpret than trying to find a 
trend in many separate indicators. They 
facilitate the task of ranking communities on 
complex issues. 
(2) The simple “big picture” results, which indices show 
may invite politicians to draw simplistic policy 
conclusions. Indices should be used in combination with 
the sub-indices to draw sophisticated policy conclusions. 
(3) Indices can help attract public interest by 
providing a summary figure with which to 
compare the performance across 
communities and their progress over time. 
(3) The construction of indices involves stages where 
judgment has to be made such as the selection of sub-
indicators, choice of model, weighting indicators, and 
treatment of missing values. These judgments should be 
transparent and based on sound statistical principles. 
(4) Indices could help to reduce the size of a 
list of indicators or to include more 
information within the existing size limit 
(4) The selection of sub-indices and weights could be the 
target of political challenge. 
  
Source: Nardo et al.(2005) 
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However, despite these limitations, the use of indicators and indices has continued to 
grow mainly because of two reasons; if they are properly constructed indices can be (1) effective 
communication and planning tools and (2) used effectively to compare performance and progress 
across space and time (Freudenberg, 2003). 
4.3. Identification and selection of disaster resilience indicators 
Construction of a composite index is a process that requires several steps to be 
systematically followed (Birkmann, 2006; Freudenberg, 2003; Nardo et al., 2005). These steps 
include: (1) Developing a theoretical framework for indicator selection; (2) Identifying and 
developing relevant indicators; (3) Standardizing indicators to allow comparisons; (4) Weighting 
indicators and groups of indicators; and (5) Testing the validity and reliability of the index. 
This study follows similar basic steps in constructing the proposed community disaster resilience 
index (CDRI). While this chapter discusses steps one to four, step five will be introduced and 
discussed in Chapters V and VI. 
4.3.1. Theoretical framework for indicator selection 
The goal of indicator selection is to ensure that the selected indicators are relevant, 
measurable, practical, and most importantly reflect the concept being measured (Freudenberg, 
2003; Nardo et al., 2005). Table 4.2 illustrates the theoretical framework or matrix that was used 
as a guide to achieve this goal. This framework is the key component to this dissertation; 
because it provides the basic logic followed in creating the CDRI. The framework represents a 
matrix of four by four cells. In total there are sixteen cells which represent sixteen disaster 
phase/capital domain sub indices that were used to develop the CDRI. These sub-indices will be 
discussed at length in the next section. The columns of the framework denote the community 
capitals while the rows represent the disaster phases’ activities. 
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Based on this theoretical framework, disaster resilience indicators were selected by 
cross-classifying the four major forms of capital by the four disaster phases’ activities. The first 
step was to identify the various activities of each disaster phase. Examples of the disaster phases’ 
activities are provided in the first column. As can be recalled, these disaster phases’ activities are 
discussed in Chapter III but also a detailed list of activities, stakeholders, and other actors that 
play a role in undertaking these activities is included in Appendix A. Then, based on the list of 
activities of each disaster phase, the second step was to identify indicators for each capital 
domain that are relevant to undertake each activity under each disaster phase. In the framework, 
these indicators are denoted by the word indicator 1 to k. These indicators will be discussed in 
detail in the next section. 
Generally, the cross-classification method helped identify unique elements of 
community capital important in undertaking activities of each disaster phase. In addition, the 
cross-classification method helped to ensure content validity of the selected indicators. 
Specifically, one might simply combine together a host of capital indicators that appear to be 
relevant for measuring disaster resilience. However, this research takes a more theoretically 
driven approach by first identifying activities relevant to each disaster phase and then 
specifically identifying indicators from each form of capital that might be important for carrying 
out those activities. In addition the approach taken in this study begins to build the overall 
community disaster resilience index (CDRI) from the ground up, inductively, by first developing 
sub-indices for each disaster phase and capital domain. This process is driven by both theoretical 
and empirical decisions. 
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Table 4.2. Theoretical framework matrix for indicator selection 
 
Capital Domains’ Indicators Disaster Phases’ Activities 
Social Capital Economic Capital Physical Capital Human Capital 
I: Hazard Mitigation 
General definition: 
Hazard mitigation is defined as 
those advance actions taken to 
reduce or eliminate the long term 
risk to human life and property 
from natural hazards 
 
Example of activities: 
• Building dams, levees, dikes, 
and   floodwalls.  
• Landuse planning to prevent 
development in hazardous areas 
• Strengthening buildings 
through building codes and 
building standards. 
• Protecting natural environment 
e.g., wetlands  
 
Indicator 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator k 
Indicator 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator k 
Indicator 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator k 
Indicator 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator k 
II: Disaster Preparedness     
General definition: 
Disaster preparedness is defined 
as those activities undertaken to 
protect human lives and property 
in conjunction with threats that 
cannot be controlled by means of 
mitigation 
 
Example of activities: 
• Developing response    
procedures 
• Design and installation of 
warning systems,  
• Developing plans for 
evacuation  
• Exercise to test emergency 
operations(Exercise & Drills) 
• Training of emergency 
personnel 
• Stockpiling of resources e.g., 
medical supplies 
Indicator 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator k 
Indicator 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator k 
Indicator 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator k 
Indicator 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator k 
III Emergency Response     
General definition: 
Disaster response is defined as 
those activities that are conducted 
during the time period that begins 
with detection of the event and 
ends with the stabilization of the 
situation following the impact 
 
Example of activities: 
• Securing  impacted  area 
• Warning 
• Evacuation 
• Search & Rescue 
• Provision of  medical care 
• Sheltering evacuees 
Indicator 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator k 
Indicator 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator k 
Indicator 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator k 
Indicator 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator k 
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Table 4.2 continued 
 
Disaster Phases’ Activities Capital Domains’ Indicators 
 Social Capital Economic Capital Physical Capital Human Capital 
IV: Disaster Recovery     
General definition: 
Disaster recovery comprises 
actions taken to repair, rebuild, 
and reconstruct damaged 
properties and to restore disrupted 
community social routines and 
economic activities 
 
Example of activities: 
(i) Relief & rehabilitation 
• Re-establishment of economic 
activities  
• Provision of housing, clothing, 
and food  
• Restoration of critical facilities 
• Restoration of essential 
community services 
(ii) Reconstruction 
• Rebuilding of major structure 
e.g. public buildings, roads, 
bridges, and dams 
• Revitalizing the economic 
system 
• Reconstruction of housing 
Indicator 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator k 
Indicator 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator k 
Indicator 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator k 
Indicator 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator k 
 
Note: k is the number of indicators 
 
4.3.2. Indicators of community capital domains 
Prior discussion in Chapter III clearly defined each disaster phase and identified 
activities associated with each phase. These have been reproduced in Table 4.2 in the first 
column. What has yet to be completely discussed are the four capital domains, particularly with 
the types of indicators often associated with each domain. The following discussion summarizes 
how each capital domain is measured in this study in relation to disaster phases’ activities. It is 
also important to stress that this discussion is of “raw” unstandardized data used to create the 
community disaster resilience index (CDRI). Later discussion will address how each measure is 
standardized. 
 
  
54 
(1) Indicators for measuring social capital 
Social capital is probably the most studied form of capital among the four major forms 
of capital. Numerous studies have attempted to measure social capital and to quantify its effects. 
However, because of its multiple components, which require a broad measurement strategy, 
measuring social capital and its effects becomes extremely difficult. Yet, social capital is a 
theoretical construct that can not be directly measured. For that reason, empirical studies have 
used a wide range of variables as a measure or indicators of social capital. 
While there is little consensus on the definition of social capital, at least there is an 
agreement among researchers that social capital is a group property rather than an individual 
property (Putnam, 2000). Therefore, social capital can best be measured by examining 
participation and involvement in social groups and civic engagement. For example, Putman 
(2000) has  suggested measuring social capital by using composite indicators containing 
measures of involvement in community and organizational life, public engagement such as 
informal socializing (e.g. visiting friends), and reported level of inter-personal trust. However, 
while many researchers consider trust to be a good measure of social capital, trust itself is 
difficult to measure (Keeley, 2007), particularly using secondary data sources. In many cases, 
researchers have argued that there is no universal measure of social capita that is comprehensive 
enough to capture all elements of social capital. 
Nonetheless, in relation to disaster phases’ activities, social capital in this study was 
measured using the following six components suggested in the literature. 
(i) Participation in voluntary organizations (Volunteerism): This component was 
measured using registered non profit organizations. 
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(ii) Involvement in social groups (Association densities): The involvement in social 
groups was measured using recreational centers (bowling centers, and fitness centers), 
golf clubs, and sport organizations. 
(iii) Civic and political participation: This social capital component was measured using 
three indicators: registered voters, civic and political organizations, and Census 
response rates for the decennial population and housing survey. 
(iv) Religious participation: Religious participation was measured using religious 
organizations. 
(v) Community attachment: The community attachment component was measured using 
owner-occupied housing units. 
(vi) Connection to working places: This element was measured using two indicators: 
professional organizations and business organizations. 
(2) Indicators for measuring economic capital 
Economic capital means different things to different people, and many researchers have 
defined and measured economic capital differently (Keeley, 2007; Smith et al., 2001). For the 
purpose of this study, economic capital is broadly defined as financial resources that people use 
to support their livelihoods (DFID, 1999). It includes savings, income, investments, and credit. 
The literature suggests a variety of ways in which economic capital can be measured (Keeley, 
2007). In this study, economic capital was measured using five components:  
(i) Income: Income was measured using two indicators: per-capita income and median 
household income. Both per capita income and household median income were 
utilized mainly because the income distribution is skewed. 
(ii) Employment: The employment component was measured using the percentage of 
people who are employed. 
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(iii) Property value: This component was measured using the median value of owner-
occupied housing units. 
(iv) Business: The business component was measured using business establishments. 
(v) Health insurance: The health insurance component was measured using the 
percentage of people with health insurance. 
(3) Indicators for measuring physical capital 
Of the five major forms of capital, physical capital is probably the least studied form of 
capital in the literature that was reviewed. There is not much discussion in the literature on how 
it should be measured. However, in this study physical capital is loosely defined as the total built 
environment that helps people to support their livelihoods (DFID, 1999). It comprises of 
residential housing, commercial and industrial buildings, and public buildings, roads, bridges, 
dams, and levees. Also, it includes lifelines such as electricity, water, and telephone, and critical 
facilities such as hospitals, schools, fire and police stations, nursing homes, and emergency 
shelters. It is also important to note that most of the physical capital indicators utilized in this 
study were measured using establishments (rate). According to the U.S. Census an establishment 
is a single physical location at which business is conducted and/or service are provided. It is not 
necessarily identical with a company or enterprise, which may consist of one establishment or 
more (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). Also note that the classifications and grouping of indicators 
are based on similarities of the indicators and/or the activities they can successfully perform. 
In relation to disaster phases’ activities, physical capital was measured using the 
following components:  
(i) Construction: The construction component was measured using five indicators: 
building construction establishments, heavy and civil engineering construction 
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establishments, highway, street, and bridge construction establishments, utility 
systems establishments and architecture and engineering establishments. 
(ii) Environment: The environment component was measured using two indicators: 
environmental consulting establishments and environmental and conservation 
establishments.  
(iii) Land and building regulations: This component was measured using three indicators: 
land subdivision establishments, legal services establishments, and building inspection 
establishments. 
(iv) Land use planning: The land use planning component was measured using landscape 
architecture and planning establishments. 
(v) Property insurance: This component was measured using property and causality 
insurance establishments 
(vi) Research: The research component was measured using scientific research and 
development establishments. 
(vii)  College: The college component was measured using colleges, universities, and 
professional schools. 
(viii) Housing: The housing component was measured using two indicators: occupied 
housing units and vacant housing units.  
(ix) Critical facilities: This component was measured using eight indicators: hospitals, 
hospital beds, ambulances, fires stations, schools, licensed child care facilities, nursing 
homes, and hotels and motels.  
(x) Transportation: The transportation component was measured using three indicators: 
occupied housing units with a vehicle available, special need transportation services, 
and school and employee buses. 
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(xi) Communication: The communication component was measured using five indicators: 
occupied housing units with telephone services, newspaper publishers, radio stations, 
television stations, and internet providers. 
(xii) Emergency shelter and relief services: This component was measured using three 
indicators: temporary shelters, community housing, and community food services’ 
facilities. 
 (4) Indicators for measuring human capital 
Literature shows that there is little agreement among researchers on the definition of 
human capital or how it should be measured (Keeley, 2007). Many researchers have defined and 
measured human capital in different ways using different indicators. However, two most 
commonly used measures of human capital suggested in the literature are: (1) educational 
attainment of population, which is measured using the number of years of formal schooling of 
the working-age population, and (2) health, which is measured through self reported health status 
and life expectancy (Keeley, 2007). In relation to disaster phases human capital in this study was 
measured using three components: (i) educational attainment, (ii) health, and (iii) labor force 
(human resources). 
(1) Education attainment: The education component was measured using percentage of 
population with more than high school education. 
(2) Health: The health component was measured using two indicators: physicians and health 
care support workers. 
(3) Labor force (human resources): The labor force component in relation to disaster phase’s 
activities was measured using the following sub-components: 
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(i) Construction: This sub-component was measured using four indicators: building 
construction workers, heavy and civil engineering construction workers, architecture 
and engineering workers, and highway, street, and bridge  construction workers 
(ii) Environment: The environment sub-component was measured using two indicators: 
environmental consulting workers and environmental and conservation workers.  
(iii) Land and building regulations: This sub-component was measured using three 
indicators: land subdivision workers, population employed in legal services, and 
building inspectors. 
(iv)  Land use planning: The planning sub-component was measured using landscape 
architects and planners. 
(v) Property insurance: This sub-component was measured using property and causality 
insurance workers. 
(vi) Mitigation: The mitigation sub-component was measured using five indicators:  
FEMA community rating system (CRS) score, comprehensive plans, zoning 
regulations, FEMA approved mitigation plans, and building codes. 
(vii) Citizen protection: The citizen protection sub-component was measured using the 
population employed as fire fighters, prevention, and law enforcement workers. 
(viii) Research: The research sub-component was measured using the population employed 
in scientific research and development services. 
(ix) College: The professional sub-component was measured using population employed 
in colleges, universities, and professional school. 
(x) Language: The language sub-component was measured using the population that 
speaks English language very well. 
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(xi) Transportation: The transportation sub-component was measured using the 
population employed in special need transportation services. 
(xii) Community and social services: This sub-component was measured using community 
and social workers. 
4.3.3. Selected set of indicators for measuring disaster resilience 
 Initially, using the theoretical framework (Table 4.2), more than 120 indicators based on 
community capitals were identified that seemed theoretically relevant to the various disaster 
phases’ activities. However, after further evaluation of each individual indicator using a 
reliability method (internal consistency) which will be discussed at greater length in Chapter V, 
only 75 indicators met the selection criteria. Table 4.3 presents the final set of selected indicators 
summarized by capital domains vis-à-vis disaster phases. In fact Table 4.3 is a new version of 
the framework matrix (Table 4.2). The rows represent the four community capitals’ indicators 
and the columns represent the disaster phases’ activities. In total, there are 75 indicators 
representing four types of capital: social capital, which consists of 9 indicators, economic capital 
(6), physical capital (35), and human capital (25).  
The relevance of indicators to various disaster phases’ activities is indicated by 1 and 0. 
A cell labeled 1 in Table 4.3 indicates that an indicator or set of indicators was used to develop a 
particular disaster phase sub-index. A cell labeled 0 indicates that an indicator or set of indicators 
was not used in creating that particular disaster phase sub-index. It is also important to note that 
during the indicator selection process, it became clear that social and economic capital indicators 
are critical to all disaster phases’ activities. As shown in Table 4.3, each cell is labeled 1 in all 
social and economic capital indicators against all four disaster phases’ activities. This indicates 
that these indicators are relevant to all disaster phases. As an example of the relevance of 
indicators, consider indicator # 31. Hospital (indicator # 31) is labeled 0 under hazard mitigation 
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but the same indicator has been labeled 1 under disaster response, which indicates that hospital 
as an indicator is less relevant to hazard mitigation but is more relevant to disaster response. 
 
Table 4.3. The final set of selected indicators used to construct the CDRI 
 
Index item Mitigation Preparedness Response Recovery 
I: Social capital indicators     
(1) Nonprofit organizations registered with the IRS 1 1 1 1 
(2) Recreational centers(bowling, fitness, golf clubs) and sport organizations 1 1 1 1 
(3) Registered voters  1 1 1 1 
(4) Civic and political organizations 1 1 1 1 
(5) Census response rates 1 1 1 1 
(6) Religious organizations 1 1 1 1 
(7) Owner-occupied housing units  1 1 1 1 
(8) Professional organizations 1 1 1 1 
(9) Business organizations 1 1 1 1 
II: Economic capital indicators     
(10) Per capita income  1 1 1 1 
(11) Median household income  1 1 1 1 
(12) Employed civilian population  1 1 1 1 
(13) Median value  of owner-occupied housing units  1 1 1 1 
(14) Business establishments 1 1 1 1 
(15) Population with health insurance 1 1 1 1 
III: Physical capital indicators     
(16) Building construction establishments 1 0 0 1 
(17) Heavy and civil engineering construction establishments 1 0 0 1 
(18) Highway, street, and bridge construction establishments 1 0 0 0 
(19) Architecture and engineering establishments 1 1 0 1 
(20) Land subdivision establishments 1 0 0 0 
(21) Legal services establishments 1 0 0 0 
(22) Property and causality insurance establishments 1 0 0 0 
(23) Building inspection establishments 1 0 0 0 
(24) Landscape architecture and planning establishments 1 0 0 0 
(25) Environmental consulting establishments 1 0 0 0 
(26) Environment and conservation establishments 1 0 0 0 
(27) Scientific research and development establishments 0 1 0 0 
(28) Colleges, Universities, and Professional schools 0 1 0 0 
(29) Housing units 0 0 1 0 
(30) Vacant housing units 0 0 1 0 
(31) Hospitals 0 0 1 0 
(32) Hospital beds 0 0 1 0 
(33) Ambulances 0 0 1 0 
(34) Fire stations 0 0 1 0 
(35) Nursing homes 0 0 1 0 
(36) Hotels and motels 0 0 1 0 
(37) Occupied housing units with vehicle available 0 0 1 0 
(38) Special need transportation services 0 0 1 0 
(39) School and employee buses 0 0 1 0 
(40) Owner-occupied housing units with telephone service  0 0 1 0 
(41) Newspaper publishers 0 0 1 0 
(42) Radio stations 0 0 1 0 
(43) Television broadcasting 0 0 1 0 
(44) Internet service providers 0 0 1 0 
(45) Temporary shelters 0 0 1 0 
(46) Community housing  0 0 1 0 
(47) Community food service facilities 0 0 1 0 
(48) Schools 0 0 1 0 
(49) Licensed child care facilities 0 0 1 0 
(50) Utility systems construction establishments 0 0 0 1 
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Table 4.3 continued 
 
Index item Mitigation Preparedness Response Recovery 
IV: Human capital indicators     
(51) Population with more than high school education 1 1 1 1 
(52) Physicians 1 1 1 1 
(53) Health care support workers 1 0 0 0 
(54) Building construction workers 1 0 0 1 
(55) Heavy and civil engineering construction workers 1 0 0 1 
(56) Architecture and engineering workers 1 0 0 1 
(57) Environmental consulting workers 1 0 0 0 
(58) Environment and conservation  workers 1 0 0 0 
(59) Land subdivision workers 1 0 0 0 
(60) Building inspectors 1 0 0 1 
(61) Landscape architects and planners 1 1 1 0 
(62) Property and causality insurance workers 1 0 0 0 
(63) Highway, street, and bridge construction workers 1 0 0 1 
(64) Population employed in legal services 1 0 0 0 
(65) Percentage of population covered  by comprehensive plan 1 0 0 0 
(66) Percentage of  population covered  by zoning regulations 1 0 0 0 
(67) Percentage of  population covered  by building codes 1 0 0 0 
(68) Percentage of population covered by FEMA approved mitigation plan 1 0 0 0 
(69) Community rating system(CRS) scores 1 0 0 0 
(70) Fire fighters, prevention, and law enforcement workers 0 1 1 0 
(71) Population employed in scientific research and development services 0 1 0 0 
(72) Colleges, universities, and professional schools employees 0 1 0 0 
(73) Population that speaks english language very well 0 1 1 1 
(74) Population employed in special need transportation services 0 0 1 0 
(75) Community and social workers 0 0 0 1 
 
Note: (1) Most of the physical capital indicators were measured using establishments. According to the U.S. Census an establishment 
is a single physical location at which business is conducted and/or service are provided. It is not necessarily identical with a company 
or enterprise, which may consists of one establishment or more. 
(2) Indicators were standardized by percentage or rate (per 1000) 
 
The selected set of indicators is also more elaborated and included in Appendix B. The 
first column of each Table in Appendix B describes the activities that should be undertaken 
during a particular disaster phase.  The second column shows the components that were used to 
measure a capital domain in relation to the disaster phase’s activities, while the third column lists 
the specific indicators for each component. The indicators are further grouped into two major 
categories; generic indictors and specific indicators. Generic indicators refer to those indicators 
which are relevant to all disaster phases. For example, education as an indicator is important or 
relevant to all disaster phases. Specific indicators are those indicators which are only relevant to 
a specific type of disaster phase. For example, building code as an indicator is more relevant to 
measuring hazard mitigation than disaster response. As mentioned previously, unlike physical 
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and human capital indicators, social and economic capital indicators are relevant to all disaster 
phases. Thus, all social and economic capital indicators fall under generic category. 
4.4. Procedures for calculating the sub-index and CDRI scores 
A four-step procedure was employed in calculating the CDRI and sub-index scores: (i) 
scale adjustment of indicators, (ii) standardization or normalization, (iii) creation of 16 sub-
indices, and (iv) creation of the CDRI. These four steps are described below. 
Step 1: Scale adjustment of indicators 
The first step in calculating the sub-index scores and CDRI was to perform a scale 
adjustment of the selected indicators. From the mathematical point of view, it is important to do 
a scale adjustment before performing the mathematical combination of indicators so as to put the 
indicators in a common scale. Typically, indicators should be adjusted to a common dimensional 
scale e.g., number of deaths per live births (Freudenberg, 2003). Indicators in this study were 
adjusted by population size. The indicators were converted into either percentage or rate (per 
1000), depending on the type of an indicator and the unit of measurement.  The rate of per 1000 
was chosen because given the ranges of values of the indicators this rate seemed a reasonable 
adjustment measure in order to avoid obtaining small fractions of numbers after adjusting the 
scale.  
Step 2: Standardizing indicators 
Data used to measure indicators come from different sources in a variety of statistical 
units, such as dollars, miles, degrees, hours, and number of people. To avoid adding up apples 
and oranges, it is imperative to standardize or normalize them before they are aggregated into a 
composite index. In addition, indicators are normalized in order to avoid having extreme values 
dominate and also to minimize the  potential problems of data quality (Freudenberg, 2003; 
  
64 
Nardo et al., 2005). Most importantly, indicators are normalized or standardized in order to 
provide a way of comparing them that includes consideration of their distribution (Abdi, 2007). 
Several methods have been suggested in the literature that can be used to standardize or 
normalize indicators such as Z-score, Minimum-Maximum, and Distance from the mean 
(Briguglio, 2003; Freudenberg, 2003; Nardo et al., 2005). Each of these methods has its own 
advantages and disadvantages. For the purpose of this study a z-score method was used to 
standardize the selected set of indicators. The z-score is given by equation 4.1 (Freudenberg, 
2003). 
Z-Score = 




 −
Deviation Standard
Value MeanValue Actual
      (4.1) 
The z-score method was chosen mainly because it is one of the most commonly used 
methods, which reflects its relevance and strength in standardizing indicators. In addition, the z-
score method was preferred over other methods because it converts all indicators to a common 
scale (Abdi, 2007). So, the z-scores computed from different samples with different 
measurement units can be directly compared because these numbers do not express the original 
unit of measurements (Abdi, 2007; Freudenberg, 2003). 
One of the major limitations of other methods such as Minim-Maximum method is that the 
scaling factor is based on range rather than standard deviation (Freudenberg, 2003). As a result 
extreme values such as outliers can have a large impact on the overall index, and hence 
misrepresent the results.  
Step 3: Creation of 16 sub-indices 
The first step in creating the CDRI was to combine indicators to create sub-indices. As 
mentioned earlier, the conceptual matrix (Table 4.2) denotes 16 cells. Each cell represents a 
disaster phase/capital domain sub-index. Conceptually 16 sub-indices can be created from the 
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framework. However, because social and economic capitals both have the same set of indicators 
there are only 10 disaster phase/capital domain sub-indices. Thus, based on the conceptual 
matrix (Table 4.2) a total of 18 sub-indices can be created using three different “permutations” or 
approaches as referred to in this dissertation, to develop the final CDRI.  These 18 sub-indices 
are listed in Table 4.4. Approach one consists of 4 capital domain sub-indices, approach two (10 
disaster phase/capital domain sub-indices), and approach three (4 disaster phase sub-indices).  
 
Table 4.4. The list of 18 sub-indices used to create CDRI 
1 Approach 1(Capital domain )  
 Social capital 
  Economic capital 
 Physical capital 
 Human capital 
       CDRI-1 
2 Approach 2 (Disaster phase/capital domain)  
 Social capital 
 Economic capital 
 Physical capital-hazard mitigation 
 Human capital-hazard mitigation 
 Physical capital-disaster preparedness 
 Human capital-disaster preparedness 
 Physical capital-disaster response 
 Human capital-disaster response 
 Physical capital-disaster recovery 
 Human capital-disaster recovery 
  CDRI-2 
3 Approach 3 (Disaster phases)  
 Hazard mitigation 
 Disaster preparedness 
 Disaster response 
 Disaster recovery 
  CDRI-3 
 
Although there are three different ways in which indicators can be combined to create the 
overall community disaster resilience index (CDRI), this research focuses on the first approach, 
which is based on capital domains. This is because there is a conceptual and/or methodological 
problem regarding approaches two and three. Conceptually, indicators of the second and third 
approach are counted more than once. Given the fact that these indicators can be relevant to 
more than one disaster phase, double counting becomes inevitable. Double counting of indicators 
should always be avoided because of the potential for bias. However, one may also argue that, if 
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an indicator is relevant to all four disaster phases for example, this will imply that such an 
indicator is more important than say an indicator, which is relevant to only one disaster phase. It 
is also important to note that the problem of double counting arises only when these sub-indices 
are combined together to create the overall CDRI. However, there is no problem if individual 
sub-indices are used. While the primary focus of this dissertation is on CDRI-1, for comparison 
purposes all three approaches will be utilized. 
Step 4: Creation of CDRI 
Several mathematical aggregation methods have been suggested in the literature that can be 
utilized to calculate the final index score (Chakraborty, Tobin, & Montz, 2005; Vincent, 2004). 
In this study two mathematical aggregation methods were tested: The simple linear summation 
aggregation method (based on unequally weighted indicators) and the averaging method (based 
on equally weighted indicators). Using summation method the final score is obtained by simply 
adding up indicators whereas the score of averaging method is obtained by calculating the 
average of the indicators. The results of these two methods appeared to be similar but not 
identical. The averaging method seemed to yield better results than the simple linear summation 
method; therefore was used to calculate the sub-index and overall CDRI scores. Essentially, 
there are three reasons that make the average method more relevant to use than the simple linear 
summation method: 
(i) Each sub-index has a different number of indicators, so if indicators are simply 
added together; the final score will tend to be highly influenced by the sub-
indices with the highest numbers of indicators. That is, sub-indices with more 
indicators such as physical capital (35 indicators) will be weighted more heavily 
than the other sub-indices in the overall CDRI score. 
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(ii) The average method assumes equal weights among sub-indices. This assumption 
seems reasonable because, in essence, there is no theoretical reason to suggest 
that any of the capital domains (social, economic, physical, and human) or 
disaster phases’ activities (mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery) is 
more important than the other. 
(iii) Most importantly, the average method seemed to perform better with all the 
external criteria utilized in this study in assessing the validity of the CDRI.  
(a) Calculating sub-index score 
To obtain a score for each sub-index, indicators were aggregated by calculating an arithmetic 
mean score using equation 4.2. This is a general equation used to calculate the sub-indices’ 
scores. 
SI = 
N
Z
N
i
∑
= 1
          (4.2) 
Where: 
SI = Sub-index score 
Z = Standardized score of an indicator  
N = Number of indicators of a sub-index 
i = 1, 2, 3…..N 
So, for example, the mean score of economic capital sub-index (EC)1 is given by equation 4.3. 
EC = 
6
insurancebusshsg_valueemploymed_incoper_inco +++++
   (4.3) 
 
                                                 
1
 per_inco = per capita income; med_inco = median household income; employ = employed civilian 
population; hsg_value = median value of owner occupied housing units; buss = business establishments; 
insurance = population with health insurance. 
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(b) Calculating the overall CDRI score 
Utilizing the three approaches, the score for each CDRI was calculated as follows: 
(i) Approach 1: Capital based approach 
The capital based approach means that the CDRI was created based on four capital 
domain’s sub-indices; and is referred as CDRI-1. While CDRI-2 and CDRI-3 are based on 
counting of indicators more than once, indicators used to calculate CDRI-1 were counted only 
once. Four capital sub-indices with a total of 75 indicators were used to calculate the CDRI-1 
score using equation 4.4. The total number of indicators used to calculate the CDRI-1 score are 
summarized in Table 4.5. 
CDRI-1 = (SC+EC+PC+HC)/4         (4.4) 
Where: 
SC = Social capital sub-index 
EC = Economic capital sub-index 
PC = Physical capital sub-index 
HC = Human capital sub-index 
 
Table 4.5. Total number of indicators used to calculate CDRI-1 score 
 
 Capital domain sub-index Number of indicators 
1 Social capital 9 
2 Economic capital 6 
3 Physical capital 35 
4 Human capital 25 
Total  75 
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(ii) Approach 2: Disaster phase/capital domain approach 
The disaster phase/capital domain approach is the combination of capital domain’s sub-
indices and disaster phase’s sub-indices as shown in Table 4.6. The CDRI calculated using the 
disaster phase/capital domain approach is referred as CDRI-2 and consists of ten sub-indices. 
The CDRI-2 score was calculated by counting indicators of social capital and economic 
capital sub-indices only once even though they are relevant to all four phases of disaster whereas 
indicators for physical and human capital sub-indices were counted more than once depending 
on their relevance to disaster phases’ activities (see Table 4.3). Given the fact that indicators 
were counted more than once; in total CDRI-2 consists of 95 indicators and was calculated using 
equation 4.5. Table 4.6 summarizes the total number of indicators and sub-indices used to 
calculate the CDRI-2 score. 
 
CDRI-2 = [(SC+EC) +
48476Mitigation
)HCPC( + +
48476 ssPreparedne
)HCPC( + +
48476Response
)HCPC( + +
48476Recovery
)HCPC( + ]/10          (4.5) 
 
Where: 
SC = Social capital sub-index 
EC = Economic capital sub-index 
PC = Physical capital sub-index 
HC = Human capital sub-index 
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Table 4.6. Total number of indicators used to calculate CDRI-2 score 
 
 Capital domain sub-index Number of indicators 
1 Social capital 9 
2 Economic capital 6 
3 Physical capital-Mitigation 11 
4 Human capital-Mitigation 19 
5 Physical capital-Preparedness 3 
6 Human capital-Preparedness 7 
7 Physical capital-Response 21 
8 Human capital-Response 6 
9 Physical capital-Recovery 4 
10 Human capital-Recovery 9 
Total  95 
 
(iii) Approach 3: Disaster phase based approach 
The disaster phase approach, which is based on disaster phase’s sub-indices, is referred 
as CDRI-3. It was calculated using four disaster phase’s sub-indices as shown in Table 4.7 with a 
total of 140 indicators. This implies that indicators were counted more than once; depending on 
the relevance of an individual indicator to the disaster phases’ activities (see also Table 4.3). For 
example, social and economic capital indicators, which are relevant to all disaster phases’ 
activities were counted four times or, in other words, were given a weight of four. The advantage 
of CDRI-3 is that it enables the assessment of disaster resilience based on individual disaster 
phases’ activities, which could be very instrumental to emergency managers and planners in 
identifying areas where they can direct resources in building disaster-resilient communities. In 
addition, the CDRI-3 score can be used to compare levels of disaster resilience based on disaster 
phases across and within communities. The CDRI-3 score was calculated using equation 4.6. 
The total numbers of indicators and sub-indices used to calculate the CDRI-3 score are 
summarized in Table 4.7. 
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CDRI-3 = [
444 8444 76 Mitigation
)HCPCECSC( +++  +
444 8444 76 ssPreparedne
)HCPCECSC( +++  +
444 8444 76 Response
)HCPCECSC( +++  + 
 
444 8444 76 erycovRe
)HCPCECSC( +++ ]/4        (4.6) 
 
Where: 
SC = Social capital sub-index 
EC = Economic capital sub-index 
PC = Physical capital sub-index 
HC = Human capital sub-index 
 
Table 4.7. Total number of indicators used to calculate CDRI-3 score 
 
  Mitigation Preparedness Response Recovery 
1 Social capital 9 9 9 9 
2 Economic capital 6 6 6 6 
3 Physical capital 11 3 21 4 
4 Human capital 19 7 6 9 
Total  45 25 42 28 
 
 
4.5. Study region, unit of analysis, and data sources 
(i) Study region  
As mentioned previously in Chapter I, the study region for this research is the U.S. Gulf 
coast region. It was chosen because the region is one of the most vulnerable coastal regions in 
the nation to various weather related hazards such as hurricanes, tropical storms, and floods. The 
increasing hazard vulnerability in the U.S. Gulf coast region poses a challenge to planners and 
emergency managers on how to enhance local community coping capacities and foster disaster 
resilience within the region. This makes the U.S. Gulf coast region to be an excellent setting for 
studying disaster resilience at a regional scale. 
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This region extends from the Florida Keys westward to the Southern tip of Texas 
following the coast line of six states; Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and 
Texas (see Figure 4.1). More specifically, this study focuses on coastal counties of the U.S. Gulf 
coast region.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. The U.S. Gulf coast region (the green area depicts the coastal counties and parishes) 
 
According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) special 
projects’ office, the U.S. Gulf coast region has a total of 144 coastal counties and parishes 
(Crossett et al., 2004). Florida has the largest number of coastal counties (42) followed by Texas 
(41), Louisiana (38), Mississippi (12), Alabama (8) and lastly Georgia (3). Table 4.8 summarizes 
the total number of coastal counties and parishes for each state in the U.S Gulf coast region. 
 
 
U.S. Gulf Coast Region 
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Table 4.8. List of coastal counties and parishes of the U.S. Gulf coast region 
 
 
 
        
I Florida 31 Okaloosa 59 Lamar 89 St. Charles 119 Harris 
1 Bay 32 Pasco 60 Marion 90 St. Helena 120 Hidalgo 
2 Calhoun 33 Pinellas 61 Pearl River 91 St. James 121 Jackson 
3 Charlotte 34 Polk 62 Pike 92 St. John the Baptist 122 Jasper 
4 Citrus 35 Santa Rosa 63 Stone 93 St. Landry 123 Jefferson 
5 Collier 36 Sarasota 64 Walthall 94 St. Martin 124 Jim Hogg 
6 DeSoto 37 Sumter 65 Wilkinson 95 St. Mary 125 Jim Wells 
7 Dixie 38 Suwannee V Louisiana 96 St. Tammany 126 Kenedy 
8 Escambia 39 Taylor 66 Acadia 97 Tangipahoa 127 Kleberg 
9 Franklin 40 Wakulla 67 Ascension 98 Terrebonne 128 Lavaca 
10 Gadsden 41 Walton 68 Assumption 99 Vermilion 129 Liberty 
11 Gilchrist 42 Washington 69 Avoyelles 100 Vernon 130 Live Oak 
12 Glades II Georgia 70 Beauregard 101 Washington 131 Matagorda 
13 Gulf 43 Decatur 71 Calcasieu 102 West Baton Rouge 132 Newton 
14 Hardee 44 Grady 72 Cameron 103 West Feliciana 133 Nueces 
15 Hendry 45 Thomas 73 East Baton Rouge VI Texas 134 Orange 
16 Hernando III Alabama 74 East Feliciana 104 Aransas 135 Refugio 
17 Hillsborough 46 Baldwin 75 Evangeline 105 Austin 136 San Patricio 
18 Holmes 47 Clarke 76 Iberia 106 Bee 137 Starr 
19 Jackson 48 Covington 77 Iberville 107 Brazoria 138 Tyler 
20 Jefferson 49 Escambia 78 Jefferson 108 Brooks 139 Victoria 
21 Lafayette 50 Geneva 79 Jefferson Davis 109 Calhoun 140 Waller 
22 Lake 51 Mobile 80 Lafayette 110 Cameron 141 Washington 
23 Lee 52 Monroe 81 Lafourche 111 Chambers 142 Webb 
24 Leon 53 Washington 82 Livingston 112 Colorado 143 Wharton 
25 Levy IV Mississippi 83 Orleans 113 DeWitt 144 Willacy 
26 Liberty 54 Amite 84 Plaquemines 114 Duval   
27 Madison 55 George 85 Pointe Coupee 115 Fayette   
28 Manatee 56 Hancock 86 Rapides 116 Fort Bend   
29 Marion 57 Harrison 87 Sabine 117 Galveston   
30 Monroe 58 Jackson 88 St. Bernard 118 Goliad   
          
 
 
NOAA’s special projects office defines a county as coastal if one of the following two 
criteria is met: (1) at a minimum, 15% of the county’s total land area is located within a coastal 
watershed or, (2) a portion of, or an entire county accounts for at least 15% of a coastal 
cataloging unit. According to the U.S. Geologic Survey, hydrologic units are classified at four 
levels: regions, sub-regions, accounting units, and cataloging units. A cataloging unit is the 
smallest hydrologic unit in this hierarchy (Crossett et al., 2004). 
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(ii) Unit of analysis 
As mentioned earlier, a county is the unit of analysis for this study. A county was chosen 
mainly because (with the exception of Texas) it is often where local decisions on community 
mitigation measures and risk reduction programs are directed. In additional, data at county scale 
are available and relatively easy to access. 
However, the use of a county as the unit of analysis has some limitations. First, while 
some counties are limited in political powers, others are powerful central political units (Zahran, 
Brody, Kim, & Vedlitz, 2006). Second, counties vary considerably in geographical and 
population sizes. For example, Harris county (Texas) which includes Houston metropolitan area 
has a population of more than three million people whereas Kenedy county (Texas) has a total 
population of about four hundred people. Small counties such as Kenedy are more likely to be 
overshadowed by big counties such as Harris. Third, measuring disaster resilience at a county 
level is generally problematic because a county is not often considered as a real social unit. Few 
people think of a county as their community. This is because social interactions and networks 
take place in communities not counties. Nonetheless, taking into account all these factors, a 
county appeared to be a reasonable unit of analysis to explore the concept of disaster resilience 
both in terms of spatial and non-spatial dimensions. 
(iii) Data sources 
One of the critical elements of any research is the issue of data availability. Like any 
other research in social science, this research was somewhat shaped by the issue of data 
availability. Generally, the indicator selection was partly limited by the unavailability of data. 
Data for some potential indicators were not available or not easily accessible; for example, data 
on emergency response plans, disaster recovery plans, certified floodplain managers, certified 
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planners, community emergency response teams, and volunteers. Most of these data can only be 
obtained by conducting a field survey.  
In general, data for this study were obtained from a variety of secondary sources. 
However, most data were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau; specifically from the County 
Business Patterns. Other main sources of data for this study included the U.S. Fire 
Administration, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Department of 
Education, the National Child Care Information Center, the International Code Council, the 
Association of Religious Data Archives, the National Center for Charitable Statistics, the FEMA 
National Flood Insurance Program, and the NOAA Coastal Risk Atlas.  Also, data were obtained 
from the Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States (SHELDUS), the 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and various county and city websites. The 
data sources for each indicator used in this study are included in Appendix C.  
4.6. Summary 
In this chapter, a review of the use of indicators and indices was conducted, a final set of 
indicators was generated, three approaches for combining and aggregating the indicators to 
calculate the sub-indices and the overall CDRI scores were developed and finally a study region, 
a unit of analysis, and data sources were introduced. The following bullets summarize the key 
points from this chapter. 
• The literature suggests that indices are a useful tool because of their ability to simplify 
complex data into a simpler way so that both experts and non-experts can understand 
them. However, poorly constructed indices can also provide misleading information; so 
indices should be interpreted with great caution. 
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• The theoretical framework or matrix developed for selecting indicators (see Table 4.2) is 
an easy and effective way to identify relevant disaster resilience indicators based on 
capital domains/disaster phases. 
• A total of 75 disaster resilience indicators representing four capital domains was 
selected: Social capital (9), economic capital (6), physical capital (35), and human 
capital (25).  
• Based on the conceptual matrix it became clear that social and economic capital 
indicators play an important role in undertaking all disaster phases’ activities whereas 
physical and human capital indicators are relevant to specific disaster phases’ activities. 
• Three approaches were developed to aggregate the selected indicators and calculate the 
sub-indices and overall CDRI scores. Putting aside the conceptual limitations of CDRI-2 
and CDRI-3, the approaches seem useful for comparison purposes. 
• The overall CDRI scores were calculated using the average method, which is based on 
equal weighting of sub-indices and seemed to provide better results than the summation 
method. 
• A county seems a reasonable unit of analysis to use for this type of research mainly 
because of easy data availability and is where hazard mitigation plans and risk reduction 
programs are directed 
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CHAPTER V 
RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 
5.1. Introduction 
Chapter IV presented and discussed the selected set of indicators, and the method used 
to calculate the sub-indices and the overall CDRI scores. This chapter will discuss the 
procedures used to assess the reliability of the sub-indices and CDRIs as measures of disaster 
community resilience. 
Generally, reliability is concerned with consistency of a set of measurements or 
measuring instruments (Babbie, 2005; Carmines & Zeller, 1979). One way of assessing 
reliability of a composite index is to examine the internal consistency of individual indicators 
within the index on how they relate to the overall index score (Norusis, 2005).  In this respect the 
greater the internal consistency (correlation), the more reliable the measure (Norusis, 2005). 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were utilized in assessing the reliability of the CDRI and sub-
indices.  
The reliability assessment was employed to assess the internal consistency of the 
indicators as well as to facilitate the selection of indicators. Indicators were selected based on 
their performances in terms of the overall internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha level) and 
inter-item correlations. Additionally, the reliability assessment helped to examine whether the 
sub-indices had adequate precision. To ensure that the sub-indices had adequate precision, 
indicators that exhibited low “Corrected item-Total correlation” statistics were dropped from the 
scale. Corrected item-total correlation is the correlation of an item with the sum score of all other 
items in a scale (Norusis, 2005). This helped to maximize the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of 
the sub-indices. 
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5.2. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of the sub-indices 
Cronbach’s alpha is given by equation 5.1 (Norusis, 2005). 
α = 
1−κ
κ










−
∑
varianceScale
variancesitem
1        (5.1) 
Where  κ  = Number of items or indicators 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients can vary from zero to one; where one denotes perfect 
reliability and zero a very unreliable measure. While there is little agreement on the 
interpretation of alpha or what constitutes an acceptable level of alpha that is, even a low level of 
alpha may still be useful (Schmitt, 1996), a great body of literature suggests that for the early 
stages of research a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient approaching .70 is acceptable (Norusis, 2005). 
Given the fact that research on disaster resilience in the hazards and disasters field is at its infant 
stage, it is therefore reasonable to use the alpha level of about .70 as a basic standard to ascertain 
the reliability of the overall index and sub-indices for this study.  
As discussed in Chapter IV, the conceptual matrix (Table 4.2) was used as a guide for 
selecting indicators in this study, which conceptually represents 16 disaster phase/capital domain 
sub-indices. However, because social and economic capitals both have the same set of 
indicators; this reduces the number to only 10 sub-indices (See Table 5.1). Therefore, the 
reliability analysis focused on maximizing the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of the 10 sub-
indices. Indicators which appeared not to perform well were dropped until the reasonable 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of a sub-index was attained. The final total number of indicators for 
each sub-index is included in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1.Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of the sub-indices used in indicator selection 
 
Sub-index Item Alpha 
Social capital 9 .659 
Economic capital 6 .914 
Physical capital-Mitigation 11 .771 
Human capital-Mitigation 19 .693 
Physical capital-Preparedness 3 .571 
Human capital-Preparedness 7 .530 
Physical capital-Response 21 .624 
Human capital-Response 6 .466 
Physical capital-Recovery 4 .651 
Human capital-Recovery 9 .630 
   
 
The results show that the highest Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is exhibited by economic 
capital sub-index (alpha = .914), followed by the physical capital-mitigation (alpha = .771), 
human capital-mitigation (alpha = .693), social capital (alpha = .659), physical capital-recovery 
(alpha = .651), Human capital-recovery (alpha = .630), and physical capital- response (alpha = 
.624). Generally, these sub-indices demonstrated a relatively high level of internal consistency, 
which implies that these measures are reliable. 
Also, as can be observed from Table 5.1, the lowest alpha is exhibited by three sub-
indices: human capital-response (alpha = .466), human capital-preparedness (alpha =.530), and 
physical capital-preparedness (alpha = .571). Based on the threshold of a Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient of about .70, these alpha coefficients are relatively low. From a reliability analysis 
point of view, these results imply that these measures have comparatively low precision but are 
reasonable to use for this type of exploratory research. The next section discusses the inter-item 
correlations of each sub-index. 
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5.3. Inter-item correlations 
This section examines the inter-item correlations among indicators for each sub-index. 
The results are presented in Tables 5.2 through 5.11. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 present the results of 
inter-item correlations for social capital and economic capital indicators, respectively. As 
expected, the economic capital indicators (Table 5.3), are all positively correlated and significant 
(p ≤  .01). In contrast with the economic capital indicators, some of the social capital indicators 
(Table 5.2) are negatively correlated, or positively correlated but not statistically significant. For 
example, professional organization is negatively correlated with religious organization, but the 
correlation is not statistically significant. However, overall, more than 50% of the social capital 
indicators are positively correlated and statistically significant (p ≤  .05, p ≤  .01) as expected. 
 
Table 5.2. Inter-item correlations among social capital indicators 
 
 Social capital indicators 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Religious organizations (1)         
Business organizations (2) .209b        
Professional organizations (3) -.039 .302a       
Non profit organizations (4) .402a .492a .321a      
Home owners (5) .123 .017 -.012 .061     
Registered voters (6) .037 .071 .254a .160 .614a    
Census response rate (7) -.215a -.101 .185b .012 .157 .216a   
Recreational centers (8) .062 .238a .237a .426a .204b .199b .220a  
Civic & political organizations (9) -.058 .239a .354a .451a .021 -.013 .159 .351a 
 
Note:  a Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed);  b Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 5.3. Inter-item correlations among economic capital indicators 
 
 Economic capital indicators  1 2 3 4 5 
Per-capita income (1)      
Median household income (2) .807a     
Population employed (3) .681a .674a    
Median home value (4) .836a .738a .626a   
Business establishments (5) .691a .430a .542a .695a  
Population with health insurance (6) .646a .574a .621a .550a .485a 
 
Note:  a Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
The results of the inter-item correlations for the physical capital-mitigation sub-index 
and human capital-mitigation sub-index are presented in Tables 5.4 and 5.5, respectively.  
Overall, more than 60% of the indicators of physical capital-mitigation sub-index are statistically 
significant and positively correlated (see Table 5.4). In comparison with the physical-capital-
mitigation sub-index, the human capital-mitigation sub-index (Table 5.5) has a fairly low 
number of positive and significant correlations (about 34%). Based on these results, physical 
capital-mitigation indicators performed better in terms of internal consistency than the indicators 
of human capital-mitigation sub-index. 
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Table 5.4. Inter-item correlations among physical capital-mitigation indicators 
 
 Physical capital-mitigation indicators 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Building construction establishments (1)           
Heavy & civil engineering construction establishments (2) .274a          
Highway, street, and bridge  construction establishments (3) .005 .323a         
Architecture and engineering establishments (4) .682a .182b -.045        
Land subdivision establishments (5) .700a .271a -.068 .465a       
Legal services establishments (6) .450a .050 -.041 .690a .347a      
Property and causality insurance companies (7) .176b .028 .020 .286a .016 .394a     
Building inspections establishments (8) .552a .151 -.137 .540a .323a .240a -.004    
Landscape architecture and planning establishments (9) .526a .075 -.202b .473a .498a .362a .182b .367a   
Environmental consulting establishments (10) .312a .111 -.065 .446a .275a .409a .209b .221a .325a  
Environment and conservation organizations (11) .200b -.021 .005 .124 .229a .068 .025 .184b .447a .251a 
 
Note: a Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); b Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 5.5. Inter-item correlations among human capital-mitigation indicators 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
 
1                   
2 .372a                  
3 -.276a -.137                 
4 .331a -.038 -.325a                
5 .074 .033 -.130 .225a               
6 .198b .451a -.383a .360a .191b              
7 .108 -.072 -.209b .051 .039 .102             
8 .044 .010 -.002 .066 .306a -.108 .096            
9 .283a .090 -.106 .093 -.014 .031 .205b .030           
10 .111 -.071 -.060 .222a .021 -.001 .082 .068 .000          
11 .163 .074 .010 .042 -.050 -.100 .148 .371a .183b .180b         
12 .061 .098 .052 -.015 -.011 .036 -.014 -.065 -.074 -.091 -.030        
13 .073 -.092 -.077 .187b .782a .007 -.032 .435a -.052 -.077 -.084 -.025       
14 .231a .722a -.157 -.051 .065 .335a .147 -.029 .156 .003 .076 .096 -.130      
15 .484a .315a -.117 .077 .023 -.035 -.038 .207b .271a .119 .224a .041 .116 .144     
16 .409a .351a -.091 .086 .080 .065 -.043 .178b .225a .125 .220a .028 .098 .186b .911a    
17 .307a .353a -.227a .122 .115 .205b .152 -.013 .080 .061 .063 .011 .067 .342a .476a .450a   
18 .370a .149 -.330a .136 .105 .294a .067 -.077 .074 .051 -.086 .081 .028 .182b .070 .078 .304a  
19 .539a .579a -.231a .121 -.008 .372a .021 .013 .199b -.046 .176b .057 -.064 .384a .473a .447a .408a .168b 
 
Note: a Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); b Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
Population with more than high school education (1); Physicians (2); Health care support workers (3); Building construction workers (4); Heavy and civil engineering construction workers 
(5);  Architecture and engineering  workers (6); Environmental consulting workers (7); Environment and  conservation workers (8); Land subdivision workers (9); Building inspectors (10); 
Landscape architectures and planners (11); Property and causality insurance workers (12); Highway, Street, and bridge construction workers (13); Population employed in legal  services 
(14); Percentage of population covered by comprehensive plan (15); Percentage of population covered by zoning regulations (16); Percentage of population covered by building codes (17); 
Percentage of population covered by FEAM approved mitigation plans (18); FEMA community rating  system (CRS) scores (19). 
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Tables 5.6 and 5.7 show the results of the inter-item correlations of physical capital-
preparedness and human capital-preparedness sub-indices, respectively. As shown in Table 5.6, 
the inter-item correlations of physical capital-preparedness are all positively correlated and 
significant as expected. In contrast with the physical capital-preparedness, the indicators of 
human capital-preparedness have a fairly low number of positive and statistically significant 
correlations (about 29%), which reflects its low level of Cronbach’s alpha (.530). This result 
suggests that human capital-preparedness sub-index has a relatively low but reasonable internal 
consistency. 
 
Table 5.6. Inter-item correlations among physical capital-preparedness indicators 
 
 Physical capital -preparedness 1 2  
Scientific research and development services (1)    
College, universities, and professional schools (2)  .380a   
Landscape architecture and planning services (3) .341a .201b  
 
Note: a Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); b Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 5.7. Inter-item correlations among human capital-preparedness indicators 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Population with more than high school education (1)       
Physicians (2) .372a      
Fire fighting, prevention, and law enforcement workers (3) .097 -.226a     
Landscape architectures and planners (4) .163 .074 .075    
Scientific research and development services workers (5) .202b .314a .034 .047   
Colleges, universities, and professional schools workers (6) .105 .396a -.009 .004 .184b  
Population that speaks English very well (7) .732a .119 .052 .010 .117 .056 
 
Note: a Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); b Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
Tables 5.8 through 5.11 summarize the results of inter-item correlations of the following sub-
indices: physical capital-response, human capital-response, physical capital-recovery, and human 
capital-recovery. The results show that the following sub-indices generally demonstrated a fairly 
low number of significant and positively correlated indicators: physical capital-response sub-
index, which has only 23% of significant positive correlations (Table 5.8), human capital-
response sub-index, which has about 33% of positive and statistically significant correlations 
(Table 5.9), and human-capital recovery sub-index, which has about 39% of positive and 
significant correlations (Table 5.11).  These results imply that these sub-indices have relatively 
low but reasonable internal consistency. 
 The physical capital-recovery sub-index (Table 5.10) has a comparatively high 
percentage of indicators that are statistically significant and positively correlated (more than 
60%). This result indicates that physical capital-recovery sub-index has high internal consistency 
when compared with other sub-indices discussed above. 
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Table 5.8. Inter-item correlations among physical capital-response indicators 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1                     
2 .869a                    
3 -.066 -.087                   
4 .018 -.217a .278a                  
5 .140 .224a -.005 -.069                 
6 .034 .043 .113 -.022 -.048                
7 -.001 -.031 .281a .017 -.158 .142               
8 .374a .359a -.012 .015 .266a -.072 -.064              
9 .511a .183b -.054 .041 -.027 .121 .085 -.023             
10 .272a .299a .189b .053 .230a -.085 -.102 .294a .071            
11 .006 -.004 .141 .123 -.078 .189b -.096 -.008 .008 -.040           
12 .511a .171b -.045 .045 -.024 .101 .090 -.010 .993a .076 -.016          
13 .036 .119 .085 -.201b .424b .004 .190b .194b -.001 .045 .042 -.002         
14 .103 .011 .112 .323a .021 .065 .056 .428a -.060 -.039 -.029 -.056 .018        
15 .003 -.070 .049 .389a -.021 -.133 -.125 .071 -.170b -.014 -.028 -.158 -.246a .227a       
16 .139 -.062 .121 .292a -.113 -.072 .174b .101 .185b -.005 -.036 .192b -.138 .095 .226a      
17 .135 .153 -.024 .006 .132 -.054 -.204b .296a -.046 .324a -.070 -.031 .060 .107 .107 -.023     
18 .099 .073 .013 .123 .061 -.037 -.193b .277a -.092 .270a -.030 -.071 -.019 .189b .171b .061 .887a   
19 .140 .171b -.034 -.073 .030 .007 -.063 .257a .033 .249a -.057 .035 .015 .116 .033 -.082 .611a .610a   
20 .185b .446a .050 -.236a .083 .007 .192b -.044 -.306a .023 -.087 -.314a .230a -.100 -.174b -.134 .133 .043 .120  
21 .118 .047 -.103 .073 -.056 -.055 .115 .180b .126 .104 -.067 .144 .037 .114 .171b .115 .107 .136 .204b -.170a 
 
Note: a Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); b Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
Housing units (1); Vacant housing units (2); Hospitals (3); Hospital beds (4; Ambulances (5); Fire stations (6); Nursing homes (7); Hotels and Motels (8); Occupied housing units with vehicle available (9); Special 
need transportation services(10); School and employee buses (11); Occupied housing units with telephone service (12); Newspaper publishers (13); Radio stations (14); Television broadcasting (15); Internet service 
providers (16); Temporary shelters (17); Community housing (18); Community food services (19); Schools (20) Child care facilities (21) 
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Table 5.9. Inter-item correlations among human capital-response indicators 
 
 Human capital-response indicators 1 2 3 4 5 
Population with more than high school education (1)      
Physicians (2) .372a     
Fire fighting, prevention, and law enforcement workers (3) .097 -.226a    
Population that speaks English very well (4) .732a .119 .052   
Special need transportation services  workers (5) .080 -.032 .002 .061  
Landscape architectures and planners (6) .272a .340a .032 .035 .300a 
 
Note: a Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
  
 
 
Table 5.10. Inter-item correlations among physical capital-recovery indicators 
 
 Physical capital-recovery indicators 1 2 3 
 
Utility systems construction establishments (1)    
Architecture and engineering establishments (2) -.018   
Building construction establishments (3) -.035 .682a  
Heavy highway constructions establishments (4) .821a .182b .274a 
 
Note: a Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); b Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.11. Inter-item correlations among human capital-recovery indicators 
 
 
Human capital-recovery indicators 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Population with more than high school education (1)         
Physicians (2) .372a        
Population that speaks English very well (3) .732a .119       
Building construction workers (4)  .331a -.038 .318a      
Architecture and engineering  workers (5) .198b .451a .221a .360a     
Community and social workers (6) .139 .231a .090 -.101 .057    
Heavy highway construction workers (7) .074 .033 .106 .225a .191b .049   
Building inspectors (8) .111 -.071 .102 .222a -.001 .125 .021  
Highway, street, and bridge construction workers (9) .073 -.092 .100 .187b .007 .081 .782a -.077 
 
Note: a Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); b Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Overall, the results on the inter-item correlations indicate that the majority of the 
indicators exhibited positive and significant correlations. The highest average inter-item 
correlation is exhibited by economic capital sub-index (.640), followed by physical capital-
recovery (.318), physical capital-preparedness (.307), physical capital-mitigation (.235), social 
capital (.177), human capital-recovery (.159), human capital-preparedness (.139), human capital-
response (.127), human capital-mitigation (.106), and lastly physical capital-response (.073). The 
average inter-item correlation ranges from high to low, suggesting that in general the indicators 
are positively correlated. This implies that most of these indicators are at least somewhat 
consistent with each other.  
5.4. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of the CDRI 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients results for the three CDRIs developed and discussed 
in Chapter IV are summarized below. 
(i) Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for CDRI-1 
Table 5.12 presents the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients and the final total number of 
indicators used to construct the sub-indices and the overall CDRI-1. Table 5.13 shows the inter-
item correlations among CDRI-1 sub-indices, which are positively correlated as expected. The 
results show that the highest Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was exhibited by the economic capital 
sub-index (alpha = .914), followed by the physical capital sub-index (alpha = .786), the human 
capital sub-index (alpha = .731), and lastly the social capital sub-index (alpha = .659). The 
overall CDRI-1 which is the average of the four sub indices (social, economic, physical, and 
human) has a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .844.  Considering a threshold of alpha value of 
about .70, these Cronbach’s alpha coefficients are sufficient and reasonable to suggest precision 
of both the sub-indices and the overall CDRI-1. 
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Table 5.12.Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for CDRI-1 
 
Index items Item Alpha 
Social capital sub-index 9 .659 
Economic capital sub-index 6 .914 
Physical capital sub-index 35 .786 
Human capital sub-index 25 .731 
 
  
Overall CDRI-1 4 .844 
 
 
 
Table 5.13. Inter-item correlations among CDRI-1 sub-indices 
 
 
Social capital sub-index Economic capital sub-index Physical capital sub-index 
Social capital sub-index    
Economic capital sub-index .563a   
Physical capital sub-index .618a .533a  
Human capital sub-index .462a .602a .674a 
Note: a Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
(ii) Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for CDRI-2 
The overall CDRI-2, which is the average of the ten sub-indices presented in Table 5.1, 
exhibited a relatively high Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .916. Evidently, this alpha level is 
indicative of adequate precision of the overall CDRI-2. The individual Cronbach’s alpha of the 
10 sub-indices can be seen in Tables 5.1. 
(iii) Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for CDRI-3 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for CDRI-3 and the total number of indicators used to 
calculate each sub-index are summarized in Table 5.14. Table 5.15 shows the inter-item 
correlations among CDRI-3 sub-indices. The reliability analysis for CDRI-3 was intended to 
examine the precision of individual disaster phase’s sub-indices. As expected, given the fact that 
indicators were counted more than once, the results show that the sub-indices exhibited a very 
high degree of Cronbach’s alpha (see Table 5.14) and are highly correlated (see Table 5.15). 
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Table 5.14. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for CDRI-3 
 
Index items Item Alpha 
Hazard mitigation Sub-index 45 .862 
Disaster preparedness Sub-index 25 .794 
Disaster response Sub-index 42 .773 
Disaster recovery Sub-index 28 .814 
   
Overall CDRI-3 4 .979 
 
 
 
Table 5.15. Inter-item correlations among CDRI-3 sub-indices 
 
 
Hazard mitigation  Disaster preparedness  Disaster response  
Hazard mitigation     
Disaster preparedness  .922a   
Disaster response  .945a .919a  
Disaster recovery  .955a .861a .914a 
Note: a Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Of the four disaster phase’s sub-indices, the hazard mitigation sub-index exhibited the 
highest alpha coefficient (alpha =.862), followed by the disaster recovery (alpha = .814), disaster 
preparedness (alpha = .794), and disaster response (alpha = .773).  The overall CDRI-3 which is 
the average of the four sub-indices has the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .979. Considering the 
threshold of alpha value of .70, these alphas are higher enough to suggest that these measures are 
reliable. 
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5.5. Summary 
This chapter has examined the reliability of the sub-indices and the CDRI as measures of 
disaster resilience using Cronbach’s alpha coefficients. The end result of these analyses was the 
list of indicators selected to include in the CDRI (see Table 4.3).  The following bullets 
summarize the key points of this chapter: 
• Most of the sub-indices exhibited high Cronbach’s alpha coefficients implying that they 
are fairly reliable measures. 
• The results on the inter-item correlations show that the majority of the indicators are 
statistically significant and positively correlated (p ≤  .05, p ≤  .01), which implies a 
high degree of consistency of these measures. 
• The results also show that few sub-indices did not perform as expected suggesting that 
they have relatively low levels of internal consistency.  
•  Some variations exist in terms of magnitude and strength of correlations and number of 
positive correlations that are statically significant at the .05 and .01 levels, but overall 
the correlation patterns are reasonable. 
• Overall, the CDRI-1 which is the primary focus of this study exhibited a high level of 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients (.844), suggesting that it is a fairly reliable measure. Also 
as one would expect, the CDRI-2 and CDRI-3 both demonstrated high levels of 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of .916 and .979, respectively.  
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CHAPTER VI 
VALIDITY ASSESSMENT 
6.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the validity of the CDRI as a measure of disaster 
resilience. A measure is valid if it is measuring what it is intended to measure and it is invalid if 
it does not (Babbie et al., 2003; Carmines & Zeller, 1979). In the psychology literature, for a 
measure to be valid, it should be constructed according to psychometric principles related to 
different dimensions of validity. Some of the important examples of validity are content, 
construct, and predictive validity. These types of validity require different approaches in 
assessing the extent to which a measure is valid (Carmines & Zeller, 1979). However, it should 
be noted that while in some areas, such psychometrics assessment of validity are quite well 
defined, in others such as the sociological and indicator literatures, the approaches are not as 
formulaic. Regardless, in many circumstances the literature on indicators and indices has noted 
that validation of indices is a complex process (Cutter & Finch, 2008; Simpson, 2006; Vincent, 
2004). The primary reason for this difficulty is because the empirical data needed to validate 
indices are not easily available, or may require expensive in-depth field surveys.  
The validity of the CDRI as a disaster resilience measure was assessed by examining the 
measures of its content and construct validity. Content validity is essentially concerned with 
whether or not a measure captures the various dimensions or the domain of a construct and, in 
the sociological literature is sometimes referred to as sampling validity. In general, construct 
validity is the degree to which a measure relates to other variables as expected within a system of 
theoretical relationships (Babbie, 2005; Carmines & Zeller, 1979). It is often based on the extent 
to which empirical results are consistent with logically or theoretically anticipated relationships 
among variables (Babbie, 2005). In other words, the question is do we see the relationship 
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pattern (positive or negative correlations) among the measures of concepts anticipated by the 
literature. In addition, construct validation is extended by not simply examining the 
interrelationship patterns among variables, but also by examining the ability of the CDRI scores 
to predict potential expected outcomes. This assessment is sometimes referred to as predictive 
validity in that CDRI measures are employed to predict disaster outcomes (deaths, losses, etc.) in 
order to determine its ability to account for these outcomes after controlling for other related 
measures. Predictive validity is extended further by addressing the incremental validity of the 
CDRI measure. Incremental validity is essentially concerned with whether a newly proposed 
measure adds incrementally to our ability to predict or account for a phenomenon of interest. The 
next sections discusses how each of these four types of validity was assessed 
6.2. Content validity  
Content validity is often concerned with the actual content of a measure (Carmines & 
Zeller, 1979; Trochim, 2006), which means that based on the procedure (operationalization of 
the concept), would the measure appear to capture the theoretical concept. Babbie (2005) has 
defined content validity as the degree to which a measure covers the range of meanings included 
within a concept. This dimension of content validity is sometimes referred to as sampling 
validity, in that the concern is if the measure captures the conceptual or theoretical “sampling 
space” or the domain associated with the concept. In other words, if a concept includes three 
dimensions of conceptual space, a, b, and c, then a measure should also capture a, b, and c, 
otherwise it fails with respect to sampling validity. In the psychometric literature content validity 
is generally assessed by utilizing a panel of expert raters to assess the various components 
proposed to be utilized to measure a concept to determine if the set of component does indeed 
capture the domain associated with the theoretical concept. Oftentimes this entails assessing 
inter-rater agreement on the extent to which the components capture the concept. Unfortunately, 
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given limited resources a panel could not be employed, instead two raters, working within the 
formalized operationalization procedure itself should provide a degree of content validity.  
Ideally, as Babbie (2005) notes, content validity should be a guiding principle in the 
initial development of a measure to ensure that all domains of the concept to be measured are 
included in the measure. Indeed sampling validity has been employed and has guided the 
development of the CDRI measure since the beginning. Sampling validity was at play in Chapter 
III when it was noted that some measures of disaster resilience tended to focus on recovery and 
reconstruction, because of the centrality of “bouncing back” element in the concept. And, yet, 
resistance or reducing impact is equally important. Hence, the decision was made to ensure that 
the measure assesses community resources (types of capitals) important for undertaking 
activities associated with all four phases of disaster: mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery. In other words, the CDRI measure seeks to cover the full range of dimensions 
associated with disaster resilience. In addition, as seen in Chapter IV, one of the reasons for 
using the cross-classification method was to facilitate and ensure that indicators associated with 
all phases of disaster and four community capitals were selected for inclusion in the measure. 
Together the four dimensions of disaster phases and the four community capitals provided a 
CDRI conceptual framework defining the conceptual space or conceptual domain for which 
indicators were selected. Utilizing this framework, two raters worked to select subsets of 
indicators associated with the 16 disaster phase/capital sub-indices. 
6.3. Construct validation 
Construct validity is the degree to which a measure relates to other variables as expected 
within a system of theoretical relationships (Babbie, 2005; Carmines & Zeller, 1979). It is often 
based on the extent to which empirical results are consistent with logically or theoretically 
anticipated relationships among variables (Babbie, 2005). In other words, the question is do we 
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see the relationship pattern (positive or negative correlations) among the measures of concepts 
anticipated by the literature. In particular, construct validation was extended by not simply 
examining the interrelationship patterns among variables, but also by examining the ability of the 
CDRI scores to predict expected outcomes. This assessment is sometimes referred to as 
predictive validity in that CDRI as a measure is employed to predict disaster outcomes (e.g., 
death and losses) in order to determine its ability to account for these outcomes after controlling 
for other related measures.  In addition the validity assessment was taken a step further by 
examining the CDRI’s incremental validity as a measure of community disaster resilience.  
By definition, incremental validity refers to the capacity of one measure to improve 
prediction over one or more alternative measures (Meyer, 2000). This means that if a new 
measure is able to improve the prediction of a theoretically relevant criterion over the existing 
measure, one can conclude that the new measure contributes meaningful information that could 
not have been obtained from the existing measure.  
 Construct validity in this study was assessed by examining a relationship between the 
CDRI scores and the following theoretically relevant measures: (1) Flood related deaths: These 
are deaths due to flood related hazards that occurred between 2000 and 2005 as reported by the 
Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention; (2) Total property damage due to flooding: This is 
the flood property damage that occurred between 2000 and 2005.The data on total flood property 
damage were obtained from the SHELDUS database, at Hazard Research Lab, at the University 
of South Carolina; (3) Insured flood property damage: This is the total of payments made to 
flood property damage claims between 2000 and 2005. The data on insured flood property 
damage were obtained from FEMA. (4) Uninsured flood property damage: This is the difference 
between the total flood damage and insured property damage; (5) Social vulnerability: This is an 
index based on 2000 census data, developed by the Hazard Vulnerability Research Institute, at 
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the University of South Carolina; and (6) Physical risk, which includes (a) flood risk, (b) wind 
risk, (c) surge risk, and (d) total risk, which is the sum of flood, wind, and surge risk. Data on 
physical risk were obtained from the Coastal Risk Atlas. The theoretical expectations of the 
relationship between the external criteria and the CDRI scores were as follows: 
(i) A disaster resilient community is more likely to experience a low number of flooding 
related deaths. In other words, there should be a negative relationship between CDRI 
measures and flooding related deaths. This is expected because disaster resilient 
communities should be more likely to have effective hazard mitigation, disaster 
preparedness, and disaster response plans, which should result in lower flooding related 
deaths. 
(ii)  Disaster resilient communities should suffer from lower levels of total property damage 
due to flooding than less disaster resilient communities. In other words, there should be a 
negative relationship between CDRI scores and total property losses. This is so because 
disaster resilient communities are more likely to take protective measures to reduce flood 
damage. 
(iii) A disaster resilient community is more likely to experience a high level of insured flood 
property damage. At first blush this might seem counter intuitive, given the previous 
expectation above, however with respect to this expectation; the issue is insured versus 
uninsured losses. This expectation is based on the assumption that in a disaster resilient 
community, most people are more likely to participate in flood insurance programs because 
the community will promote participation to ensure recovery process and community 
residence will have greater capital to invest in insurance. 
(iv)  A disaster resilient community is more likely to experience a low level of uninsured flood 
property damage. This expectation is simply the opposite of the above, for now we are 
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addressing uninsured losses. This is expected because less resilient communities will not be 
addressing flood hazard effectively and because less resilient communities are likely to 
have residents without the capital to invest in insurance.  
(v) A disaster resilient community is more likely to have a low level of social vulnerability. 
Several studies have characterized the concept of social vulnerability and disaster resilience 
as being opposite (Buckle et al., 2001; Manyena, 2006; Pelling, 2003). Hence it is expected 
that there will be a negative relationship between social vulnerability and resilience. This is 
expected because disaster resilience activities such as hazard mitigation programs are more 
likely to reduce social vulnerability. 
(vi) Coastal communities, which are located in high risk areas, are more likely to have high 
levels of disaster resilience. In some sense, this might be thought of as a hope, rather than 
an expectation. However, this expectation is perhaps valid because coastal communities 
with high levels of risk are more likely to have high perception of risk, which is often 
considered as a determinant factor for a community to take disaster protective measures and 
hazard adjustments. Also, these communities are more likely to have experience of coastal 
hazards and frequent occurrence of disasters in high risk areas is more likely to result in a 
community developing better disaster preparedness programs. In addition, previous studies 
have shown that experience is an important predictor of higher level of disaster 
preparedness and more effective disaster response; largely because it leads to greater 
awareness of consequences of dissenters (Lindell & Perry, 2000; Mileti, 1999). The 
expectation then is that high levels of hazard risk should be positively associated with 
community resilience. 
Two methods were employed in assessing the construct validity of the overall CDRIs: (1) 
correlational analysis, and (2) regression analysis 
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6.3.1. Construct validity: Correlational analysis 
The validity of the CDRI was assessed by conducting a Pearson’s product-moment 
correlation (correlation of zero-order) analysis to examine the degree to which the CDRI is 
correlated with the external criteria described in the previous section. The primary focus of this 
analysis is on the correlations between the CDRI-1 measure and the external criteria; however 
the other CDRI scores are also included for comparison purpose. Table 6.1 presents the results of 
correlations between the CDRIs and external criteria. 
 
Table 6.1. Bivariate correlations between external criteria and CDRIs 
  
 Validity measure CDRI-1 CDRI-2 CDRI-3 
(1) Deaths due to flooding  -.420b -.332c  -.387b 
(2) Total flood property damage -.239a -.222a -.224a 
(3) Insured flood property damage .385a .415a .411a 
(4) Uninsured flood property damage -.223a -.214a -.214a 
(5) Social vulnerability index -.308a -.332a -.319a 
(6) Wind risk .291a .324a .310a 
(7) Flood risk .270a .272a .270a 
(8) Surge risk .141b .125c .146b 
(9) Total risk (wind, flood, and surge) .266a .267a .273a 
 
Note: a = prob (r) ≤  .01; b = prob (r) ≤  .05; c = prob (r) ≤ .10; N = 144; (one-tailed tests) 
 
Consistent with theoretical expectations, the results in Table 6.1 indicate that all the external 
criteria examined have statistically significant correlations with the overall CDRI-1 measure. 
The directions of the relationships for all the CDRIs performed as expected, although there are 
some variations with regard to the strength of the relationships. On the whole, the significant 
statistical relationship suggests that the CDRIs are indeed valid measures. Table 6.2 presents the 
complete correlation matrix between the CDRIs and all the external criteria employed in 
assessing the construct validity. 
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Table 6.2.  A complete correlation matrix between external criteria and CDRIs 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1            
2 .672a           
3 .509a .548a          
4 .797a .896a .832a         
5 -.121 -.113 .019 -.077        
6 .291a .270a .141c .266a -.308a       
7 .324a .272a .125 .267a -.332a .951a      
8 .310a .270a .146c .273a -.319a .993a .968a     
9 .321 .280 .217 .294 .082 -.420c -.332 -.387c    
10 -.141 -.098 .099 -.039 -.060 -.239a -2.22a -.224a .423b   
11 .638a .542a .362a .581a -.057 .385a .415a .411a .364c -.038  
12 -.182b -.101 .066 -.065 -.072 -.223a -.214b -.214a -.352 .919a -.201b 
 
Note: a p < .01; b p < .05; c p <.10; N = 144; (2 tailed tests) 
 
Wind risk (1); Flood risk (2); Surge risk (3); Total risk (4); Social vulnerability index (5); CDRI-1(6); CDRI-2 (7);CDRI-3 (8); Flood related-deaths (9); Total flood property damage(10); 
Insured flood property damage (11); Uninsured property damage (12) 
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The following provides a more detailed discussion of the relationships between the external 
criteria and the CDRI-1 as the primary measure. Examining the results more closely, the 
relationships suggest that: 
(i) There is a statistically significant negative relationship (r = -.420, p ≤ .05) between 
the number of deaths due to flooding  and the overall community disaster resilience 
index in the U.S Gulf coast region. Based on how disaster resilience is measured in 
this study, this relationship suggest that counties with a relatively high level of 
disaster resilience in the U.S. Gulf coast region are more likely to experience a low 
level of deaths due to flooding.  
(ii) The total flood property damage is negatively correlated with the overall community 
disaster resilience index and the correlation is statistically significant (r = -.239, p 
≤ .01). This result is consistent with the expectation that counties with a 
comparatively high level of disaster resilience in the U.S. Gulf coast region are more 
likely to experience a relatively low level of total property damage due to flooding.  
(iii) As anticipated, the insured and uninsured flood property damage is significantly 
correlated with the overall community disaster resilience index. The insured flood 
property damage is positively correlated with community disaster resilience index (r 
= .385, p ≤ .01), supporting the theoretical expectation that counties with a 
comparatively high level of disaster resilience in the U.S. Gulf coast region are more 
likely to experience a high level of insured flood property losses. Conversely, 
uninsured flood property damage is negatively correlated with the community 
disaster resilience index (r = -.223, p ≤ .01), supporting the hypothesis that counties 
with a high level of disaster resilience are less likely to suffer a high level of 
uninsured flood property losses.  
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(iv) As expected, the social vulnerability index is negatively correlated with the 
community disaster resilience index (r = -.308, p ≤ .01). This result is consistent 
with the proposition that there is a negative relationship between social vulnerability 
and community disaster resilience. This result implies that counties with a high level 
of resilience are more likely to have a low level of social vulnerability. 
(v) Finally, regarding physical risk; as anticipated, the results indicate that the total risk 
is positively correlated with community disaster resilience and the correlation is 
statistically significant (r = .266, p ≤ .01). This result supports the hypothesis that 
counties with a high level of risk are more likely to have a high level of disaster 
resilience.  
6.3.2. Predictive validity: Regression analysis 
Regression analysis techniques were also utilized to extend construct validation of the 
CDRI measure in this study by assessing its predictive validity. While the bivariate correlations 
suggest that the measure is valid, it is also important to assess whether the CDRI measure 
performs as expected after controlling other factors. Specifically regression analysis was 
employed to determine if the CDRI measure still has a significant impact on flood property 
damage and flood related deaths after controlling for total physical risk and social vulnerability. 
More specifically, the aim was to explicitly examine if community disaster resilience has: 
(i) a negative impact on deaths due to flooding 
(ii) a positive impact on total property damage due to flood related hazards 
(iii) a positive impact on insured flood property damage, and 
(iv) a negative impact on uninsured flood property damage 
To achieve this goal two regression methods were utilized (1) the ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression model, and (2) the zero-truncated poisson (ZTP) regression model. 
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(a) Ordinary least square (OLS) regression model 
An OLS regression model was used to predict the flood-related property damage in the 
U.S. Gulf coast region from 2000 to 2005. Before estimating the effect of the CDRI on property 
damage, this section briefly reviews the trend of property damage in the U.S. Gulf coast region 
from 2000 to 2005 to get a better understanding of property losses in the region. Generally, 
among the natural hazards, floods are the most common and frequently cause the greatest threat 
to property and human life in the United States. The economic impacts from flood-related 
property damage are significantly increasing and estimated in billions of dollars annually 
(Brody, Zahran, Maghelal, Grover, & Highfield, 2007).  
Figure 6.7 shows the estimated total flood property damage, insured flood property 
damage, and uninsured flood property damage from 2000 to 2005 in the U.S. Gulf coast region 
(damage is adjusted to 2005 U.S. dollar value). The total flood property damage data were 
obtained from the Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States 
(SHELDUS), Version 6.2 (Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute, 2008). The insured flood 
property damage data were obtained from FEMA-National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and 
the uninsured flood property damage is the difference between the total flood property damage 
and the insured flood property damage. 
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Figure 6.1. Estimated total flood property damage, insured flood property damage, and 
uninsured flood property damage in the U.S. Gulf coast region from 2000 to 2005 
(damage adjusted to 2005 U.S. dollar’s value) 
 
As shown in Figure 6.1, the estimated losses from the SHELDUS data indicate that from 
2000 to 2005 Louisiana suffered the highest total flood-related damage in the region when 
compared with the other states. Within that time period Louisiana experienced a total flood 
property damage of more than $20 billion, followed by Florida ($16 billion), Mississippi ($7 
billion), Texas ($4 billion), Alabama ($2 billion) and, last Georgia ($6 million). The high total 
property damage exhibited by Louisiana is due to hurricane Katrina in 2005, which is one of 
costliest hurricanes in the United States history. The data from FEMA indicate that from 2000 to 
2005 Louisiana had the highest insured flood property damage of more than $10 billion, 
followed by Mississippi ($1.9 billion), Florida ($1.3 billion), Texas ($900 million), Alabama 
($500 million), and Georgia ($21,000). 
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The results on uninsured flood property damage, which is the difference between the 
total flood property damage and insured flood property damage, shows that Florida has the 
highest losses. From 2000 to 2005, Florida experienced uninsured property damage of about $15 
billion, followed by Louisiana ($10 billion), Mississippi ($6 billion), Texas ($4 billion), 
Alabama ($2 billion) and, last Georgia ($6 million). However it is also important to stress that 
the results on uninsured property damage should be interpreted with extra caution because the 
data come from completely two different sources (FEMA and SHELDUS). 
Three OLS regression models were employed. The first model examined the impact of 
the CDRI on the total flood property damage, the second model examined the impact of the 
CDRI on the insured flood property damage, and the third model assessed the impact of the 
CDRI on uninsured flood property damage. As mentioned earlier, the Social Vulnerability Index 
and total physical risk were both used as control variables in the models. The OLS models were 
performed by fitting the following parameters: 
(1) ln )( 01γ = 0β
 
+ 1β CDRI +
 
2β Total_risk + 3β Social_vulnerability +ε  
(2) ln )( 20γ = 0β
 
+ 1β CDRI +
 
2β Total_risk + 3β Social_vulnerability +ε  
(3) ln )( 30γ = 
 
0β + 1β CDRI +
 
2β Total_risk + 3β Social_vulnerability +ε  
Where:  
ln )( 01γ  = Natural log of total flood property damage 
ln )( 01γ  = Natural log of insured flood property damage 
ln )( 01γ  = Natural log of uninsured flood Property damage 
0β  = Y-intercept 
β  = Regression coefficients 
ε   = Error component  
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Property damage was measured in dollars. Like any other variable often measured in 
monetary terms, its distribution was somewhat skewed. In order to achieve a normal distribution, 
all three dependent variables (total flood property damage, insured flood property damage, and 
uninsured flood property damage) were log-transformed. Furthermore, threats due to 
heteroskedasticity were diagnosed using residual plots, Breusch-Pagan and Koenker-Bassett tests 
(Allison, 1999). Zero-order correlations and the variance inflation factor (VIF) tests were used to 
detect multicollinearity problems (Allison, 1999). All the tests performed to diagnose 
heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity suggested no violation of the OLS regression model 
assumptions. The results of the OLS regression models are summarized in Tables 6.3 through 
6.11 which provide the regression results with respect to the unstandardized coefficients (b), 
standardized coefficients (Beta), standard errors, t-values, and one-tailed significant levels. F-
statistics, R2, and adjusted R2 are also presented. 
Tables 6.3 to 6.5 summarize the results of model 1, which examines the effect of CDRI 
on the total property damage. The results show that for all the three models, about 13% of the 
variance in the total property damage is explained by each model. As expected, in all the models, 
for every increase in CDRI, there is a significant decrease in total property damage, even after 
controlling for social vulnerability and total physical risk. However, the effect of CDRI-3 is not 
statistically significant. Furthermore, the results indicate that the increase in total risk also leads 
to increase in total property damage, which is consistent with the expectation. Finally, the results 
show that social vulnerability is significant but not in the anticipated direction. 
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Table 6.3. Effect of CDRI-1 on the total flood property damage  
 
 Variable Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Standard error t-value Significance 
CDRI-1 -.507 -.162 .276 -1.836 .035 
Social vulnerability index -.120 -.314 .032 -3.701 .000 
Total risk .110 .250 .037 2.925 .002 
Constant 6.007  .221 27.183 .000 
 
Note: N =144; F-statistic = 7.428; Significance = .000; R 2 = .150; adjusted R 2 = .130 
 
 
Table 6.4. Effect of  CDRI-2 on the total flood property damage  
 
 Variable Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Standard error t-value Significance 
CDRI-2 
-.528 -.168 .281 -1.878 .032 
Social vulnerability index 
-.123 -.323 .033 -3.759 .000 
Total risk 
.111 .253 .038 2.948 .002 
Constant 6.007  .221 27.208 .000 
 
Note: N =144; F-statistic = 7.486; Significance = .000; R 2 = .151; adjusted R 2 = .131 
 
 
Table 6.5. Effect of CDRI-3 on the total flood property damage  
 
 Variable Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Standard error t-value Significance 
CDRI-3 
-.400 -.141 .252 -1.585 .058 
Social vulnerability index 
-.118 -.311 .033 -3.640 .000 
Total risk 
.108 .246 .038 2.857 .003 
Constant 6.013  .222 27.104 .000 
 
Note: N =144; F-statistic = 7.100; Significance = .000; R 2 = .145; adjusted R 2 = .124 
 
 
The results of model 2, which examines the effect of the CDRIs on insured flood 
property damage, are presented in Tables 6.6 to 6.8. These results indicate that each model 
explained about 40% of the variance in insured flood property damage. Overall, the results 
suggest that the CDRIs have a significant positive impact on the insured flood property damage. 
Consistent with expectations, the increase in CDRI leads to an increase in insured flood property 
damage. These results suggest that counties with a high level of disaster resilience are more 
likely to have a high number of flood insurance claims, because highly resilient communities 
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will promote participation in flood insurance programs and most high-income counties are likely 
to be able to afford participating in flood insurance programs. 
The results also reveal that risk is significantly positive related with insured flood 
property damage, implying that  people in counties located in relatively high risk areas are more 
likely to purchase flood insurance. This result is consistent with FEMA’s findings that about 
75% of the flood insurance claims come from high-risk areas, and only 25% come from outside 
high-risk areas (FEMA, 2008).  
 
Table 6.6. Effect of CDRI-1 on insured flood property damage  
 Variable Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Standard error t-value Significance 
CDRI-1 
.874 .274 .238 3.667 .000 
Social vulnerability index 
.020 .052 .028 .723 .236 
Total risk 
.233 .512 .033 7.166 .000 
Constant 4.969  .196 25.319 .000 
 
Note: N =144; F-statistic = 28.296; Significance = .000; R 2 = .403; adjusted R 2 = .388 
 
 
Table 6.7. Effect of  CDRI-2 on insured flood property damage  
 
 Variable Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Standard error t-value Significance 
CDRI-2 
.972 .303 .239 4.065 .000 
Social vulnerability index 
.026 .067 .028 .935 .176 
Total risk 
.230 .505 .032 7.153 .000 
Constant 4.972  .194 25.633 .000 
 
Note: N =144; F-statistic = 29.849; Significance = .000; R 2 = .415; adjusted R 2 = .402 
 
 
Table 6.8. Effect of CDRI-3 insured flood property damage  
 
 Variable Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Standard error t-value Significance 
CDRI-3 
.870 .301 .216 4.034 .000 
Social vulnerability index 
.025 .065 .028 .899 .185 
Total risk 
.229 .504 .032 7.113 .000 
Constant 4.975  .194 25.613 .000 
 
Note: N =144; F-statistic = 29.723; Significance = .000; R 2 = .414; adjusted R 2 = .400 
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However, the results show that one of the control variables (social vulnerability) did not 
work as expected, because the coefficient is not in the anticipated direction and not statistically 
significant. 
The results of the effect of disaster resilience on uninsured flood property damage are 
presented in Tables 6.9 through 6.11. Generally, each model accounted for about 13% of the 
variance in uninsured flood property damage. As anticipated, the results show that an increase in 
disaster resilience leads to a decrease in uninsured flood property damage. These results suggest 
that counties with high level of disaster resilience are more likely to have low level of uninsured 
property damage. Neither control variable performed as expected. These results are somewhat 
surprising because one would expect counties with a high level of social vulnerability to have 
high uninsured flood property damage, while counties located in relatively high risk areas should 
have low uninsured property damage.  
 
Table 6.9. Effect of CDRI-1 on uninsured flood property damage  
 
 Variable Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Standard error t-value Significance 
CDRI-1 
-.614 -.207 .275 -2.236 .014 
Social vulnerability index 
-.117 -.333 .032 -3.684 .000 
Total risk 
.069 .178 .035 1.937 .028 
Constant 6.368  .212 30.019 .000 
Note: N =144; F-statistic = 6.531; Significance = .000; R 2 = .156; adjusted R 2 = .132 
 
 
Table 6.10. Effect of  CDRI-2 on uninsured flood property damage  
 
 Variable Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Standard error t-value Significance 
CDRI-2 
-.616 -.202 .285 -2.161 .017 
Social vulnerability index 
-.120 -.341 .032 -3.740 .000 
Total risk 
.068 .176 .035 1.914 .029 
Constant 6.371  .212 29.996 .000 
 
Note: N =144; F-statistic = 6.406; Significance = .000; R 2 = .153; adjusted R 2 = .130 
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Table 6.11. Effect of  CDRI-3 on uninsured flood property damage  
 
 Variable Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Standard error t-value Significance 
CDRI-3 
-.483 -.182 .249 -1.941 .028 
Social vulnerability index 
-.116 -.331 .032 -3.636 .000 
Total risk 
.067 .174 .036 1.881 .032 
Constant 6.373  .214 29.841 .000 
 
Note: N =144; F-statistic = 6.067; Significance = .001; R 2 = .147; adjusted R 2 = .122 
 
 
 
(b) Zero-truncated poisson (ZTP) regression model 
A zero-truncated poisson (ZTP) regression model was employed to examine the impact 
of CDRI on flood related deaths because this is a count variable, with a large number of zero 
counts, which can not be modeled using OLS regression model (Long & Freese, 2006). The 
zero-truncated poisson regression model was employed using Stata SE 10.0 software. The ZTP 
is designed for data in which observations with an outcome of zero have been excluded from the 
sample. Since the counts are truncated at zero, ZTP computes the probability of positive 
outcomes, or outcomes which are greater than zero (Long & Freese, 2006). Literature suggests 
that when using ZTP models, the presence of overdispersion may result in biased estimates. The 
assumption of the ZTP model is that the mean and the variance functions are equal. When the 
variance exceeds the mean, the model is overdispersed (Long & Freese, 2006). Thus, 
overdispersion was checked by first fitting a zero-truncated negative binomial (ZTNB) model 
(Long & Freese, 2006), which revealed that there was no problem of overdispersion. 
Before presenting the results of the ZTP regression model analysis, the descriptive 
statistics of the number of deaths due to flooding in the U.S. Gulf coast region from 2000 to 
2005 are summarized in order to provide a better understanding of the trend of flood related 
deaths in the region. Figure 6.2 summarizes the number of flood related deaths occurred between 
2000 and 2005 in the U.S. Gulf coast region. 
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Figure 6.2. Number of deaths due to flooding in the U.S. Gulf coast region from 2000-2005  
 
The data on flood related deaths were obtained from the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention. Overall, the deaths indicate that a total of 852 people died due to flooding in the U.S. 
Gulf coast region between 2000 and 2005. As reported in Figure 6.2, Louisiana suffered the 
highest number of flood related deaths during this period; approximately 631 people died there, 
followed by Mississippi (171), Texas (25), Florida (6) and, last Alabama (2). At a count level, 
the results show that the majority of the deaths during this period of time occurred in Orleans 
parish, Louisiana, which recorded 475 deaths, followed by St. Bernard parish, Louisiana (121), 
Harrison county, Mississippi (104), Hancock county, Mississippi (55), Harris county Texas (21), 
Jefferson parish, Louisianan (19), and Jackson county, Mississippi (12). 
The results of the ZTP regression models are summarized in Tables 6.12 through 6.14. 
Overall, the results indicate that CDRI-1 and CDRI-3 performed as expected while CDRI-2 did 
not meet the theoretical expectations. Both models employing CDR-1 and CDRI-3 are 
statistically significant. The results indicate that model one (CDRI-1) presented in Table 6.12, is 
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statistically significant (Chi-squared = 1492.74, df = 3, p ≤ .001). Similarly, model 3 (CDRI-3) 
which is presented in Table 6.14, is statistically significant (Chi-Squared = 1460.34, df = 3, 
p ≤ .001).  
As expected, the results of both models  employing CDRI-1 and CDRI-3 show that the 
increase in community disaster resilience leads to a decrease in a number of deaths due to 
flooding, controlling for social vulnerability and total physical risk. In other words, counties with 
a high level of disaster resilience are more likely to experience a low number of deaths due to 
flooding in the U.S. Gulf coast region. Moreover, the results support the hypothesis that a high 
level of social vulnerability significantly contributes to an increase in the number of deaths due 
to flooding. Finally, and consistent with theoretical expectations, the results indicate that 
counties located in high risk areas are more likely to experience a high number of deaths due to 
flooding. 
 
Table 6.12. Effect of the CDRI-1 on deaths due to flooding  
 
 Variable Coefficient Standard error z P>|z| 95% Conf. 
Interval 
95% Conf. 
Interval 
CDRI-1 -1.916 .213 -8.97 0.000 -2.334 -1.497 
Social vulnerability  .374 .015 24.50 0.000 .344 .404 
Total risk .162 .015 11.00 0.000 .133 .190 
Constant 1.174 .162 7.23 0.000 .855 1.492 
 
Note: N =22; Chi2 = 1492.74, df = 3, Significance = .001; Pseudo R2 = 0.5563 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.13. Effect of the CDRI-2 on deaths due to flooding  
 
 Variable Coefficient Standard error z P>|z| 95% Conf. 
Interval 
95% Conf. 
Interval 
CDRI-1 .008 .142 0.05 0.957 -.271 .287 
Social vulnerability  .376  .015  25.39 0.000 .347   .405 
Total risk .247 .014 18.38   0.000   .221 .274 
 
Constant .136   .151 0.91   0.364   -.159  .433 
 
 
Note: N =22; Chi2 = 1402.73, df = 3, Significance = .001; Pseudo R2 = 0.5228 
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Table 6.14. Effect of the CDRI-3 on deaths due to flooding  
 
 Variable Coefficient Standard error z P>|z| 95% Conf. 
Interval 
95% Conf. 
Interval 
CDRI-3 -1.316 .183 -7.20 0.000 -1.674 -.958 
 
Social vulnerability  .375   .015 24.87 0.000 .346 .405 
Total risk .190 .014 13.34   0.000 .162  .218 
 
Constant .884 .163  5.42 0.000 .564 1.204 
 
 
Note: N =22; Chi2 = 1460.34, df = 3, Significance = .001; Pseudo R2 = 0.5443 
 
 
Table 6.13 presents the results of model 2 (CDRI-2). As mentioned previously, the 
results of this model generally suggest that the CDRI-2 did not theoretically perform as 
expected. The relationship between CDRI-2 and the number of deaths turned out to be 
statistically insignificant. The control variables, however, worked as expected. Both social 
vulnerability and total physical risk are significantly positive correlated with the number of 
deaths due to flooding, supporting the proposition that counties with a high level of social 
vulnerability and physical risk are more likely to experience a high number of deaths due to 
flooding. 
In conclusion, the results of the ZTP regression models discussed above generally 
exhibited a satisfactory explanatory power, which empirically supports the hypothesis that 
community disaster resilience will decrease the number of flood related deaths in a community. 
Consistent with the results of the zero-order correlations and the OLS regression models, the 
results of the ZTP regression models also strongly confirm that the CDRIs are indeed valid 
measures. 
 
 
 
  
113 
6.3.3. Incremental validity 
Yet another approach in assessing validity of a measure is an assessment of the 
measure’s “incremental validity” or its ability to incrementally add to a model predicting a 
criterion measure over alternative measures available to assess the same or closely related 
constructs (Hunsley and Meyer, 2003). In other words, does the measure add to the prediction of 
criterion above what can be predicted or accounted for by other alternative measures? Studies 
have suggested that a newly developed measure should demonstrate an ability to add to the 
prediction of outcomes beyond that which was possible with the best available measures (Dawes, 
1999; Haynes & Lench, 2003; Hunsley & Meyer, 2003).  
The previous section has, in some sense assessed this, in that it has assessed the ability 
of CDRI to predict criterion measures such as flood property losses and flood related deaths 
while controlling for Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI). It was shown that the CDRI measure 
has performed as expected and has done well relative to SoVI a closely related measure. Indeed, 
SoVI sometimes did not perform well at all, yielding insignificant results or results that were 
completely counter to the theoretical expectations. Here the validity assessment is taken a step 
further by assessing the incremental validity of CDRI2 not only with respect to SoVI, but also 
with respect to a county’s median income. Specifically, an argument might well be offered that 
in many respects CDRI could perhaps be more parsimoniously measured by simply employing 
median income. It is somewhat conspicuous that, when viewing the maps in Chapter VIII, that 
poorer and more rural areas appear to score lower on the overall CDRI score. From the 
perspectives of this study, CDRI, while related to median income is of course much more in that 
it assesses a broad range of capital resources, not simply economic resources such as income, 
necessary for addressing hazard mitigation, disaster preparation, response, and recovery. 
                                                 
2
 The incremental validity analysis is only preformed with the CDRI-1, a primary measure for this study 
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Nevertheless, the aforementioned argument might be advanced. For that matter, a similar 
argument might be suggested that SoVI could also be more parsimoniously measured by income, 
with median income simply being the opposite of social vulnerability. Hence, this application of 
incremental validity assesses if CDRI contributes to predicting flood property losses (total, 
insured, and uninsured) and flood related deaths, after total risk, median income, and SoVI are 
entered in the model. Then CDRI is entered to determine if it contributes to the ability of the 
model to account for the variance in the respective variables. The initial step in this analysis 
begins with an examination of the zero order correlations between the independent and 
dependent variables presented in Table 6.15. 
The intercorrelations among the independent variables suggest that there are indeed 
moderate, negative, and significant correlations between SoVI and median income (-.298) and 
CDRI-1 (-.308). In addition there is a relatively strong positive relationship between CDRI-1 and 
median income (.630), though it is far from perfect as might be anticipated if median income was 
a more simple measure of CDRI-1. Interestingly, there are moderate correlations between total 
risk and CDRI-1 and median income, but an insignificant negative relationship between SoVI 
and total risk. Even more interesting are the correlations between the dependent variables and 
SoVI, median income, and CDRI-1. There are no significant correlations between SoVI and 
total, insured, and uninsured flooding losses nor is there a relationship with flooding deaths. 
Median income only has a significant positive relationship with insured losses. However, CDRI-
1, as seen before, has a significant positive relationship with insured losses and the anticipated 
negative significant relationships with total and uninsured losses as well as with flood related 
deaths. Clearly, CDRI-1 appears to perform better than either SoVI or median income at least 
with respect to zero order correlations. The question remains if it will perform equally well when 
other factors are controlled for in a regression format. 
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Table 6.15. Correlation matrix among variables used to assess incremental validity 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Total risk (1)        
Social vulnerability index-SoVI (2) -.077       
Median Income (3) .381a -.298a      
CDRI-1 (4) .266a -.308a .630a     
Flood related deaths (5) .294 .082 -.298 -.420c    
Total flood damage (6) -.039 -.060 -.076 -.239a .423b   
Insured  flood damage (7) .581a -.057 .441a .385a .364c -.038  
Uninsured flood damage (8) -.065 -.072 -.070 -.223a -.352 .919a -.201b 
  
Note: N = 144; a p < .01; b p < .05; c p <.10 (two-tailed tests) 
 
Table 6.16 presents the OLS results for three models predicting total flood property 
damage. As with the predictive validity analysis above, CDRI-1 should have a negative effect 
while SoVI should have a positive effective and median income should also have a negative 
effect. The first model regresses total flood losses on the control variable, total risk, and median 
income. The second model then adds SoVI, while the third model includes CDRI-1. Since a 
single variable is added in models 2 and 3, the t-test for the coefficients is the appropriate test to 
determine if the new variable adds incrementally to the model. The first model, which includes 
only total risk and median income accounts for 5.4% of the variance, but it should be noted that 
only the total risk measure is significant, median income is not significant. The second model, in 
which SoVI is added, has a significantly higher R2 of 12.8% and SoVI is significant but not in 
the anticipated direction. The third model has an even higher R2 of 15.6% and the CDRI-1 
measure is both significant and in the anticipated positive direction. The significant t-test for the 
CDRI-1 suggest that it does indeed contribute to the model and is indeed contributing, even with 
the inclusion of median income, which remains non-significant, and SoVI, which is not 
performing as expected. 
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Table 6.16.  OLS regression model: SoVI, median income, and CDRI-1 predicting total flood 
property damage 
 
Model Variable Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize 
Coefficients 
t-value P-value R2 Adj.R2 
1 Total risk .090 .205 2.187 .016b   
 Median income .075 .056 0.593 ..278 .054b .039 
2 Total risk .094 .215 2.376 .010a   
 Median income -.026 -.019 -0.206 .419   
 SoVI -.107 -.281 -3.265 .000a .128a .107 
3 Total risk .099 .226 2.524 .007a   
 Median income .135 .101 0.922 .179   
 SoVI .-.115 -.303 -3.537 .000a   
 CDRI-1 -.670 -.213 -2.043 .022b .156a .129 
 
Note: N = 144; a p < .01; b p <.05; c p < .10 (one-tailed tests) 
 
The results for the models predicting insured flood property damage presented in Table 
6.17, are equally supportive of CDRI’s incremental validity. The first model accounts for 40% of 
the variance in insured flood property damage, with both total risk and median income having 
significant positive effects. The second model suggests that SoVI does not significantly 
contribute; its t-test is not significant. The third model however does account for significantly 
more of the variance in insured losses, with R2 of 42.2%, and CDRI is statistically significant 
and positive as expected. Also in the third model, median income and total risk remain 
significant and positive, but SoVI remains non-significant and not performing as expected. 
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Table 6.17. OLS regression model: SoVI, median income, and CDRI-1 predicting insured flood 
property damage 
 
Model Variable Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize 
Coefficients 
t-value P-value R2 Adj.R2 
1 Total risk .220 .484 6.547 .000a   
 Median income .367 .266 3.605 .000a .400a .390 
2 Total risk .219 .480 6.475 .000a   
 Median income .396 .287 3.676 .000a   
 SoVI .023 .060 .829 .205 .403a .389 
3 Total risk .214 .471 6.413 .000a   
 Median income .258 .188 2.052 .021b   
 SoVI .031 .081 1.115 .134   
 CDRI-1 .568 .178 2.036 ..022b .422a .403 
 
Note: N = 144; a p < .01; b p <.05; c p < .10 (one-tailed tests) 
 
  
The results for the models predicting uninsured flood damage are presented in Table 
6.18. The first model accounts for 2.8% of the variance in uninsured flood property damage, 
with both total risk and median income not performing as expected. The second model in which 
SoVI is added has a significantly higher R2 of 11.6% and SoVI is significant but not in the 
anticipated direction. It would be expected that SoVI should have a positive effect. The third 
model does account for significantly more of the variance in uninsured losses, with R2 of 17.3%, 
and CDRI is statistically significant and negative as expected. Also in the third model, median 
income, total risk, and SoVI remain significant, but again, SoVI is not performing as expected. 
Clearly these results add increasing confidence in CDRI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
118 
Table 6.18. OLS regression model: SoVI, median income, and CDRI-1 predicting uninsured 
flood property damage 
 
Model Variable Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize 
Coefficients 
t-value P-value R2 Adj.R2 
1 Total risk .049 .126 1.206 .112   
 Median income .081 .070 .665 .254 .028c .010 
2 Total risk .053 .137 1.366 .088c   
 Median income -.017 -.015 -.141 .444   
 SOVI -.108 -.308 -3.255 .001a .116a .091 
3 Total risk .049 .127 1.306 .097c   
 Median income .218 .186 1.485 .070c   
 SOVI -.107 -.305 -3.313 .000a   
 CDRI-1 -.914 -.309 -2.691 .004a .173a .143 
 
Note: N = 144; a p < .01; b p <.05; c p < .10 (one-tailed tests) 
 
The results for the models predicting flood related deaths presented in Table 6.19, are 
also supportive of CDRI’s incremental validity. The first model which includes total risk and 
median income performs as expected, with total risk having a positive effect while median 
income having a negative effect on flood related deaths.  The second model which includes SoVI 
is significant and SoVI performed as expected. The third model indicates that CDRI-1 is 
statistically significant and negative as expected suggesting that it does indeed contribute to the 
model. Also in the third model, total risk, median income, and SoVI are significant and perform 
as expected. 
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Table 6.19. ZTP regression model: SoVI, median income, and CDRI-1 predicting deaths due to 
flooding  
 
Model  Variable Coefficient Standard error z P>|z| Pseudo R2 
1 Total risk .223 .013 17.30 .000  
 Median income -1.657 .053 -31.14 .000 0.6485 
2 Total risk .196 .014 13.57 .000  
 Median income -1.406 .078 -18.02 .000  
 SoVI .862 .020 4.30 .000 0.6553 
3 Total risk .163 .015 11.01 .000  
 Median income -1.229 .077 -16.04 .000  
 SoVI .125 .012 5.90 .000  
 CDRI-1 -1.496 .224 -6.67 .000 0.6722 
 
Note: N = 22; prob>Ch2 = 0.000; Model 1: Chi2 = 1739.97, df = 2; Model 2: Chi2 = 1758.20; df = 3; Model 3: Chi2 = 
1803.54; df = 4; Pseudo R2 = 0.6722. 
 
In conclusion, clearly CDRI as a measure has made a unique contribution to the 
prediction of flood losses and flood related deaths that could not have been obtained from SoVI 
and/or median income. The significant incremental validity of CDRI over SoVI and median 
income in predicting flood losses and flood related deaths suggest that adding CDRI as new 
measure in the hazard literature will be beneficial to planners and emergency managers.  
6.4. Summary 
This chapter has examined the validity of the CDRI using two methods; the zero-order 
correlation and the regression analyses. The key findings of this chapter can be summarized as 
follows. 
First, there is a negative correlation between the CDRI and the number of flood related 
deaths in the U.S. Gulf coast region. This result implies that communities that engage in 
activities related to building disaster resilience are more likely to significantly reduce the number 
of deaths due to flooding. These include activities of the four phases of disaster: mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and disaster and the resources or community capitals, which help to 
undertake the activities to build disaster resilience: social, economic, physical, and human. This 
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result is consistent with the findings by Zahran et al. (2008) who found that counties in Texas 
that frequently suffered from flooding but had strong hazard mitigation plans in place 
experienced fewer flood related deaths and injuries.  
Second, there is a negative correlation between the CDRI and the total flood property 
damage in the U.S. Gulf coast region. This finding implies that communities with a high level of 
resilience or those which engage in activities that foster disaster resilience are more likely to 
significantly reduce flood related property damage. For example, communities which engage in 
hazard mitigation activities such as re-directing developments out of floodplains are more likely 
to reduce the flood related property damage.  
Third, the results suggest that there is a positive correlation between the CDRI and the 
insured flood property damage in the U.S. Gulf coast region. This finding implies that counties 
with a high level of disaster resilience are more likely to insure their property against flood 
damage because they have access to financial resources. 
Fourth, the results also indicate that there is a negative relationship between the CDRI 
and the uninsured flood property damage. These results suggest that most people residing in 
communities with a comparatively high level of disaster resilience are more likely to afford to 
buy flood insurance because they have access to financial resources.  
Fifth, there is a negative correlation between the CDRI and social vulnerability. This 
result suggests that communities that have high disaster resilience have low social vulnerability.  
Sixth, as expected, the results show that there is a negative correlation between social 
vulnerability and the number of deaths due to flooding in the U.S. Gulf coast region. This result 
implies that communities with a high number of socially vulnerable populations are more likely 
to experience more flood related deaths. This is not surprising because in recent years, hazard 
researchers have reached the consensus that demographic differences play an important role in 
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determining the risk people face. It has been found that households with higher socioeconomic 
status suffer less when compared with low income households (Cutter et al., 2003; Morrow, 
1999; Peacock et al., 1997). Perhaps the most recent evidence was from the hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita (2005) which revealed that poor communities often suffer disproportionately in terms of 
human deaths and injuries.  
Seventh, there is a positive correlation between the CDRI and the total physical risk. 
This result implies that communities located in high risk areas are more likely to engage in 
disaster resilience related activities such as hazard mitigation and disaster preparedness. 
Although there is no perfect correlation between perceive risk and scientifically estimated risk, 
studies have found that perceived risk is a significant predictor of hazard adjustment adoption 
(Lindell & Perry, 2000).  High perceived risk is more likely to lead to a community to take 
hazard protective measures such as hazard mitigation or preparedness (Peacock, 2003; Peacock, 
Brody, & Highfield, 2005). 
Eighth, CDRI has shown some evidence of incremental validity. It has demonstrated 
unique contributions to the prediction of flood losses and flood related deaths that could not have 
been obtained from SoVI and/or median income. 
Finally, on the whole, the CDRI-1 measure, which is the primary focus in this study 
performed as expected. The results on correlational and regression analyses clearly suggest 
construct and incremental validation of the measure implying that the measure is theoretically 
and empirically valid. 
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CHAPTER VII 
ASSESSING DISASTER RESILIENCE OF THE U.S. GULF COAST REGION 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to employ the final disaster resilience index scores 
with the aim of identifying which states and counties are comparatively more disaster resilient in 
the Gulf coast region. This exercise provides not only information about the relative disaster 
resilience of states and counties in the region, but also additional confidence in the validity and 
utility of the CDRI scores as well as the subcomponent measures associated with disaster phases 
and community capitals. Throughout this exercise emphasis is placed on the CDRI-1 score, 
although again the other CDRI scores are displayed for comparison purposes. In this analysis the 
disaster phases and community capitals sub-indices are employed to gain additional insight in 
their utility and to gain additional understanding on how these components are operating within 
the CDRI. 
In order to maximize the ability of this essentially descriptive analysis, in terms of 
providing additional feedback regarding the utility and validity of the CDRI measurement 
approach developed in this dissertation, it is important to outline, at least in general terms the 
expectations of this analysis. In other words, what are the general expectations with respect to 
disaster resilience across states and counties along the Gulf coast? In an ideal analysis, it would 
be advantageous to have a set of hypotheses to test regarding which state and/or county should 
score highest on the CDRI index when compared to others. Unfortunately the literature and 
previous research on disaster resilience is not sufficiently developed to allow for formal 
hypothesis testing. Nevertheless, the literature does suggest some general expectations. 
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7.2. Disaster resilience expectations along the U.S. Gulf coast 
The literature on local land use planning suggests that communities with high quality and 
effective comprehensive plans are more likely to have a high level of disaster resilience and a 
low level of vulnerability (Burby, 1998; Burby et al., 2000). A great body of literature has 
demonstrated that local land use planning is an important element in dealing with disasters 
(Berke & Beatley, 1992; Brody, 2003; Brody & Highfield, 2005). These researchers found that 
local land use planning is a key to improving hazard mitigation which is an important element in 
building disaster-resilient communities. Generally speaking, hazard and disaster planning are 
measures undertaken prior to disasters to help avoid and reduce loss of human life and property 
damage (Burby, 1998). Land use planning for example, can help to identify high risk areas so 
that developments can be re-directed away from these areas (Burby, 1998).  
Overall the literature suggest that states or counties which mandate comprehensive plans, 
adopt building codes and zoning regulations, or participate in the FEMA’s Community Rating 
System are more resilient, particularly with respect to mitigation activities, than other 
communities. Indeed the importance of these planning elements necessitated their inclusion as a 
small part of the set of indicators included in the CDRI. Specifically of the 75 indicators 
incorporated in the CDRI scores, five indicators address: (1) land use planning and zoning 
regulations, (2) FEMA approved mitigation plans, (3) comprehensive plans, (4) building codes, 
and (5) FEMA’s Community Rating System participation.  The following brief discussion draws 
on the planning research literature with respect to these five planning elements to address which 
state or states appear to make better use of them and therefore suggest which states and 
subsequently counties should score better on the CDRI indices. 
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(i) Land use planning and zoning regulations: There are significant differences in planning 
powers and authority between Florida and the rest of the states in the U.S. Gulf coast 
region. Most of the U.S. Gulf coast counties have zoning regulations to regulate 
development but Florida is the only state in the region to mandate local plans. Also, in 
Florida both counties and cities have what is known as the “Home Rule” and the authority 
to plan (Jacob & Showalter, 2007). Home rule is the power and authority a local 
government is granted to plan by the state. It enables the local government to exercise all 
governmental powers except those limited by the state. Generally, the ability to develop, 
implement, and enforce local plans depends predominantly on home rule power (Jacob & 
Showalter, 2007). In contrast, municipalities in Texas, for example, have planning and 
enforcement power but counties have no planning power (Jacob & Showalter, 2007). This 
implies that Texas provides little or no intervention in guiding local planning or specifying 
elements to include in local plans. These findings suggest that Florida and its counties 
should be at the upper end of the CDRI index while Texas should be at the lower end, with 
other states falling in between. 
(ii) Comprehensive plans and hazard mitigation plans: Florida requires its coastal counties to 
have comprehensive plans and local mitigation plans (Brody, Godschalk, & Burby, 2003). 
Most importantly, Florida is the only U.S. Gulf coast state to include hazard mitigation 
within a state plan. Texas and others in the U.S. Gulf coast region do not require inclusion 
of hazard mitigation component in a state plan (Jacob & Showalter, 2007), although there 
are may be independent mitigation plans. Texas and other states in the region take what 
Jacob and Showalter (2007) called a “fairly laissez faire” approach towards planning. In 
other words, local municipalities and counties (except in Florida) are free to develop 
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comprehensive plans, with or without mitigation plans, but the state does not mandate these 
plans. These finding suggest that Florida should be near the top of the CDRI scores. 
(iii) Building codes: In general, there are two building codes that states often adopt: the 
International Building Code (IBC) for commercial and multifamily structures, and the 
International Residential Code (IRC) for single and two-family structures (Jacob & 
Showalter, 2007). The current version of these building codes is 2006, and they include 
wind and flood elements. Only Florida and very recently Louisiana mandate state building 
codes both IBC and IRC. Alabama and Mississippi have state codes that apply to state 
buildings only, although building codes were developed for coastal areas in Mississippi 
following Hurricane Katrina and some coastal counties did adopt these measures. Texas has 
no officially mandated state building code for either residential or commercial constructions 
but it recommends adoption of the 2000 IBC and IRC codes (Jacob & Showalter, 2007). 
More specifically, Texas, through its department of insurance, does develop its own version 
of IBC and IRC, but local communities, not counties are free to adopt or not to adopt the 
codes. 
(iv) Community Rating System (CRS): Local communities in the United States can obtain 
substantial reductions in flood insurance premiums by participating in the Community 
Rating System of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The NFIP’s Community 
Rating System encourages communities to keep new development out of flood plains. The 
main goal of the NFIP program is to reduce flood losses. The CRS has been designed to 
provide incentives in terms of flood insurance premium discounts, (up to a maximum of 
45%) for communities to go beyond the minimum flood management requirements (Brody 
et al., 2007). The rating scores are divided into 10 classes, which correspond to flood 
insurance premium discount rate from 5% to 45%. Class 1 requires the most credit points 
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and receives the highest premium discount (45%) whereas Class 9 receives the lowest 
premium discount (5%) (Brody et al., 2007). Class 10 does not obtain a minimum number 
of credit points and therefore receives no discount. The CRS classes are based on 18 
activities, which are grouped into the following four main categories: (1) public 
information, (2) mapping and regulation, (3) flood damage reduction, and (4) flood 
preparedness (Brody et al., 2007). Communities that implement most of these measures 
receive high CRS scores. The results of this research show that Florida counties exhibited 
higher CRS scores, suggesting that most of the counties have implemented the NFIP’s 
required flood management measures. 
Clearly the above discussions suggest that of the entire Gulf coast states, Florida and its 
counties should rank near the top in terms of disaster resilience. It should also be recalled 
however, that the above elements are much more focused on hazard mitigation issues and do not 
necessarily capture other dimensions of disaster preparedness, response, and recovery. 
Furthermore, these elements capture only a small part of the full complement of community 
capital elements. Nevertheless the discussion does suggest that Florida, with its much more 
comprehensive approach to addressing natural hazards and disasters, should rank higher than 
other states in the Gulf coast. Furthermore, while information on other states is more limited, the 
discussion also suggests that Texas, with its relatively more laissez-faire approach and inability 
of counties to be involved in planning process might well be expected to fall at the lower end of 
the CDRIs. 
 The following discussion begins by examining the states in terms of their CDRI score 
rankings, followed by an examination of state rakings on the disaster phases and community 
capitals sub-indices. The final section presents a brief discussion of county rankings. 
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7.3. CDRI scores by state 
This section discusses the results of the CDRI mean scores in the study region. As it can 
be recalled, in the development of the CDRI and sub-indices, standardized scores or z-scores 
were employed. Therefore, the scores are centered, or have a mean of zero and positive scores 
indicate rankings above the mean and negative scores indicate rankings below the mean. In 
addition, it should be recalled that the unit of analysis in development of the CDRIs was the 
county or parish; therefore the state averages were calculated based on the coastal 
counties/parishes falling in each states. Again, the numbers of counties/parishes for each state 
are: Florida, 42; Texas, 41; Louisiana, 38; Mississippi, 12; Alabama, 8; and Georgia, 3. As with 
previous discussion the focus is on the CDRI-I scores, with the other two CDRIs displayed for 
comparison purposes.  
The assessment of the state results begins by examining the box plots of the CDRI 
scores across all states. Box plots are efficient tools to visualize and compare distributions of 
data in several samples (Dumbgen & Riedwyl, 2007). They can easily depict the locality, spread, 
and skewness of data. The box plots use the median, the approximate quartiles, and the lowest 
and highest data points to convey the level, spread, and symmetry of a distribution of data values 
(Dumbgen & Riedwyl, 2007). They can also be easily used to identify outlier data values. The 
box bounds the first and the third quartiles, commonly known as the inter-quartile range (IQR) 
which represents the middle 50% of the data distribution (Coolidge, 2006). The length of the box 
is used to compare the spread of the distribution of the data.  If the box is small, it means that the 
middle data are tightly packed around the median. If the box is large, it means that the middle 
data spread out far from the median. The median value is represented by a horizontal line within 
a box. The vertical line is used to identify outliers; the mild outliers are marked by a circle (o) 
and the extreme outliers are marked by a star (*).  
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Figures 7.1 through 7.3 present the box plots for the individual CDRIs for each state. 
Not surprisingly, the plots for the individual CDRI scores are very similar. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Box plots for CDRI-1  
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Figure 7.2. Box plots for CDRI-2 
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Figure 7.3. Box plots for CDRI-3  
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Focusing on Figure 7.1, which displays the results for the preferred CDRI-1 score, the 
results suggest that there is a good deal of dispersion among the counties in Florida and Texas, 
however, as noted above, these two states also included the greatest number of coastal counties. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the Florida dispersion has a slight positive skew, while 
Texas’s dispersion has a slight negative skew. Furthermore, the results show that Florida has the 
highest median score in all the CDRIs; supporting the previously discussed findings that Florida 
is the most disaster resilient state in the study region. The results also suggest that Louisiana 
demonstrated the lowest median scores in almost all the CDRIs. Additionally, the box plots in 
Figures 7.1(CDRI-1) and 7.2 (CDRI-2) indicate that East Baton Rouge, Lafayette, and St. 
Tammany parishes (Louisiana) are a good bit higher than other parishes in Louisiana, 
designating them as outliers on these graphs. Also, in Figure 7.2 Starr county in Texas appears as 
an outlier on the lower end, indicating that this county scores a good deal lower on the CDRI-2 
index than others in the state. Table 7.1 presents the mean CDRI scores for each Gulf coast state 
and Figure 7.4 displays these average for each state graphically. As can be seen by comparing 
across CDRI scores in Table 7.1 or Figure 7.4, there is a good deal of similarity in the CDRIs for 
each state. While there is some variation, for the most part the CDRIs scores for each state tend 
to cluster. 
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Table 7.1. CDRI mean scores by state 
State CDRI-1  CDRI-2  CDRI-3 
 Mean Score Rank  Mean Score Rank  Mean Score Rank 
Florida .2539 1  .3035 1  .2759 1 
Alabama .0067 2  -.0125 2  .0137 2 
Georgia -.0479 3  -.1004 5  -.0856 4 
Mississippi -.0860 4  -.0785 3  -.0780 3 
Louisiana -.0981 5  -.0994 4  -.0968 5 
Texas -.1418 6  -.1861 6  -.1665 6 
 
 
Most important however, there appears to be variations among the states and the patterns are 
consistent with the general expectations discussed above. Specifically, the mean scores among 
states indicate that, on average, Florida performed better by scoring the highest scores in all the 
three CDRIs, followed by Alabama, which scored above average with regard to CDRI-1 and 
CDRI-3, and near average in terms of CDRI-2. The results also indicate that Texas scored the 
lowest scores in all the three CDRIs, suggesting that on average Texas counties are the least 
disaster resilient in the U.S. Gulf coast region.  Furthermore the results suggest that on average 
parishes in Louisiana are comparable to the averages for counties in Mississippi and Georgia. 
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Figure 7.4. Distribution of mean score for CDRIs 
 
An analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA) was performed, and if necessary, post-hoc 
testing was undertaken to determine if the apparent differences in the mean CDRI scores seen in 
Table 7.1 reflect statistically significant variations among Gulf coast states. The results of those 
tests are displayed in Table 7.2. The results suggest that there are indeed statistically significant 
differences among the states with respect to all three CDRI measures. Specifically, a significant 
F-test simply indicates that at least one mean is different from one other mean, while a multiple 
comparison test reveals the trend of significant differences between the means (Coolidge, 2006; 
Turner & Thayer, 2001; Weiss, 2006). There is a variety of multiple comparison methods 
suggested in the literature. Some of the more commonly used methods include Fisher’s least 
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significant difference (LSD), Tukey’s honestly significant difference (HSD), Scheffe’s test, 
Bonferroni correction, and Duncan’s new multiple range test (Coolidge, 2006; Turner & Thayer, 
2001; Weiss, 2006). Some of these methods are considered to be more conservative in terms of 
controlling the Type I error (rejecting the null hypothesis when it is actually true) and others are 
considered more liberal (Coolidge, 2006). In this study, a multiple comparison test using Fisher’s 
least significant difference (LSD) was used to determine the pattern of the means difference.  
The results for ANOVA tests of CDRI score differences among the Gulf coastal states are 
presented in Table 7.2. All F-tests are statistically significant, suggesting that there are 
statistically differences among the states with respect to the mean CDRI scores.  
 
Table 7.2. ANOVA F-test for the CDRIs 
CDRI Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 3.994 5 .799 4.912 .000 
Within Groups 22.445 138 .163   
CDRI-1 
Total 26.439 143    
Between Groups 5.770 5 1.154 7.856 .000 
Within Groups 20.271 138 .147   
CDRI-2 
Total 26.041 143    
Between Groups 4.787 5 .957 4.821 .000 
Within Groups 27.402 138 .199   
CDRI-3 
Total 32.189 143    
 
 
In light of these results it makes sense to assess for significant differences among the 
states. Tables 7.3 through 7.5 display the results for Fisher’s Least Significant Difference (LSD) 
tests among the state means. In every real sense, the results for differences among states with 
respect to the primary measure, CDRI-1, are not surprising, on the whole they confirm that 
Florida’s counties have on average higher community disaster resilience scores than those of 
Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. More specifically, the results confirm that the Florida mean is 
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higher than the mean county scores for these three states. However, the difference of Florida 
from Alabama and Georgia is not significant (p < .05).  Very similar patterns emerge when 
comparing county mean scores for the CDR-2 and CDRI-3. The only variation is that mean for 
Florida’s CDRI-2 score is significantly higher than the means for all other states. There are no 
statistically significant differences among the county means for other states. In general these 
results are consistent with the expectations that Florida counties would have higher community 
disaster resilience than the other states. While the mean for Texas counties is lower than all other 
states, the differences are not statistically significant. 
 
Table 7.3. Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test for CDRI-1 
95% Confidence Interval (I) State (J) State Mean 
Difference 
 (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
2. Texas .396b .089 .000 .220 .571 
3. Louisiana .352b .090 .000 .173 .531 
4. Mississippi .340b .132 .011 .079 .601 
5. Alabama .247 .156 .114 -.060 .555 
1. Florida 
6. Georgia .302 .241 .213 -.175 .778 
3. Louisiana -.044 .091 .630 -.223 .136 
4. Mississippi -.056 .132 .674 -.318 .206 
5. Alabama -.149 .156 .342 -.457 .160 
2. Texas 
6. Georgia -.094 .241 .698 -.571 .383 
4. Mississippi -.012 .134 .928 -.276 .252 
5. Alabama -.105 .157 .506 -.415 .206 
3. Louisiana 
6. Georgia -.050 .242 .836 -.528 .428 
5. Alabama -.093 .184 .615 -.457 .271 4. Mississippi 
6. Georgia -.038 .260 .884 -.553 .477 
5. Alabama 6. Georgia .055 .273 .842 -.485 .595 
Note: b p < 0.05  
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Table 7.4. Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test for CDRI-2 
 
95% Confidence Interval (I) State (J) State Mean 
Difference 
 (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
2. Texas .490b .084 .000 .323 .656 
3. Louisiana .403b .086 .000 .233 .573 
4. Mississippi .382b .126 .003 .134 .630 
5. Alabama .316b .148 .034 .024 .608 
1. Florida 
6. Georgia .404c .229 .080 -.049 .857 
3. Louisiana -.087 .086 .317 -.257 .084 
4. Mississippi -.108 .126 .394 -.356 .141 
5. Alabama -.174 .148 .243 -.467 .119 
2. Texas 
6. Georgia -.086 .229 .709 -.539 .368 
4. Mississippi -.021 .127 .870 -.272 .230 
5. Alabama -.087 .149 .561 -.382 .208 
3. Louisiana 
6. Georgia .001 .230 .996 -.453 .456 
5. Alabama -.066 .175 .706 -.412 .280 4. Mississippi 
6. Georgia .022 .247 .930 -.467 .511 
5. Alabama 6. Georgia .088 .260 .735 -.425 .601 
Note: b p < 0.05; c p < 0.10 
 
 
Table 7.5. Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test for CDRI-3 
 
95% Confidence Interval (I) State (J) State Mean 
Difference 
 (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
2. Texas .442b .098 .000 .249 .636 
3. Louisiana .373b .100 .000 .176 .570 
4. Mississippi .354b .146 .017 .066 .642 
5. Alabama .262 .172 .129 -.078 .602 
1. Florida 
6. Georgia .362 .266 .177 -.165 .888 
3. Louisiana -.070 .100 .489 -.268 .129 
4. Mississippi -.089 .146 .546 -.378 .201 
5. Alabama -.180 .172 .297 -.521 .160 
2. Texas 
6. Georgia -.081 .267 .762 -.608 .446 
4. Mississippi -.019 .148 .899 -.311 .273 
5. Alabama -.111 .173 .525 -.453 .232 
3. Louisiana 
6. Georgia -.011 .267 .966 -.540 .517 
5. Alabama -.092 .203 .653 -.494 .310 4. Mississippi 
6. Georgia .008 .288 .979 -.561 .576 
5. Alabama 6. Georgia .099 .302 .743 -.497 .696 
Note: b p < 0.05 
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Before leaving the overall CDRI measures, it might be illustrative to examine in more 
detail the scores among the coastal counties included in the sample. Tables 7.6 through 7.8 
present the top 10 and bottom 10 counties for each of the CDRI measures. The complete listing 
of the 144 counties for each CDRI score is included in Appendix D. Interestingly, when 
examining the top 10 CDRI-1 scores in Table 7.6; seven out of ten counties are located in 
Florida. Monroe county (the Florida Keys) was the county that had the highest CDRI score. This 
clearly is good, because this is probably the most vulnerable Gulf coast county for hurricanes 
and hurricane impacts in the United States. On the lower end of the ranking, we find that eight of 
the ten counties with the lowest CDRI-1scores, are located in Texas. Most of these Texas 
counties are located along the southern tip of Texas along the Mexico-Texas border. The 
interesting exception to the top/bottom split between Florida and Texas is that one county in 
Texas, Fayette, is in the top ten list. 
 
Table 7.6. CDRI-1 ranking scores by top and bottom 10 lists  
 
TOP 10  LIST   BOTTOM 10 LIST  
Rank County State Score  Rank County State Score 
1 Monroe               Florida     1.44  135 West Feliciana      Louisiana   -0.61 
2 Leon                 Florida     1.12  136 Kenedy               Texas       -0.61 
3 Collier              Florida     1.03  137 Vernon               Louisiana   -0.67 
4 Sarasota             Florida     1.02  138 Webb                 Texas       -0.68 
5 Franklin             Florida     0.90  139 Cameron             Texas       -0.72 
6 Lee                  Florida     0.72  140 Bee                  Texas       -0.73 
7 East Baton Rouge     Louisiana   0.69  141 Hidalgo              Texas       -0.81 
8 Baldwin              Alabama     0.68  142 Duval                Texas       -0.92 
9 Fayette              Texas       0.68  143 Willacy              Texas       -0.98 
10 Okaloosa             Florida     0.67  144 Starr                Texas       -1.32 
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Table 7.7. CDRI-2 ranking scores by top and bottom 10 lists  
 
TOP 10  LIST   BOTTOM 10 LIST  
Rank County State Score  Rank County State Score 
1 Monroe               Florida     1.39  135 Vernon               Louisiana   -0.48 
2 Franklin             Florida     1.24  136 Jim Wells            Texas       -0.50 
3 Sarasota             Florida     1.13  137 Hardee               Florida     -0.59 
4 Collier              Florida     1.08  138 Cameron             Texas       -0.71 
5 Walton               Florida     0.94  139 Webb                 Texas       -0.76 
6 Okaloosa             Florida     0.85  140 Hidalgo              Texas       -0.77 
7 Leon                 Florida     0.82  141 Kenedy               Texas       -0.80 
8 Baldwin              Alabama     0.75  142 Duval                Texas       -0.87 
9 Lee                  Florida     0.71  143 Willacy              Texas       -0.98 
10 East Baton Rouge     Louisiana   0.71  144 Starr                Texas       -1.27 
 
 
Table 7.8. CDRI-3 ranking scores by top and bottom 10 lists  
 
TOP 10  LIST   BOTTOM 10 LIST  
Rank County State Score  Rank County State Score 
1 Monroe               Florida     1.56  135 Evangeline          Louisiana   -0.58 
2 Collier              Florida     1.25  136 Vernon               Louisiana   -0.65 
3 Sarasota             Florida     1.21  137 Bee                  Texas       -0.69 
4 Leon                 Florida     1.11  138 Kenedy               Texas       -0.70 
5 Franklin             Florida     0.88  139 Cameron             Texas       -0.82 
6 Baldwin              Alabama     0.84  140 Webb                 Texas       -0.82 
7 Lee                  Florida     0.83  141 Hidalgo              Texas       -0.91 
8 Okaloosa             Florida     0.81  142 Duval                Texas       -1.03 
9 Walton               Florida     0.79  143 Willacy              Texas       -1.11 
10 East Baton Rouge     Louisiana   0.79  144 Starr                Texas       -1.49 
 
 
There is a good deal of similarity between top and bottom listings among the three CDRI 
scores. The top listings among all the CDRI scores are dominated by Florida counties, which 
include Monroe, Leon, Collier, Sarasota, Franklin, Lee, and Okaloosa. The list also includes 
Baldwin county (Alabama) and East Baton Rouge parish (Louisiana). The highest scores 
exhibited by these counties suggest that these are most disaster resilient counties in the U.S. Gulf 
coast region. At the bottom 10 of the list, three Texas counties (Starr, Willacy, and Duval) are 
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consistently ranked on the same positions for all the three CDRIs. Starr county is at the 
bottommost, followed by Willacy county, and Duval county, consecutively. These results 
suggest that these three counties are the least disaster resilient counties not only in Texas but also 
in the U.S. Gulf coast region as a whole. 
The following sections undertake a brief examination of two of the main sets of sub-
indices associated with the CDRI measure. The first examines the capital domain sub-indices 
and the second focuses on the disaster phases. These sections should provide additional insight 
in terms of how the components of the CDRI are operating and provide some insight into 
potential utility of these sub-indices for examining important dimensions of community disaster 
resilience. 
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Figure 7.5. Distribution of mean score for capital domain’s sub-indices  
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7.4. Mean scores of capital domain’s sub-indices 
Table 7.5 presents the county mean scores for each of the four capital domains – social, 
economic, physical, and human – for each of the six Gulf coast states (see also Figure 7.5 for 
graphical display of the these means). As might have been expected, given the results for the 
CDRI scores, the county averages for Florida are the highest across all capital dimensions. Texas 
has the lowest county mean for economic and human capital, while Louisiana has the lowest 
county mean for social capital and physical capital. However, while Texas has the second lowest 
county means on social and physical capital indices, Louisiana has the second highest for 
economic and human capital. Thus, while the Texas county means are consistently near the 
bottom of these rankings, the parish means for Louisiana are not consistent. These results again 
suggest that, on average, Texas counties are less disaster resilient across the four capital 
domains, while Florida counties are again, at least in terms of their means, quite resilient across 
all capital domains. 
 
Table 7.9. Mean scores of capital domain’s sub-indices by state 
 
State Social Capital  Economic Capital  Physical Capital  Human Capital 
 Mean 
score 
Rank  Mean 
score 
Rank  Mean 
score 
Rank  Mean 
score 
Rank 
Florida .1942 1  .2655 1  .2224 1  .3335 1 
Alabama .1267 2  -.0119 3  .0696 3  -.1578 5 
Mississippi -.0301 3  -.1241 5  -.0770 4  -.1129 4 
Georgia -.0319 4  -.0899 4  .0353 2  -.1052 3 
Texas -.0494 5  -.2183 6  -.0889 5  -.2108 6 
Louisiana -.1760 6  -.0092 2  -.1430 6  -.0640 2 
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Table 7.10. ANOVA F-test for capital domain’s sub-indices 
Sub-index Source Sum of Squares df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Between Groups 3.004 5 .601 2.347 .044 
Within Groups 35.327 138 .256   
Social capital 
Total 38.331 143    
Between Groups 5.128 5 1.026 1.491 .197 
Within Groups 94.930 138 .688   
Economic capital 
Total 100.058 143    
Between Groups 3.293 5 .659 6.497 .000 
Within Groups 13.990 138 .101   
Physical capital 
Total 17.283 143    
Between Groups 7.033 5 1.407 16.000 .000 
Within Groups 12.131 138 .088   
Human capital 
Total 19.164 143    
 
 
Table 7.10 presents the results from the ANOVA testing for significant differences 
among the states with respect to the four capital domain means. The results suggest that there are 
significant differences among the six Gulf coast states with respect to social, physical, and 
human capitals, but no differences with respect to economic capital. Tables 7.11, 7.12, and 7.13 
present the results for Fisher’s LSD test for social, physical, and human capitals respectively. 
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Table 7.11. Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test for social capital sub-index 
 
95% Confidence Interval (I) State (J) State Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
2. Texas .244b .111 .030 .024 .463 
3. Louisiana .370b .113 .001 .146 .594 
4. Mississippi .224 .166 .178 -.103 .552 
5. Alabama .068 .195 .730 -.318 .454 
1.Florida 
6. Georgia .226 .302 .456 -.372 .824 
3. Louisiana .127 .114 .268 -.099 .352 
4. Mississippi -.019 .166 .908 -.348 .309 
5. Alabama -.176 .196 .369 -.563 .211 
2. Texas 
6. Georgia -.018 .303 .954 -.616 .581 
4. Mississippi -.146 .168 .385 -.477 .185 
5. Alabama -.303 .197 .126 -.692 .087 
3. Louisiana 
6. Georgia -.144 .303 .636 -.744 .456 
5. Alabama -.157 .231 .498 -.614 .300 4. Mississippi 
6. Georgia .002 .327 .996 -.644 .648 
5. Alabama 6. Georgia .159 .343 .644 -.519 .836 
 
Note: b P< 0.05 
 
 
 
Table 7.12. Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test for physical capital sub-index 
 
95% Confidence Interval  (I) Sates (J) States Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
2. Texas .311b .070 .000 .173 .450 
3. Louisiana .366b .071 .000 .225 .506 
4. Mississippi .299b .104 .005 .093 .506 
5. Alabama .153 .123 .215 -.090 .396 
1.Florida 
6. Georgia .187 .190 .327 -.189 .563 
3. Louisiana .054 .072 .452 -.088 .196 
4. Mississippi -.012 .105 .909 -.219 .195 
5. Alabama -.159 .123 .200 -.402 .085 
2. Texas 
6. Georgia -.124 .190 .515 -.501 .252 
4. Mississippi -.066 .105 .532 -.275 .142 
5. Alabama -.213 .124 .088 -.458 .032 
3. Louisiana 
6. Georgia -.178 .191 .352 -.556 .199 
5. Alabama -.147 .145 .315 -.434 .141 4. Mississippi 
6. Georgia -.112 .206 .586 -.519 .294 
5. Alabama 6. Georgia .034 .216 .874 -.392 .461 
 
Note: b p < 0.05 
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Table 7.13. Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test for human capital sub-index 
 
95% Confidence Interval (I) States (J) States Mean 
Difference 
 (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
2. Texas .544b .065 .000 .416 .673 
3. Louisiana .398b .066 .000 .266 .529 
4. Mississippi .446b .097 .000 .255 .638 
5. Alabama .491b .114 .000 .265 .717 
1. Florida 
6. Georgia .439b .177 .015 .088 .789 
3. Louisiana -.147b .067 .030 -.279 -.015 
4. Mississippi -.098 .097 .317 -.290 .095 
5. Alabama -.053 .115 .645 -.280 .174 
2. Texas 
6. Georgia -.106 .177 .553 -.456 .245 
4. Mississippi .049 .098 .619 -.145 .243 
5. Alabama .094 .115 .418 -.134 .322 
3. Louisiana 
6. Georgia .041 .178 .817 -.310 .393 
5. Alabama .045 .135 .741 -.223 .312 4. Mississippi 
6. Georgia -.008 .191 .968 -.386 .371 
5. Alabama 6. Georgia -.053 .201 .794 -.450 .344 
 
Note: b p < 0.05 
 
 
The results for the three capital indices display patterns similar to those found among the 
CDRI measures. With respect to social capital, the Florida county mean is significantly higher 
than those of Texas and Louisiana. Similarly, with respect to physical capital, the mean for 
counties in Florida is again higher than those of the Texas and Louisiana, as well as Mississippi. 
And, finally, when considering human capital, the Florida mean is significantly higher than those 
of each of other five Gulf coast states. Yet again, there are no significant differences among the 
means of the other states. Overall, these findings again suggest that Florida’s counties on average 
have consistently higher scores with respect to social, physical, and human capital than counties 
in Texas and parishes in Louisiana. In addition, Florida counties also have higher average scores 
than counties in Alabama and Georgia with respect to human capital. 
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Tables 7.14 through 7.17 present the top and bottom 10 scoring counties for each of the 
capital sub-indices: Economic, physical, human, and social capital (for a complete listing of 
counties, see Appendix E). When examining the results for economic capital (Table 7.14), 
physical capital (Table 7.15) and human capital (Table 7.15), a similar pattern emerges. In each 
of these listings Florida counties dominated the top 10, taking 7 to 8 out of the top 10 slots in 
each. Furthermore, Texas counties dominated the bottom 10 holding 6 to 8 of the bottom 10 
slots. There is, however an interesting exception to this pattern when examining the top and 
bottom ten counties with respect to social capital (Table 7.17). 
 
Table 7.14. Economic capital sub-index scores by top and bottom 10 lists 
 
TOP 10  LIST   BOTTOM 10 LIST  
Rank County State Score  Rank County State Score 
1 Monroe               Florida     2.90  135 St. Helena           Louisiana   -0.97 
2 Collier              Florida     2.59  136 Cameron             Texas       -1.10 
3 Fort Bend            Texas       2.01  137 Evangeline          Louisiana   -1.12 
4 Sarasota             Florida     1.99  138 Hidalgo              Texas       -1.29 
5 St. Tammany          Louisiana   1.68  139 Wilkinson           Mississippi -1.49 
6 Lee                  Florida     1.50  140 Bee                  Texas       -1.51 
7 Baldwin              Alabama     1.40  141 Duval                Texas       -1.51 
8 Hillsborough         Florida     1.36  142 Brooks               Texas       -1.61 
9 Leon                 Florida     1.30  143 Willacy              Texas       -1.85 
10 Pinellas             Florida     1.24  144 Starr                Texas       -2.31 
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Table 7.15. Physical capital sub-index scores by top and bottom 10 lists  
 
TOP 10  LIST   BOTTOM 10 LIST  
Rank County State Score  Rank County State Score 
1 Franklin             Florida     1.72  135 Webb                 Texas       -0.42 
2 Monroe               Florida     1.43 
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St. John the 
Baptist Louisiana   -0.43 
3 Walton               Florida     0.96  137 Bee                  Texas       -0.44 
4 Leon                 Florida     0.75  138 Hardee               Florida     -0.48 
5 Bay                  Florida     0.69  139 Kenedy               Texas       -0.49 
6 Sarasota             Florida     0.68  140 Duval                Texas       -0.49 
7 Lafayette            Louisiana   0.66  141 West Feliciana      Louisiana   -0.50 
8 Collier              Florida     0.64  142 Willacy              Texas       -0.51 
9 Okaloosa             Florida     0.57  143 St. Bernard          Louisiana   -0.54 
10 Baldwin              Alabama     0.51  144 Starr                Texas       -0.63 
 
 
Table 7.16. Human capital sub-index scores by top and bottom 10 lists  
 
TOP 10  LIST   BOTTOM 10 LIST  
Rank County State Score  Rank County State Score 
1 Franklin             Florida     1.34  135 Monroe               Alabama     -0.44 
2 Liberty              Florida     1.09  136 Webb                 Texas       -0.51 
3 Orleans              Louisiana   0.81  137 Cameron             Texas       -0.52 
4 Bay                  Florida     0.73  138 Walthall             Mississippi -0.57 
5 Sarasota             Florida     0.73  139 Jim Hogg            Texas       -0.62 
6 Gulf                 Florida     0.71  140 Hidalgo              Texas       -0.64 
7 Monroe               Florida     0.65  141 Duval                Texas       -0.64 
8 East Baton Rouge     Louisiana   0.64  142 Willacy              Texas       -0.75 
9 Okaloosa             Florida     0.61  143 Kenedy               Texas       -0.92 
10 Walton               Florida     0.59  144 Starr                Texas       -0.92 
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Table 7.17. Social capital sub-index scores by top and bottom 10 lists  
 
TOP 10  LIST   BOTTOM 10 LIST  
Rank County State Score  Rank County State Score 
1 Goliad               Texas       1.97  135 Glades               Florida     -0.63 
2 Leon                 Florida     1.91  136 Willacy              Texas       -0.80 
3 Fayette              Texas       1.65  137 Liberty              Florida     -0.88 
4 Lavaca               Texas       1.19  138 Cameron             Texas       -0.90 
5 Austin               Texas       0.97  139 Hidalgo              Texas       -1.02 
6 Washington           Texas       0.91  140 Webb                 Texas       -1.03 
7 East Baton Rouge     Louisiana   0.84  141 West Feliciana      Louisiana   -1.04 
8 Citrus               Florida     0.82  142 Duval                Texas       -1.06 
9 Colorado             Texas       0.81  143 Vernon               Louisiana   -1.07 
10 Monroe               Florida     0.76  144 Starr                Texas       -1.40 
 
Table 7.17 displays the county listings for the social capital sub-index. While the by now 
familiar pattern holds for the bottom 10, in that six of these ten are counties in Texas, a very 
different pattern holds for the top 10. Specifically rather than the top 10 being dominated by 
counties from Florida, for the social capital listings, we find only three counties from Florida. 
Instead, Texas has 6 of the top 10 positions. As can be recalled social capital was measured 
using six components participation in voluntary organizations (volunteerism), involvement in 
social groups (group associations), civic and political participation, religious participations, 
community attachments and connection in working places. When compared to other Gulf coast 
states, Texas seems to perform comparatively better in almost all of these components. 
In conclusion, while there are certainly some variations, at least in terms of the top and 
bottom ten counties, on the whole the results suggest that on average, counties in Florida scored 
more highly on four community capital indices. It must be recalled that when considering these 
indices, while they do capture important dimensions of community capital, the goal in the 
selection of capital indicators was dictated by those capital elements most closely associated 
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with disaster phases. Hence, they may not be relevant to researchers simply wanting valid 
indicators of capital dimension. 
7.5. Mean scores of disaster phase’s sub-indices  
The final section examines the disaster phase’s sub-indices which assess resilience with 
respect to hazard mitigation, and disaster preparedness, response, and recovery. Table 7.18 
displays the county averages for each state with respect to each disaster phases. The averages are 
also displayed graphically in Figure 7.6 which displays the relative clustering of each of the four 
indices with respect to each state as well as the relative magnitude of these scores between the 
states. Consistent with the findings thus far, the results in Table 7.18 indicate that the means for 
counties in Florida are consistently higher across all disaster phases, as is more easily seen in 
Figure 7.6; these averages are much higher than those of the other states. In addition, the means 
for counties in Alabama consistently are ranked second across all disaster phases. On the other 
hand, the average for counties in Texas is again the lowest or nearly the lowest. Specifically, the 
average for Texas counties is in sixth or last place for hazard mitigation and disaster 
preparedness and response. Furthermore, Texas counties have the second to the lowest average 
in disaster recovery. 
 
Table 7.18. Mean scores of disaster phase’s sub-indices by state 
 
State Hazard  
Mitigation 
 Disaster 
Preparedness 
 Disaster  
Response 
 Disaster  
Recovery 
 Mean 
score 
 
Rank 
 Mean 
score 
 
Rank 
 Mean 
score 
 
Rank 
 Mean 
score 
 
Rank 
Florida .2806 1  .3031 1  .2688 1  .2511 1 
Alabama .0055 2  -.0202 2  .0384 2  .0312 2 
Louisiana -.0919 3  -.0836 5  -.1074 5  -.1045 4 
Mississippi -.0964 4  -.0603 4  -.0603 4  -.0951 3 
Georgia -.1469 5  -.0410 3  -.0030 3  -.1514 6 
Texas -.1644 6  -.2085 6  -.1655 6  -.1276 5 
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Preparedness -0.02 0.30 -0.04 -0.08 -0.06 -0.21
Response 0.04 0.27 0.00 -0.11 -0.06 -0.17
Recovery 0.03 0.25 -0.15 -0.10 -0.10 -0.13
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Figure 7.6. Distribution of mean score for disaster phase’s sub-indices  
 
 
Table 7.19. ANOVA F-test for disaster phase’s sub-indices 
Sub-index Source Sum of Squares df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Between Groups 4.911 5 .982 4.674 .001 
Within Groups 29.003 138 .210   
Mitigation 
Total 33.914 143    
Between Groups 5.959 5 1.192 5.102 .000 
Within Groups 32.236 138 .234   
Preparedness 
Total 38.195 143    
Between Groups 4.652 5 .930 5.650 .000 
Within Groups 22.722 138 .165   
Response 
Total 27.374 143    
Between Groups 3.916 5 .783 3.145 .010 
Within Groups 34.362 138 .249   
Recovery 
Total 38.278 143    
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The results for ANOVAs testing for significant difference in mean disaster phases 
among the six Gulf coast states are presented in Table 7.19. The findings again suggest that there 
are statistically significant differences among the states with respect to all four disaster phases: 
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Therefore, it makes sense to perform the 
multiple comparison tests. Tables 7.20 through 77.23 present the results for Fisher’s LSD test for 
hazard mitigation, disaster preparedness, disaster response, and disaster recovery, respectively. 
 
Table 7.20. Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test for hazard mitigation sub-index 
 
95% Confidence Interval (I) State (J) State Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
2. Texas .445b .101 .000 .246 .644 
3. Louisiana .373b .103 .000 .170 .575 
4. Mississippi .377b .150 .013 .080 .674 
5. Alabama .275 .177 .122 -.075 .625 
1.Florida 
6. Georgia .428 .274 .121 -.114 .969 
3. Louisiana -.073 .103 .484 -.277 .132 
4. Mississippi -.068 .151 .652 -.366 .230 
5. Alabama -.170 .177 .340 -.520 .181 
2. Texas 
6. Georgia -.017 .274 .949 -.560 .525 
4. Mississippi .005 .152 .976 -.296 .305 
5. Alabama -.097 .178 .586 -.450 .255 
3. Louisiana 
6. Georgia .055 .275 .842 -.489 .599 
5. Alabama -.102 .209 .627 -.516 .312 4. Mississippi 
6. Georgia .051 .296 .865 -.535 .636 
5. Alabama 6. Georgia .152 .310 .624 -.461 .766 
 
Note: b p < 0.05 
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Table 7.21. Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test for disaster preparedness sub-index 
 
95% Confidence Interval (I) State (J) State Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
2. Texas .512b .106 .000 .302 .722 
3. Louisiana .387b .108 .000 .1727 .601 
4. Mississippi .363b .158 .023 .051 .676 
5. Alabama .323c .186 .085 -.045 .692 
1.Florida 
6. Georgia .344 .289 .236 -.227 .915 
3. Louisiana -.125 .109 .253 -.340 .090 
4. Mississippi -.148 .159 .352 -.462 .165 
5. Alabama -.188 .187 .315 -.558 .181 
2. Texas 
6. Georgia -.168 .289 .563 -.739 .404 
4. Mississippi -.023 .160 .885 -.340 .293 
5. Alabama -.063 .188 .737 -.435 .308 
3. Louisiana 
6. Georgia -.043 .290 .883 -.616 .531 
5. Alabama -.040 .221 .856 -.476 .396 4. Mississippi 
6. Georgia -.019 .312 .951 -.636 .598 
5. Alabama 6. Georgia .021 .327 .949 -.626 .668 
 
Note: b p < 0.05; c p < 0.10 
 
 
Table 7.22. Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test for disaster response sub-index 
 
95% Confidence Interval (I) Sate (J) Sate Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
2. Texas .434b .089 .000 .258 .611 
3. Louisiana .376b .091 .000 .197 .556 
4. Mississippi .329b .133 .014 .067 .592 
5. Alabama .230 .157 .143 -.079 .540 
1.Florida 
6. Georgia .272 .243 .264 -.208 .751 
3. Louisiana -.058 .091 .526 -.239 .123 
4. Mississippi -.105 .133 .431 -.369 .158 
5. Alabama -.204 .157 .196 -.514 .106 
2. Texas 
6. Georgia -.163 .243 .504 -.642 .317 
4. Mississippi -.047 .134 .727 -.313 .219 
5. Alabama -.146 .158 .357 -.458 .166 
3. Louisiana 
6. Georgia -.104 .243 .669 -.586 .377 
5. Alabama -.099 .185 .595 -.465 .268 4. Mississippi 
6. Georgia -.057 .262 .827 -.575 .461 
5. Alabama 6. Georgia .041 .275 .880 -.502 .585 
 
Note: b p < 0.05  
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Table 7.23. Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test for disaster recovery sub-index 
 
95% Confidence Interval (I) State (J) State Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
2. Texas .379b .110 .001 .162 .595 
3. Louisiana .356b .112 .002 .135 .577 
4. Mississippi .346b .163 .036 .023 .669 
5. Alabama .220 .193 .255 -.161 .601 
1.Florida 
6. Georgia .403 .298 .179 -.187 .992 
3. Louisiana -.023 .112 .837 -.245 .199 
4. Mississippi -.033 .164 .843 -.356 .291 
5. Alabama -.159 .193 .412 -.540 .223 
2. Texas 
6. Georgia .024 .299 .937 -.566 .614 
4. Mississippi -.009 .165 .955 -.336 .317 
5. Alabama -.136 .194 .486 -.520 .248 
3. Louisiana 
6. Georgia .047 .299 .876 -.545 .639 
5. Alabama -.126 .228 .580 -.577 .324 4. Mississippi 
6. Georgia .056 .322 .861 -.580 .693 
5. Alabama 6. Georgia .183 .338 .590 -.485 .851 
 
Note: b p < 0.05  
 
 
The results of Fisher’s test for the disaster phases show similar pattern to those found 
among the community capitals as well as the CDRI measures. As expected, with respect to 
hazard mitigation the mean for Florida is significantly higher than that of Texas, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi. With respect to disaster preparedness, again the Florida mean is significantly higher 
than those of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Finally, with respect to disaster 
preparedness and response, the mean for counties in Florida is again higher than those of Texas, 
Louisiana, and Mississippi. The results also show no significant differences among the means of 
other Gulf coast states.  Overall, these findings further suggest that Florida counties on average 
have scored higher with respect to all phases of disaster. 
 Tables 7.24 through 7.27 present the top and bottom 10 scoring counties for each 
disaster phases’ sub-indices: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. The complete 
listing of the 144 counties for each disaster phase is included in Appendix F.  The results show 
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similar pattern for all disaster phases with very minimal variations. In each of the rankings, 
Florida counties dominate the top 10, taking 6 to 8 of the top ten slots in each. In additional, 
Texas counties continue to dominate the bottom 10, taking 7 to 9 of the bottom slots. 
In conclusion, although there are some slightly variations, overall the results again 
suggest that counties in Florida scored comparatively higher in all phases of disaster; suggesting 
that, on average, Florida counties are the most disaster resilient in terms of disaster phases. 
Furthermore, the results also suggest that, on overage, the majority of counties in Texas are at 
the lowest end of disaster resilience scale. 
 
Table 7.24. Hazard mitigation sub-index scores by top and bottom 10 lists  
 
TOP 10  LIST   BOTTOM 10 LIST  
Rank County State Score  Rank County State Score 
1 Monroe               Florida     1.38  135 West Feliciana      Louisiana   -0.67 
2 Collier              Florida     1.28  136 Newton               Texas       -0.67 
3 Leon                 Florida     1.25  137 Cameron             Texas       -0.72 
4 Sarasota             Florida     1.24  138 Vernon               Louisiana   -0.77 
5 Franklin             Florida     0.89  139 Hidalgo              Texas       -0.79 
6 Walton               Florida     0.87  140 Kenedy               Texas       -0.79 
7 Lee                  Florida     0.87  141 Bee                  Texas       -0.83 
8 East Baton Rouge     Louisiana   0.86  142 Duval                Texas       -1.04 
9 Baldwin              Alabama     0.86  143 Willacy              Texas       -1.07 
10 Hillsborough         Florida     0.79  144 Starr                Texas       -1.30 
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Table 7.25. Disaster preparedness sub-index scores by top and bottom 10 lists  
 
TOP 10  LIST   BOTTOM 10 LIST  
Rank County State Score  Rank County State Score 
1 Monroe               Florida     2.01  135 Jim Wells            Texas       -0.59 
2 Collier              Florida     1.39  136 Hardee               Florida     -0.60 
3 Sarasota             Florida     1.38  137 Bee                  Texas       -0.66 
4 Okaloosa             Florida     1.12  138 Jim Hogg            Texas       -0.73 
5 Leon                 Florida     1.10  139 Cameron             Texas       -0.80 
6 Hancock              Mississippi 1.09  140 Webb                 Texas       -0.86 
7 Franklin             Florida     0.90  141 Hidalgo              Texas       -0.95 
8 Baldwin              Alabama     0.90  142 Duval                Texas       -1.01 
9 East Baton Rouge     Louisiana   0.88  143 Willacy              Texas       -1.07 
10 St. Tammany          Louisiana   0.84  144 Starr                Texas       -1.50 
 
 
Table 7.26. Disaster response sub-index scores by top and bottom 10 lists  
 
TOP 10  LIST   BOTTOM 10 LIST  
Rank County State Score  Rank County State Score 
1 Monroe               Florida     1.58  135 Evangeline          Louisiana   -0.51 
2 Franklin             Florida     1.24  136 Hardee               Florida     -0.56 
3 Sarasota             Florida     1.07  137 Bee                  Texas       -0.60 
4 Collier              Florida     1.03  138 Vernon               Louisiana   -0.62 
5 Leon                 Florida     1.02  139 Cameron             Texas       -0.85 
6 Lee                  Florida     0.75  140 Webb                 Texas       -0.88 
7 Baldwin              Alabama     0.68  141 Duval                Texas       -0.96 
8 Fayette              Texas       0.64  142 Hidalgo              Texas       -0.97 
9 St. Tammany          Louisiana   0.59  143 Willacy              Texas       -1.03 
10 Pinellas             Florida     0.59  144 Starr                Texas       -1.55 
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Table 7.27. Disaster recovery sub-index scores by top and bottom 10 lists 
 
TOP 10  LIST   BOTTOM 10 LIST  
Rank County State Score  Rank County State Score 
1 Collier              Florida     1.29  135 West Feliciana      Louisiana   -0.77 
2 Monroe               Florida     1.27  136 Vernon               Louisiana   -0.81 
3 Walton               Florida     1.18  137 Webb                 Texas       -0.88 
4 Sarasota             Florida     1.13  138 Cameron             Texas       -0.90 
5 Leon                 Florida     1.08  139 Kenedy               Texas       -0.94 
6 Lee                  Florida     0.96  140 Hidalgo              Texas       -0.95 
7 Baldwin              Alabama     0.91  141 Brooks               Texas       -0.97 
8 East Baton Rouge     Louisiana   0.87  142 Duval                Texas       -1.11 
9 St. Tammany          Louisiana   0.79  143 Willacy              Texas       -1.27 
10 Okaloosa             Florida     0.78  144 Starr                Texas       -1.60 
 
 
7.6. Summary 
 
This chapter has assessed the level of disaster resilience in the study region by 
comparing county average scores across the six Gulf coast states, as well as more detailed 
examination of the top and bottom ten counties for the entire Gulf coast region. The key findings 
of this assessment are summarized as follows: 
• Florida has the most disaster resilient coastal counties in the U.S. Gulf coast region. 
Florida counties scored the highest scores in all the CDRIs and sub-indices, which is 
consistent with Florida planning powers. 
• On average, Alabama consistently has the second most disaster resilient coastal counties 
in the U.S. Gulf coast region. Alabama counties scored relatively high scores in both the 
CDRIs and sub-indices. 
• Texas has the least disaster resilient coastal counties in the U.S. Gulf coast region. Most 
Texas counties scored the lowest scores in almost all the CDRIs and the sub-indices.  
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• Louisiana has the second least disaster resilient coastal counties in the U.S. Gulf coast 
region. Most Louisiana counties scored relatively low scores in almost all the CDRI 
measures and the sub-indices.  
• On average Mississippi coastal counties tended to be more disaster resilient than 
counties in Georgia, Texas, and Louisiana. 
• While the CDRI measures seek to capture the overall disaster resilience of a community 
by assessing community capitals across four phases of disaster–mitigation, preparedness, 
response, and recovery – it is interesting to note that overall the findings are consistent 
with the general expectations of the planning literature which more generally focus on 
disaster and hazard mitigation planning, not actually dimensions of capital. The 
differences in the levels of disaster resilience demonstrated by states/counties in the U.S. 
Gulf coast region in part can be explained by their local planning powers. The way states 
plan and mandate local plans significantly influences the level of disaster resilience and 
the degree to which the goal of building disaster resilience can be achieved. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF DISASTER RESILIENCE IN THE U.S. GULF COAST 
REGION 
8.1. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to explore and analyze the spatial dimensions of disaster 
resilience in the study region. To achieve this objective, a Geographical Information System 
(GIS) was used to identify the presence of spatial patterns and clusters (hot spots) of disaster 
resilience. The first step was to simply examine the spatial patterns of the CDRI scores and their 
components by simply mapping the respective scores for coastal counties throughout the region. 
This assessment provides a visual representation of the analysis of the state means undertaken in 
Chapter VII. However, this analysis takes the results a step further in that county scores for the 
CDRI and the component scores are mapped. Our general expectation is again that Florida’s 
counties will rank high and hence will show a clear pattern of high ranking on the map. 
However, since all coastal county data scores are mapped, we will be able to detect the patterns 
of resilience across all coastal counties. 
In addition to generally noting the spatial distribution and patterns of CDRI measures an 
important element is to note clusters of counties that have similar CDRI measures in a further 
attempt to further assess the validity and potential utility of these indices. It might be expected 
that a county that scores high on the CDRI index would more likely be surrounded or near other 
counties that score similarly. In addition, those counties that score low might also be expected to 
be clustered with other low scoring counties. There are a number of reasons to anticipate these 
patterns of clustering. First, as discussed previously in Chapter VII, the planning environments 
can be considerably different across states. While Florida has a rigorous planning environment, 
mandating comprehensive and mitigation planning, Texas has an extreme laissez-faire approach 
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and is further thwarted by the inability of counties to engage in meaningful planning activities 
because they lack “Home Rule”. It can therefore be expected that mapping should yield low-low 
resilience clusters in Texas, but high-high clusters in Florida. The variability of the state 
planning environment in the remaining states makes it difficult to predict clustering. Yet another 
reason to anticipate clustering is due to the focus of the CDRI approach on community capitals. 
At least three of the community capital dimensions – economic, physical, and human – are 
necessarily related to the overall levels of development and development patterns themselves 
tend to cluster. As municipal areas develop, that development all too often begins to spread into 
adjacent counties either directly through the proximate placement of business activities or 
because of suburb and exurban development. These development patterns suggest that clustering 
might appear in and around development concentrations as well. 
In light of these expectations, one might well expect to see clustering. But the question 
that can arise from a simple visual interpretation of a map is when a visual cluster is significant. 
In other words, when is a cluster sufficiently different from other potential clusters to warrant 
attention? There are several spatial data analysis techniques that can be used to detect spatial 
patterns or clusters of the georeferenced data such as Moran’s I, Getis-Ord G*, and Geary’s C 
(Anselin, 1995; Mitchell, 2005). This dissertation employs the most commonly used method – 
the local Moran’s I, also known as LISA to locate spatial clusters of disaster resilience (hot spot) 
in the study region.  
Moran’s I statistic is used as a local indicator of spatial association to identify spatial 
clusters. In this study, the local Moran’s I statistic was calculated using GeoDa 0.9.5-i software. 
To calculate LISA or local Moran’s I statistic requires a weight matrix, which, defines a local 
neighborhood around each geographical unit (Anselin, Syabri, & Kho, 2006). In this study, a 
county is used as the geographical unit. The value of each unit is compared with the weighted 
  
158 
average of the value of its neighbors (Anselin et al., 2006). A weight matrix based on rook 
contiguity was created using GeoDa 0.9.5-i software (Mitchell, 2005). Generally, the rook 
contiguity method assumes that neighbors are those which share a common boundary. The 
weight matrix is defined by the following equation (Mitchell, 2005). 
Wij =
∑
=
N
1j
ijC
Cij
            (8.1) 
Where: 
Cij = 1 when i is linked to j; and Cij = 0 when otherwise 
N = Number of units 
Given the weight matrix (Equation 8.1), the local Moran’s I statistic is defined by the following 
equation (Mitchell, 2005).  
∑=
j
jii zz ijWI          (8.2) 
Where: 
Zi and Zj = Standardized scores of attribute value for unit i and j. 
j is among the identified neighbors of i according to the weights matrix wij. 
Generally, a LISA cluster map indicates the location with significant local Moran’s I 
statistic. The interpretation of the local Moran’s I statistic is that a large positive value indicates 
that a county has a high disaster resilience score and is surrounded by similar counties with high 
resilience scores (high-high), also known as hot spot.  A low positive value indicates that a 
county has a low disaster resilience score and is surrounded by similar counties with low 
resilience scores (low-low), also known as cold spot. A negative value for local Moran’s I 
statistic indicates that a county is surrounded by counties with dissimilar scores. A large negative 
value indicates that a county has a high resilience score but is surrounded by counties with low 
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resilience scores (high-low); such a county is considered an outlier.  A low negative value 
indicates that a county has a low resilience score but is surrounded by counties with high 
resilience scores (low-high); such a county is also considered an outlier. The focus, again, in this 
analysis is in the low-low and high-high clusters. 
The following analysis proceeds in two parts for each set of CDRI measures: overall 
measures, community capital measures, and disaster phase measures. The first step focuses on 
identifying general spatial patterns of disaster resilience scores, which provides the overall 
spatial distribution of the level of disaster resilience in the study region. During this process 
clusters are noted. Then, the apparent clustering is assessed using the LISA clustering analysis 
which identifies the spatial hot spots of disaster resilience. 
8.2. Spatial distribution patterns of CDRI scores 
The maps for the CDRIs are displayed in Figures 9.1 through 9.3. The maps display the 
CDRI scores classified into four classes based on quartiles to provide a fairly simple comparison 
of high or low community disaster resilience scores among counties. The dark brown color in the 
maps reflects high disaster resilience whereas the light yellow color reflects low disaster 
resilience.  
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Figure 8.1. Spatial distribution patterns of CDRI-1 scores 
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Figure 8.2. Spatial distribution patterns of CDRI-2 scores 
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Figure 8.3. Spatial distribution patterns of CDRI-3 scores 
 
Generally, Figures 8.1 to 8.3 revealed some similar interesting spatial patterns with 
respect to the levels of disaster resilience in the study region. First, as expected, all the three 
maps indicate that the majority of counties having the highest levels of disaster resilience in the 
U.S. Gulf coast region, which scored the highest (i.e., score > .67), are located in Florida. 
Focusing on CDRI-1 scores, these counties include: Monroe, Collier, Sarasota, Franklin, Leon, 
Lee, Escambia, Okaloosa, and Walton. The non-Florida counties in the highest quartile are: 
Fayette county (Texas), Baldwin county (Alabama), and East Baton Rouge parish (Louisiana) all 
exhibited high levels of disaster resilience by obtaining highest scores (i.e., score > .67). There 
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are some minor variations with respect to the other CDRI measures, but this general pattern 
holds. 
Second, the CDRI-1 map indicates that most counties in the southern part of Texas, 
along the U.S.-Mexico border region exhibited a fairly low level of disaster resilience with 
scores less than -.48, suggesting a cluster of low scoring counties. These counties include; Starr, 
Hidalgo, Cameron, Willacy, Kenedy, Brooks, Jim Hogg, Jim Wells, Duval, and Webb. This 
result is consistent with previous research findings, which found that counties along the U.S.-
Mexico border region are comparatively poor with a high level of social vulnerability (Cutter & 
Finch, 2008). Moreover, the 2000 U.S. Census data indicated that the majority of counties in the 
U.S.-Mexico border region are relatively poor (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). According to the 
2000 U.S. Census data, counties along the Texas-Mexico border region had the largest 
population of poor people living below the poverty line. Furthermore, studies suggest that 
counties along the Texas-Mexico border region are characterized by settlements called 
Colonias3. Colonias are mostly semirural, unzoned, and unregulated communities, with low 
income, high unemployment rate, and poor housing conditions (Cisneros, 2001; Loustaunau & 
Sanchez-Bane, 1999). Most Colonias lack basic infrastructure services such as access to safe 
drinking water, sewage systems, garbage disposal services, health services, and electricity 
(Loustaunau & Sanchez-Bane, 1999). Most Colonia residents are extremely poor with incomes 
far below the poverty line (Cisneros, 2001). Although Colonias can be found in Texas, New 
Mexico, Arizona, and California, the literature indicates that Texas has both the largest number 
of colonia settlements and the largest population living in Colonias (Cisneros, 2001; Community 
Affair Department, 1995; Loustaunau & Sanchez-Bane, 1999). It is estimated that more than 
400,000 Texans live in Colonias (Cisneros, 2001; Community Affair Department, 1995). 
                                                 
3
 Colonia is a Spanish word for neighborhood or community (Cisneros, 2001). 
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Generally, the Colonia population is predominately Hispanic, which constitutes more than 60% 
of the total Colonia population (Cisneros, 2001; Community Affair Department, 1995). 
Third, counties in and around the Greater-Houston region also known as Houston-Sugar 
Land-Baytown Metropolitan Statistical Area has a high level of disaster resilience, which ranges 
from moderate to high. These counties include: Harris, Galveston, Chambers, Fort Bend, 
Brazoria, Waller, and Austin. 
Fourth, all the three maps indicate two clusters of counties in Texas, which demonstrated 
a moderately high level of disaster resilience, with scores ranging from .40 to .67. The first 
cluster includes the following counties: Fayette, Washington, Colorado, and Lavaca while the 
second cluster includes Goliad, Victoria, Refugio, Aransas, and Nueces. 
Fifth, there also appears to be a slight tendency to see slightly higher scores around areas 
with more concentrated development such as the Houston-Galveston area, Beaumont, New 
Orleans, Mobile, Pensacola, and Ft. Myers areas. These areas are not the highest but the scores 
around these areas appear to be relatively higher. 
Maps displayed in Figures 8.4 through 8.6 show the LISA cluster maps for CDRIs. 
These maps show significant clusters based on the concentration of different types of counties. 
Specifically the red clusters indicate high-high clusters and darker blue clusters indicate 
significant low-low clusters. In addition, disjointed clusters low-high (light blue) and high-low 
(pink) are also displayed. The primary focus in the following discussion concerns of the high-
high and low-low clusters and their consistency with the general expectations of the spatial maps 
above. 
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Figure 8.4. LISA cluster map for CDRI-1 
 
Overall, all the three CDRI cluster maps show a similar spatial pattern. Figure 8.4 
presents the LISA cluster map for the primary measure, the CDRI-1 (Moran’s I = .432, p < .05). 
The map clearly shows three statistically significant clusters: (1) counties in Texas along the 
U.S.-Mexico border region indicate a large cluster of counties with a low level of disaster 
resilience (cold spot), (2) there is a statistically significant cluster of counties with a high level of 
disaster resilience (hot spot) in Texas; these counties include Fayette, Washington, and Waller, 
and (3) there is a significant cluster of counties with a high level of disaster resilience (hot spot) 
located in the Florida peninsula, which includes the following counties: Monroe, Collier, and 
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Charlotte. While few counties seem to be outliers, Figure 8.4 indicates that most counties in the 
region appeared to be not statistically significant.  
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 Figure 8.5. LISA cluster map for CDRI-2 
 
Figure 8.5 displays the LISA cluster map for CDRI-2 (Moran’s I = .411, p < .05). The 
map shows some similar spatial patterns as exhibited by CDRI-1. It also points to the counties 
along the U.S.-Mexico border region in Texas as the largest significant cluster of counties that 
exhibit a low level of resilience (cold spot). Generally, the map in Figure 8.5 does not indicate a 
well-defined cluster of counties that has a high level of disaster resilience (hot spot). However, 
there is a small cluster of counties, which has a high level of disaster resilience (hot spot) in the 
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Florida peninsula area, which includes Collier, Monroe, and Charlotte. Furthermore, few 
counties, turned out to be outliers; these counties include Liberty (Florida), Escambia (Alabama), 
Rapides (Louisiana), Lafayette (Louisiana), and Nueces (Texas), but the majority of counties in 
the region are not statistically significant. 
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Figure 8.6. LISA cluster map for CDRI-3 
 
The LISA cluster map for the CDRI-3 is presented in Figure 8.6 (Moran’s I = .422, p < 
.05). The map clearly shows the presence of two noticeable clusters. First and as expected, the 
map indicates a presence of a significant cluster of counties in the southern part of Texas, along 
the U.S.-Mexico border region, which has a low level of disaster resilience (cold spot). Second, 
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the map indicates a presence of a cluster of counties with a high level of disaster resilience (hot 
spot) in the Florida Panhandle area, which includes the following counties: Bay, Calhoun, 
Washington, Gulf, Wakulla, Liberty, and Jefferson. Figure 8.6 further indicates the presence of a 
few counties, which appeared to be outliers in the region and most of the counties are 
statistically not significant.  
8.3. Spatial distribution patterns of capital domain’s sub-indices  
This section examines the spatial distribution of scores for capital domain’s sub-indices: 
Social, economic, physical, and human. The maps are displayed in Figures 8.7 through 8.10. 
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Figure 8.7. Spatial distribution patterns of social capital scores 
 
The spatial distribution pattern for social capital (Figure 8.7) indicates that there is a 
high concentration of counties, which demonstrated a comparatively high level of social capital 
in Texas, with the score greater than .56. These counties include: Lavaca, Colorado, Austin, 
Fayette, Goliad, and Washington. As expected, most Texas counties, along the U.S.-Mexico 
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border region have low levels of social capital with the majority of these counties falling in the 
lowest quartile. Not surprising the map of social capital indicates a high concentration of 
counties with moderate to high level of social capital in Florida; with scores ranging between .56 
and 1.97. These counties include: Monroe, Sarasota, Hernando, Citrus, Lake, Gulf, Franklin, and 
Leon.  
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Figure 8.8. Spatial distribution patterns of economic capital scores 
 
As expected and consistent with the previous research findings (Cisneros, 2001; Cutter 
& Finch, 2008; Loustaunau & Sanchez-Bane, 1999), the economic capital  map (Figure 8.8) 
indicates that there is a high concentration of counties with low  levels of economic capital in 
Texas, along the U.S.-Mexico border region, with scores  less than -2.3. Similarly, the map also 
indicates a large number of counties with a low level of economic capital in Louisiana and 
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Mississippi, which is also not surprising; because these states are among the poorest in the nation 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). In addition, the map indicates that Fort Bend county (Texas), 
Monroe county (Florida), Collier county (Florida), and Sarasota county (Florida) all 
demonstrated a high level of economic capital in the region with scores greater than 1.69. 
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Figure 8.9. Spatial distribution patterns of physical capital scores 
 
The physical capital map (Figure 8.9) indicates that Louisiana, Mississippi, and the 
southern part of Texas have more counties that obtained the lowest scores (less than -.63). These 
results are consistent with the positive relationship that exists between physical capital and 
economic capital, which implies that the higher the economic capital the better the physical 
capital. These counties also demonstrated low levels of economic capital. As might be expected, 
counties in Florida (Walton, Franklin, and Monroe) have the highest levels of physical capital 
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with scores ranging from .76 to 1.72. This result is not surprising because these counties also 
demonstrated a moderately high economic capital. 
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Figure 8.10. Spatial distribution patterns of human capital scores 
 
Figure 8.10 shows that most Florida counties have higher levels of human capital than 
counties in the other states. These counties include: Monroe, Sarasota, Hillsborough, Polk, Gulf, 
Franklin, Liberty, Bay, Jackson, Okaloosa, and Walton. The map also indicates that there is a 
high concentration of counties that exhibit moderately high levels of human capital in the 
Greater-Houston region of Texas, which include Harris, Galveston, Fort Bend, Austin, Brazoria, 
and Waller. Other counties in Texas which exhibit a moderately high level of human capital 
include Victoria, Nueces, Aransas, Washington, and Jefferson. The human capital spatial 
patterns shown by the majority of counties in the region are not surprising because human capital 
is highly correlated with economic capital. Therefore, counties with high levels of human capital 
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are more likely to exhibit high levels of economic capital. Most importantly, the Greater-
Houston region of Texas is one of the biggest economic centers in the United States with the 
highest rate of employment (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). Furthermore, the map also shows that 
most counties in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia exhibit a moderately low level of 
human capital, which is consistent with the low level of economic capital demonstrated by most 
of these states. 
The maps in Figures 8.11 through 8.14 display the LISA cluster maps for community 
capital sub-indices. The LISA maps are used to confirm whether the spatial clusters discussed 
above are statistically significant. Again the primary focus is in the high-high and the low-low 
clusters of community capital sub-indices. 
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Figure 8.11. LISA Cluster map for social capital sub-index 
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 The LISA cluster map for social capital sub-index (Moran’s I = .366, p < .05) indicates 
that there are two noticeable social capital clusters in Texas (see Figure 8.11). As expected, 
given the spatial distribution map discussed earlier, there is a cluster of counties with a low level 
of social capital (cold spot) in Texas along the U.S.-Mexico border region.  In addition, the map 
also uncovers the presence of a spatial hot spot of social capital in Texas, which includes the 
following counties: Jackson, Victory, Dewitt, Colorado, Austin, Fayette, Lavaca, and 
Washington. Overall, the majority of the counties in the region with respect to social capital 
cluster analysis are not statistically significant. 
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Figure 8.12. LISA Cluster map for economic capital sub-index 
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The LISA cluster map for economic capital sub-index (Moran’s I = .479, p < .05) shows 
three significant clusters (see Figure 8.12). First, and as expected, the Texas-Mexico border 
region is a large economic capital cold spot in the U.S. Gulf coast region. Second, the map 
indicates that the Greater-Houston region of Texas is an economic capital hot spot, which has a 
high level of economic capital, which is consistent with our expectation that in and around this 
area there is a high concentration of business activities. Third, the map indicates a presence of a 
significant spatial hot spot of economic capital in the Florida peninsula, which consists of 
Monroe, Collier, Lee, Charlotte, and Hillsborough counties. The map also revealed the presence 
of a few outlier counties in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. 
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Figure 8.13. LISA Cluster map for physical capital sub-index 
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The LISA cluster map for the physical capital sub-index (Moran’s I = .244, p < .05) shows a 
presence of relatively small clusters (see Figure 8.13). Generally the majority of the counties are 
not statistically significant. This results is not surprising because such a small value of Moran’s I 
statistic (.244) is not a strong indication of a presence of clusters. The map indicates a small 
cluster (cold spot) of physical capital in Texas, which consists of Hidalgo, Cameron, and Willacy 
counties. In addition, the map indicates a presence of cold spot in Louisiana, which includes 
Lafourche, St. Mary, Assumption, St. James, St. John, and Ascension counties. Finally, there is a 
significant hot spot of physical capital in the Florida area, which includes Gulf, Liberty, and 
Wakulla counties. 
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Figure 8.14. LISA cluster map for human capital sub-index 
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The LISA cluster map for the human capital sub-index (Figure 8.14) indicates that there 
are three significant clusters in the region (Moran’s I = .458, p < .05). First and not surprising, 
the counties along the Texas-Mexico border region formed a human capital cold spot. Second, 
the map shows that there is a relatively large hot spot of human capital located in Florida, which 
includes Franklin, Gulf, Bay, Washington, Liberty, Calhoun, Gadsden, and Wakulla counties. 
Third, the map also indicates a presence of a relatively small hot spot cluster located in the 
Tampa Bay area, which includes two counties, Hillsborough and Pasco. These two hot spot areas 
are not surprising because they both consist of the largest cities in Florida: Tallahassee, Panama, 
and St. Petersburg. These cities/metropolitan areas form the largest economic centers that 
provide employment opportunities in these areas, which is one of the important indicators of 
human capital. 
8.4. Spatial distribution patterns of disaster phase’s sub-indices  
This section summarizes the results of the spatial distribution scores for disaster phase’s 
sub-indices (mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery). The maps are displayed in 
Figures 8.15 through 8.18. 
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Figure 8.15. Spatial distribution patterns of hazard mitigation sub-index scores 
 
As expected, the map of hazard mitigation sub-index (Figure 8.15) indicates that 
counties in Texas along the U.S.-Mexico border region exhibited a very low level of hazard 
mitigation with scores less than -.44. Also a substantial number of counties in Louisiana, 
Alabama, Mississippi and Georgia demonstrated a low level of hazard mitigation. As discussed 
previously in Chapter VII, this result is not surprising because Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Alabama, and Georgia do not mandate comprehensive plans, or require counties and 
municipalities to incorporate hazard mitigation plans in comprehensive plans. Florida which 
mandates comprehensive plans and requires inclusion of hazard mitigation plans demonstrated a 
high level of disaster resilience with respect to hazard mitigation. Specifically the following 
counties are in the highest quartile: Okaloosa, Walton, Franklin, Monroe, Collier, Lee, Leon, 
Sarasota, Manatee, and Hillsborough.  
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Figure 8.16. Spatial distribution patterns of disaster preparedness sub-index scores 
 
The map of disaster preparedness (Figure 8.16) shows that there are three counties in 
Florida (Monroe, Collier, and Sarasota) that demonstrated high levels of disaster preparedness in 
the region, with scores ranging between 1.13 and 2.01. Additionally, counties in the Florida 
panhandle area and the Florida peninsula have moderately high levels of disaster preparedness 
with scores ranging between 0.23 and 1.12. Also the Greater-Houston region of Texas has a 
noticeable cluster of counties, which exhibit a moderately high level of disaster preparedness, 
with scores ranging from 0.23 to 1.12.  These results suggest that counties in the Florida 
peninsula, the Florida Panhandle, and the Texas Greater–Houston area are comparatively more 
disaster resilient with respect to disaster preparedness in the U.S. Gulf coast region. Finally, as 
anticipated, counties along the Texas-Mexico border region demonstrated very low levels of 
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disaster preparedness with the scores below -.22, which suggests that these counties are the least 
disaster resilient in the U.S. Gulf coast region with respect to disaster preparedness.  
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Figure 8.17. Spatial distribution patterns of disaster response sub-index scores 
 
Generally, the disaster response map (Figure 8.17) indicates three noticeable clusters of 
counties with a low level of disaster response in the region, which scored less than -.31. First and 
as expected, the counties in Texas along the U.S.-Mexico border region indicate a very low level 
of disaster response. Second, there is a cluster of parishes in the central part of Louisiana, which 
demonstrated very low levels of disaster response with score less than -.31. These parishes 
include Vernon, Avoyelles, West Feliciana, St. Martin, Assumption, Iberville, Evangeline, and 
St. Landry. Third, the following Florida counties also demonstrated very low levels of disaster 
response falling in the lowest quartile: Hendry, Glades, DeSoto, Hardee, and Dixie.  
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Furthermore, the disaster response map shows that Florida is the only state that has 
counties with the highest level of disaster response in the U.S. Gulf coast region, with scores 
greater than .76. These counties include, Monroe, Collier, Franklin, Sarasota, and Leon. 
Similarly, the Florida peninsula, the Florida Panhandle area, and some counties in the Greater-
Houston region (Austin, Fort Bend, and Galveston), all demonstrated a moderately high level of 
disaster response with scores ranging between .19 and .75.  
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Figure 8.18. Spatial distribution patterns of disaster recovery sub-index scores 
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The spatial distribution map of disaster recovery (Figure 8.18) generally demonstrated 
few counties that fall into the lowest quartile. However, as expected, most counties that have low 
levels of disaster recovery are located in Texas along the U.S.-Mexico border region (Starr, 
Hidalgo, Cameron, Willacy, Kenedy, Brooks, Duval, and Webb counties) and Louisiana 
(Vernon, Evangeline, West Feliciana, and St. Helena parishes). 
Furthermore, the map shows a significant number of counties that have high levels of 
disaster recovery in the region with scores greater than .64. In Florida, counties that fall into the 
highest quartile are located in the Florida Panhandle area and the Florida peninsula. These 
counties include Okaloosa, Washington, Bay, Leon, Monroe, Collier, Lee, Sarasota, and Lake. In 
Louisiana, the following parishes have high levels of disaster recovery: Fayette, East Baton 
Rouge, and St. Tammany. Other counties that show high levels of disaster recovery include 
Austin (Texas) Fayette (Texas), and Baldwin (Alabama). 
The LISA maps for disaster phases’ sub-indices (mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery) are displayed in Figures 8.19 through 8.22. Again the LISA maps are used to confirm 
whether the spatial clusters with respect to disaster phases discussed above are statically 
significant. More specifically, the discussion focuses on high-high and low-low clusters. 
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Figure 8.19. LISA cluster map for Hazard mitigation sub-index 
 
The cluster map for hazard mitigation sub-index (Moran’s I = .413, p < .05) shows three 
significant clusters in the region (see Figure 8.19). Consistent with the previously discussed 
results, there is a cluster of counties with a low level of hazard mitigation (cold spot) in Texas 
along the U.S.-Mexico border region. There is also a significant hot spot of hazard mitigation in 
Texas that exhibit a high level of hazard mitigation, which includes: Fayette, Washington, 
Austin, and Waller. As expected, there is a presence of a significant hot spot of hazard mitigation 
in the Florida peninsula area, which consists of Monroe, Collier, Lee, and Charlotte.  
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Figure 8.20. LISA cluster map for Disaster preparedness sub-index 
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Figure 8.21. LISA cluster map for disaster response sub-index 
 
The LISA cluster maps for disaster preparedness sub-index (Moran’s I = .345, p < .05) 
and disaster response sub-index (Moran’s I = .411, p < .05) shown in Figures 8.21 and 8.20 both 
revealed similar but not identical spatial clusters. They are similar because each map indicates 
two significant spatial clusters in the region. They both show a significant cold spot along the 
Texas-Mexico border region and a presence of hot spot in the Florida peninsula area. Overall, 
the majority of counties in both maps turned out to be statistically not significant. 
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Figure 8.22. Cluster map for disaster recovery sub-index. 
 
The LISA cluster map for disaster recovery (Moran’s I = .438, p < .05) revealed four 
significant clusters of disaster recovery in the region (see Figure 8.22). However, only two of 
them are relatively large in size. The map shows a presence of hot spots in Texas, which includes 
Waller, Austin, Colorado, Lavaca, Fayette, and Washington counties. There is also a hot spot in 
the Florida peninsula area, which includes the following counties, Monroe, Collier, and 
Charlotte. Generally, these areas exhibited a high level of disaster recovery when compared with 
other areas in the region. Finally, as expected the there is a presence of significant cold spots in 
the Texas-Mexico border region and in the northern part of Louisiana. These areas demonstrated 
fairly low levels of disaster recovery when compared with the other areas in the region.  
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8.5. Summary 
The aim of the spatial analyses was to further assess the validity and utility of the CDRI 
and the sub-indices as measures of disaster resilience by examining the spatial distribution of the 
scores and testing for significance of spatial clusters.  As expected, the results showed a great 
deal of consistency between the spatial patterns of disaster resilience in the study region and the 
theoretical expectations discussed in the introduction section of this chapter as well as in Chapter 
VII. Consistent with the theoretical expectations, most clusters were found in and around areas 
with high concentration of business activities, and the LISA analyses results further confirmed 
that the clusters are statistically significant. These significant clusters support the hypothesis that 
counties with high levels of disaster resilience are more likely to be surrounded by similar 
counties with a high level of disaster resilience. Conversely, counties with low levels of 
resilience are more likely to be surrounded by counties with low levels of disaster resilience.  
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CHAPTER IX 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMEDATIONS 
 
9.1. Introduction 
The overall goal of this research has been to improve the current state of knowledge on 
the concept of disaster resilience by developing a theoretically sound and empirically valid 
measure of disaster resilience. To adequately accomplish this task, several steps were undertaken 
in a process to develop this measure. This chapter discusses the steps by reviewing the five 
specific research objectives outlined in Chapter I and summarizes the major findings of the 
study. Based on the findings, this chapter draws conclusions, formulates some recommendations 
and subsequently highlights the limitations of the research. The chapter concludes by 
summarizing the theoretical contributions of the research and the practical implications. 
9.2. Discussion 
As outlined in Chapter I, this research aimed to achieve five specific research objectives. 
This section reviews each objective in relation to the steps followed in developing the index for 
measuring disaster resilience and summarizes the major findings. 
9.2.1. Defining disaster resilience 
The first objective was to explore the theory, definitions, and applications of the concept 
of disaster resilience. The rationale for this objective was to provide the theoretical foundation 
for developing the index to measure and quantify the concept of disaster resilience. With regard 
to this objective, the findings suggest that although the application of the concept of disaster 
resilience is growing in the hazard research community, the definition of the concept of disaster 
resilience is still rather fuzzy. Many definitions of disaster resilience exist in the literature as 
illustrated by the multiple definitions listed in Table 2.2. These multiple definitions are perhaps 
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not surprising because, even in the field of ecology where the concept of resilience originated 
before was introduced in hazards research, it appears that there is no consensus on how the 
concept should be defined (see Table 2.1). As of yet there is no universally agreed-upon 
definition although there is a good deal of commonality among these definitions in the hazards 
and disasters literature. 
Although some researchers have argued that there is no problem of having multiple 
definitions so long as they do not contradict each other (Manyena, 2006), it would be 
advantageous for the hazard and disaster research community to have a clearer common 
definition, if we want to advance our understanding on this concept and better ensure an 
integrated research agenda. A common definition of disaster resilience would inevitably help to 
reach consensus on how to measure and operationalize the concept. 
Given the fact that there is currently no universally agreed-upon definition of disaster 
resilience in the hazard literature, this dissertation developed a working definition, which formed 
the basis for establishing the key components of disaster resilience and finally the approach to 
measure the concept. In shaping this working definition the target was a definition that would be 
applicable for addressing community disaster resilience. The initial working definition adopts 
common elements from the disaster resilience literature, which includes the ability of a 
community, defined as a space based network of social systems and their built environment, to 
organize and structure themselves to (1) absorb, deflect or resist disaster impacts, (2) bounce 
back in a relatively rapid fashion when impacted, and (3) learn from the experience and modify 
behavior and structure to adapt to future threats.  
9.2.2. Conceptualizing community disaster resilience 
Having discussed the general definition of disaster resilience, attention was then turned 
to an examination of various conceptual frameworks or theoretical models of relevance for 
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community disaster resilience upon which to base the development of the conceptual framework, 
or Community Disaster Resilience Framework (CDRF) that can be used to identify disaster 
resilience indicators for coastal communities. Four frameworks were discussed that included (1) 
the sustainable and resilient community framework (Tobin, 1999), (2) the sustainable livelihood 
framework (Chambers & Conway, 1992; Glavovic et al., 2002), (3) the community resilience 
framework (Maguire & Hagan, 2007), and (4) the disaster resilience of place (DROP) model 
(Cutter et al., 2008). Emerging from the comparison of these frameworks was the principle that it 
was critical to consider all phases of disaster: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. 
Consideration of these phases was important because they encompass critical elements with 
respect to a system’s ability to absorb, deflect or resist disaster impacts and when impacted, 
bounce back in a relatively rapid fashion as well as the ability to learn from the experience and 
modify its behavior and structure to adapt to future threats. An important result of this analysis 
was the understanding that a capital approach to disaster resilience provides a logic and basis for 
considering and selecting community resources that are critical for addressing dimensions of 
resilience based on disaster phases. Hence the final working definition of community disaster 
resilience was: 
“the capacity of communities and their built environment to mitigate, prepare for, 
respond to, and recover quickly from disasters, and adapt to new circumstances while 
learning from past disasters” 
This definition is built on the notion of disaster phases, captures the important dimensions of 
preventing and reducing impacts of natural disasters as well as recovering from and 
learning/adapting to disaster impacts. Second, it implicitly emphasizes the “capacities” of a 
community to address issues, which were addressed by considering a community’s capital as 
resources that make it possible for communities to successfully undertake the various disaster 
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phases’ activities. Third, this definition puts a community’s network of social systems, as well as 
the people that populate the system and the built and modified environment created by those 
systems at the center. 
The community disaster resilience framework (CDRF) that was developed in this study 
is based on the contention that disaster resilience is the function of both the disaster phases’ 
activities (hazard mitigation, disaster preparedness, disaster response, and disaster recovery) and 
the community capitals (social, economic, physical, and human). It is also based on the logic that 
each community capital has a role to play in the various disaster phases’ activities.  
Conceptually, a critical step in developing the community disaster resilience index 
(CDRI) was the identification and selection of relevant indicators to include in the index. Based 
on the CDRF a framework matrix (see Table 4.2) was created by cross-classifying the four major 
forms of capitals (social, economic, physical, and human) by the four disaster phases (hazard 
mitigation, disaster preparedness, disaster response, and disaster recovery). In addition, critical 
activities associated with each disaster phase were identified along with critical 
actors/stakeholders (community organizations and actors) and resources that are generally 
involved in addressing the disaster phases’ activities were also identified (see Appendix A). The 
phase-capital matrix has 16 cells which represent 16 phase/capital sub-indices.  These sub-
indices represented the initial starting point for index development in that the activities, 
actors/stakeholders, and resources associated with each phase/capital sub-index were first 
identified and then capital indicators were selected to capture the community capital associated 
with each cell. This method appeared to be both theoretically sound and practically useful in that 
specific capital resources were specifically assessed and selected for each phase-capital cell. It 
enabled the selection of not only theoretically relevant indicators but also ensured the content 
and face validity of the selected indicators. Based on this procedure over 120 capital based 
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indicators were winnowed down to 75 indicators4 that appeared to best fit the 
activities/indicators/resources necessary for each phase-capital combination and yet across cells 
captured the multi-dimension nature of community resilience. 
During the item selection process, it became clear that social and economic capital 
resources were the same regardless of disaster phase, and yet there were often very unique 
physical and human capital resources for each phase. In total 95 indicators of capital resources 
were employed, while some of these were employed in several phases. The number of indicators 
for each phase-capital sub-index is indicated in Table 9.1 below. Over 75 unique indicators were 
employed across each capital domain, which includes 9 social capital indicators, 6 economic 
capital indicators, 35 physical capital indicators, and 25 human capital indicators. 
 
Table 9.1. Number of indicators  
  
Sub-index item 
Social capital 9 
Economic capital 6 
Physical capital-Mitigation 11 
Human capital-Mitigation 19 
Physical capital-Preparedness 3 
Human capital-Preparedness 7 
Physical capital-Response 21 
Human capital-Response 6 
Physical capital-Recovery 4 
Human capital-Recovery 9 
  
Index item Item 
Social capital 9 
Economic capital 6 
Physical capital 35 
Human capital 25 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Each indicator was first converted into a relative measure, such as percentage or rate(per 1000) 
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9.2.3. Development of the CDRI 
The third specific objective of this study was, of course, to develop a community disaster 
resilience index (CDRI) that can be used to compare and monitor disaster resilience of coastal 
communities.  
CDRI indicators were aggregated to create three different indices namely CDRI-1, 
CDRI-2, and CDRI-3. The CDRI-1 is based on the capital domains and was developed by 
averaging four sub-indices (social, economic, physical, and human). Specifically, each indicator 
was first converted into a z-score, average scores were then calculated for each capital domain, 
creating capital indices, and these in turn were averaged to create a CDRI-1score. Indicators 
within each capital domain were averaged, because there were varying numbers of indicators in 
each domain which would have resulted in unequal weighting of domains had they simply been 
added. Finally, this approach insured that each indicator was counted only once in the CDRI-1 
measure.  
The CDRI-3 is based on the disaster phases and was developed by averaging four sub-
indices (hazard mitigation, disaster preparedness, disaster response, and disaster recovery). With 
this measure, each indicator was potentially counted multiple times. The CDRI-2 is the 
combination of both the capital domains and disaster phases. It was developed by first 
calculating an index for each of the ten sub-indices listed in Table 9.1(Social capital, Economic 
capital, Physical capital-hazard mitigation, Human capital-hazard mitigation, Physical capital-
disaster preparedness, Human capital-disaster preparedness, Physical capital-disaster response, 
Human capital-disaster response, Physical capital-disaster recovery, and Human capital-disaster 
recovery) and then computing an average across these ten sub-indices. 
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The findings of this research suggest that these three approaches generated similar but 
not identical results. Each approach provides unique information which may not be obtained 
from other approaches. Approach one (CDRI-1) assesses the level of disaster resilience based on 
the community capitals whereas approach three (CDRI-3), assesses disaster resilience based on 
disaster phases. Approach two (CDRI-2) is basically a combination of approach one and three. It 
is unique in that it provides a high level of detailed information, which can be very useful to 
emergency managers in assessing disaster resilience. For example, approach two can help to 
determine if a community has sufficient physical capital resources to successfully undertake 
disaster response activities. Nevertheless, the CDRI-1 measure is preferred because each capital 
indicator is only included once in the overall measure. However, in generating the overall CDRI 
scores, the sub-indices for capital domains and disaster phases could prove useful for a variety of 
research and practical applications. 
9.2.4. Reliability and validity of the CDRI 
The fourth specific objective of this study was to assess the reliability and validity of the 
proposed community disaster resilience index (CDRI). The rationale for this objective was to 
examine whether the developed CDRI is a theoretically and empirically valid and reliable 
measure. Generally, a disaster resilience index is a complex multidimensional scale that 
encompasses many variables. Therefore, identifying appropriate variables for statistical 
validation becomes more problematic. 
(i) Reliability assessment 
Cronbach’s alpha statistical method was used to assess the reliability of the CDRI as a 
measure of disaster resilience.  The reliability analysis helped to ensure a high level of internal 
consistency or precision of a measure. Alpha was used at a variety of points, but was most 
critical when assessing the potential consistency of each of the 10 sub-indices associated with the 
  
194 
initial phase-capital sub-index development. Specifically, it was at this point that specific 
indicators were selected to capture the unique set of phase-capital resources, and the set of 
potential indicators was relatively small. The final set of indicators ranged from 3 to 21 for each 
of the 10 sub-indices (see Table 5.1). The findings of this research on reliability assessment 
suggest that the sub-indices and the CDRIs exhibited a relatively high level of consistency as 
indicated by the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients ranging from .466 to .976. Not surprising, sub-
indices containing large numbers of indicators tended to yield higher alphas (see Table 5.1). 
(ii) Validity assessment 
This research examined four types of validity; content, construct, predictive, and 
incremental validity. The content validity played an important role in the indicator selection 
process, which was performed using a cross-classification method. Generally, indicator selection 
is a subjective process (Esty et al., 2006; Simpson, 2006), which involves subjective judgments. 
The cross-classification method provided a framework in which only relevant indicators were 
selected and therefore significantly reduced the potential for subjectivity. In addition, completing 
the indicator selection across the phase and capital, insured that the various dimensions of 
disaster resilience, consistent with the working definition, were included and hence high 
sampling validity. 
The construct validity is the degree to which a measure is empirically related to 
theoretically relevant variables in a real world setting. This study attempted to establish the 
construct validity of the disaster resilience index by examining how well it correlates with the 
relevant variables in a real world setting. Based on the literature, four external criteria were 
utilized to validate the index; flood property damage (insured, uninsured, and total), flood-
related deaths, social vulnerability, and physical risk. The findings of this research suggest that 
the correlations between the disaster resilience index and the validity measures are consistent 
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with theoretical expectations. In addition, predictive validity was assessed by regressing flood 
related deaths and flood damage measures on the CDRI score, after controlling for risk and 
social vulnerability. First, the findings of this research suggest that disaster resilience is related to 
and an important predictor of flood property damage and flood-related deaths in the U.S. Gulf 
coast region. Second, there is a positive correlation between disaster resilience and physical risk.  
Furthermore, an important consideration associated with any new measure is its 
incremental validity over alternative measures available to assess the same construct. In other 
words, does the measure add to the prediction of criterion above what can be predicted by other 
alternative measures? In its most basic definition, incremental validity refers to the capacity of 
one measure to improve prediction over one or more alternative measures. In this study 
incremental validity of CDRI was measured by assessing its ability to predict flood property 
losses and flood related deaths in relation to Social Vulnerability Index and median income as 
alternative measures. It was hypothesized that the CDRI measure would provide incremental 
validity to Social Vulnerability Index and median income in predicting flood property losses and 
flood related deaths. The evidence accumulated in this study suggests that CDRI measure has 
incremental validity and can make contributions to predicting flood losses and flood related 
deaths in ways that Social Vulnerability Index or median income cannot. 
These are important findings this research has contributed to the hazards literature 
toward improving our current understanding of the concept of disaster resilience. However, 
although these measures seem to work both theoretically and empirically further reliability and 
validity tests are needed to improve these measures.  
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9.2.5. Disaster resilience spatial hot spots 
The fifth specific objective of this study was to identify and analyze spatial patterns and 
clusters (hot spots) of disaster resilience within coastal counties in the U.S. Gulf coast region. 
The rationale for this objective was to further evaluate the validity and utility of the CDRI by 
examining the spatial distribution patterns of the index scores among counties in the U.S. Gulf 
coast region. The spatial distribution analysis helped to assess if there was a presence of patterns 
or clusters of counties that were consistent with the theoretical expectations in the study region. 
For example, it was expected that counties with a high concentration of poor population are more 
likely to form a cluster of low disaster resilience (cold spot) and vice versa. It was also expected 
that counties/states which adopted comprehensive plans, building codes, FEMA approved hazard 
mitigation plans, or participate in FEMA Community Rating Systems are more likely to be 
disaster resilient or form a cluster of disaster resilient counties (hot spot). Furthermore, it was 
also expected that counties in and around areas where there is high concentration of business 
activities are more likely to form clusters of high disaster resilience. 
To achieve this objective a three-step procedure was employed to analyze the data. First, 
the scores were analyzed and ranked so as to compare and identify which county/state performed 
better in terms of the overall disaster resilience index and the sub-indices. Second, the scores 
were further analyzed using analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA). The ANOVA analysis 
method was used to compare the scores among states and determine if their means were 
statistically significant different. The comparison provided more insights on which state 
performed comparatively better. Third, the Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA) 
analysis method was used to detect the presence and the location of disaster resilience clusters 
(hot spots) in the study region. The key findings of these analyses are summarizes below. 
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With regard to the mean score, the findings of this research suggest that Florida had the 
highest scores and was ranked the first in all the three approaches (see Table 7.2). This finding 
corresponds with the theoretical expectation that Florida is the strongest state in terms of local 
planning in the U.S. Gulf coast region (Brody et al., 2003; Jacob & Showalter, 2007). In 
contrast, Texas had the lowest scores and was ranked the last (6th place) in almost every 
approach. This finding is also consistent with the theoretical expectation that counties along the 
Texas-Mexico border region are characterized by colonia settlements, which are very poor 
communities (Cisneros, 2001; Loustaunau & Sanchez-Bane, 1999) with high social vulnerability 
(Cutter & Finch, 2008). The ANOVA analysis results indicated that the means among states 
were statistically significant different (p <  .01, P < .05), and overall, the results on Fisher’s post 
hoc tests indicated that the mean for Florida was significantly higher than the means for all other 
states in the U.S. Gulf coast region. 
With regard to the LISA analysis, the key findings of this research suggest that (1) there 
is a cluster of low levels of disaster resilience in the southern part of Texas along the U.S.-
Mexico border region, which includes the following counties: Starr, Hidalgo, Cameron, Willacy, 
Kenedy, Brooks, Jim Hogg, Jim Wells, Duval, Live Oak, Kleberg, and Webb. This finding 
suggests that these are the least disaster resilient counties in the U.S. coast region; (2) there is a 
presence of disaster resilience hot spots in the Florida peninsula (Monroe, Collier, and Charlotte) 
and the Florida Panhandle area (Bay, Calhoun, Washington, Gulf, Wakulla, Liberty, and 
Jefferson). This finding implies that these are the most disaster resilient counties in the U.S. Gulf 
coast region. 
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9.3. Conclusions 
The conclusions of the main findings of this research are summarized as follows: 
 First, based on the evidence accumulated from the data analyzed in this study, it can be 
concluded that the overall goal of this research, which was to develop and validate a 
theoretically-driven index for measuring and quantifying community disaster resilience, was 
achieved. The findings of this study provided convincing empirical evidence that the community 
disaster resilience index (CDRI) has potential to enhance our understanding of the concept of 
disaster resilience. 
Second, it can also be concluded that the methodology developed in this study for 
measuring disaster resilience, which emphasizes on integration of disaster phases’ activities and 
community capitals appeared to be theoretically sound and practically useful.  
Third, disaster research needs a reliable, valid, and well tested measure to use in 
assessing and quantifying community disaster resilience. The disaster resilience index developed 
in this study is based on those premises. This measure was tested using a combination of 
statistical and GIS techniques to evaluate its reliability and validity. Based on the findings of this 
study it is reasonable to conclude that this measure is theoretically and empirically reliable and 
valid. However, further validation is needed before the measure is put on operational. 
Overall, the findings of this research are potentially promising and provided valuable 
information particularly to planners and emergency managers. However, while the results of this 
research seemed to be plausible, they should be considered as preliminary until additional 
research has been conducted to further validate the measure.  
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9.4. Limitations and recommendations for future research 
There is no research that is without limitations and this study is no exception. Several 
limitations were encountered in conducting this research. The following bullets highlight some 
of these limitations and also provide some recommendations for future research direction. 
• This research attempted to measure a very complex multidimensional concept of disaster 
resilience at a relatively large spatial scale (regional level), using a county as a unit of 
analysis. In the United States, communities are a central focus of the hazard mitigation, 
disaster preparedness, disaster response, and disaster recovery. Thus, assessing disaster 
resilience at a county level may not be useful or may not meet some other needs 
especially for planners. A smaller scale unit would probably provide a more contextual 
picture on how communities in the U.S. Gulf coast are performing with regard to 
disaster resilience. Thus, future research should focus on replicating the proposed 
methodology at a smaller scale such as a city or block group. 
• Like other social science studies, this research was limited by availability of data. While 
this research was primarily based on secondary data (mainly from the U.S. Census), 
more refined field survey data on emergency response plans, disaster recovery plans, 
floodplain managers, community emergency response team, volunteers and data on 
social capital, e.g., social networks and trust, may improve the results of future research. 
Thus, future research should focus on integrating both secondary and field survey data. 
• The CDRI is a multidimensional scale, which includes many factors. Validation of such 
a measure is problematic. Therefore, future research should focus on developing more 
external criteria. For example, one important validity measure could be the time taken by 
a community to recover after a disaster. The expectation is that a disaster resilient 
community will take a shorter period to recover while a less disaster resilient community 
  
200 
will take a longer period to recovery. However, data for this type of analysis can not be 
obtained from secondary sources; it requires longitudinal or panel data (data observed 
over time as well as space). 
• There is a limited understanding in the literature of indicators that can be used to 
measure community capitals (social, economic, physical, and human). For example, 
there is an overlap between economic capital indicators and human capital indicators. 
Some researchers for example argue that education is an indicator of human capital, 
while others consider education as an indicator of economic capital, which is perhaps not 
very surprising because education is positively related with income. Equally, some 
researchers treat unemployment as an indicator of economic capital, while others 
consider it as a human capital indicator. Conceptually, it becomes more problematic to 
identify which indicator fits better to which capital type.  
• The CDRI measure developed in this dissertation is based on only four community 
capitals (social, economic, physical, and human). To make the dissertation manageable, 
natural capital was not included in this study. However, a great body of literature has 
demonstrated that natural capital such as wetlands provide important buffers against 
hurricane damage. Therefore, future research should focus on how all five capitals 
(social, economic, physical, human, and natural) might be incorporated into a measure. 
On the other hand, the amount of natural capital and changes in natural capital might 
also be viewed as important indicators related to the context in which resilience should 
be assessed. 
• The CDRI measure developed in this research is a snapshot in time with limited ability 
to predict the future status of community disaster resilience. Thus, future research should 
focus on capturing both the spatial and temporal dimensions of disaster resilience. This 
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will inevitably help to determine whether a certain community is moving in the direction 
of becoming more disaster resilient in the face of hazards or not. 
9.5. Theoretical contributions and practical implications 
Despite the limitations outlined in the preceding section, this research has significant 
theoretical contributions to the disaster resilience literature in the hazards and disaster research. 
First, it has generally contributed to the current state of the knowledge on the concept of disaster 
resilience. Second, in the recent years much research has been focusing on the concept of 
disaster resilience, but little or no research has attempted to empirically measure the concept of 
disaster resilience. This research has contributed to this knowledge gap by developing a 
theoretically-driven index that can be used to measure disaster resilience. Third, most research in 
the hazards and disasters literature, which embarked on developing composite indices fail to 
empirically validate the measures especially in terms of incremental validity. This research has 
attempted theoretically and empirically to validate the CDRI measure and plausible results were 
obtained. This is an important contribution to this knowledge gap in terms of disaster resilience 
index validation.  Fourth, the disaster resilience hot spot maps generated in this study provide a 
new way of thinking on how disaster resilience concept can be used to enhance disaster planning 
and management.  
Although this research has demonstrated significant theoretical contributions to the 
resilience literature, it should be considered only as an entry point towards bridging the gap 
between theory and practice. 
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Table A-1: Hazard mitigation activities, stakeholders/actors, Government agencies, and community resources  
 
Hazard Mitigation Activities Actors/Stakeholders  Community Resources 
(1) Building dams, levees, dikes, floodwalls/seawalls, 
and stream channelization 
 Department of Transportation 
 US Army Corps of Engineers 
 Construction companies 
 Community 
 Transportation employees 
 Engineers 
 Construction employees 
 Local population 
(2) Landuse planning to prevent development in 
hazardous areas 
 Planners 
 Developers 
 Construction companies 
 Local population 
 Planners 
 Construction employees 
 Economic incentive e.g. Tax benefit and insurance discount 
(3) Protecting structures through strong building 
codes and building standards, e.g. installing window 
shutters for buildings located in Hurricane prone 
areas 
 Planners 
 Developers 
 Department of insurance 
 Home owners 
 Business owners 
 Legal officers 
 Building inspection officers 
 Planners 
 Home owners 
 Business owners 
(4) Acquiring and relocating damaged structures; 
Purchasing undeveloped floodplains and making 
them open spaces; Acquisition of development rights; 
and Zoning regulations 
 Federal, State, and Local governments 
 Planners 
 Developers 
 Home owners 
 Business owners 
 Community financial resources 
 Local population 
 
(5) Preserving the natural environment to serve as a 
buffer against hazard impacts 
 Environmental NGOs 
 US Army Corps of Engineers 
 Forest department 
 Parks and Wildlife department 
 Developers 
 Local population 
 Environmental experts 
 Non-Governmental Organizations(NGOs) 
(6) Educating the public about hazards and ways to 
reduce risk 
 Emergency managers 
 Local population 
 Home owners 
 Business owners 
 Developers 
 Trained personnel 
 Emergency Managers 
 Planners 
 NGOs 
 
 
 
 
Table A-2: Disaster preparedness activities, stakeholders/actors, Government agencies, and community resources  
 
Disaster preparedness Activities Actors/Stakeholders  Community resources 
(1) Development of response procedures  Emergency managers  Emergency managers 
(2) Design and installation of warning systems, 
detection and monitoring systems 
 Emergency managers 
 National weather service 
 National Hurricane Center 
 NOAA 
 Emergency managers 
(3) Developing plans for evacuation   Emergency managers  Emergency managers 
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 Department of Transportation 
 Local population 
 Transportation employees 
(4) Exercise to test emergency operations(Exercise & 
Drills) 
 Emergency managers 
 First responders 
 Public officials 
 Volunteers 
 NGOs 
 Local population 
 Emergency managers 
 First responders 
 Public officials 
 Volunteers 
 NGOs 
(5) Training of emergency personnel  Emergency managers 
 First responders 
 Emergency managers 
 First responders 
(6) Stockpiling of resources e.g. medical supplies  Emergency Medical Services(EMS) personnel 
 Emergency managers 
 First responders 
 EMS personnel 
 Hospitals 
 First responders 
 
 
 
Table-A-3: Disaster response activities, stakeholders/actors, Government agencies, and community resources  
 
Emergency Response Activities Actors/Stakeholders  Community resources 
(1) Securing the impacted area  Police department 
 Fire department 
 Police officers 
 Fire fighters  
 EMS personnel 
 Fire  Fighters vehicles 
(2) Warning  Police department 
 Media 
 Peers 
 Police officers 
 Fire fighters 
 Television 
 Radio  
 Newspapers 
 Internet 
 Telephone 
 Family and friends 
(3) Evacuating the threatened area  Local population  Personal vehicles 
 Social networks(Family and Friends) 
(4) Conducting search and rescue for the injured  Police department 
 Fire department 
 NGOs 
 Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) 
 Volunteers 
 Police officers 
 Fire fighters personnel 
 CERT 
 Volunteers 
 
(5) Providing emergency medical care  EMS 
 NGOs, e.g. Red Cross 
 EMS personnel 
 Hospitals 
 Ambulances 
 Firefighters vehicles 
(6) Sheltering evacuees and other victims  NGOs,  e.g. Red Cross 
 Faith Based Organizations(FBOs) 
 NGOs 
 FBOs 
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  e.g. Salvation Army 
 Nonprofit organizations(NPOs) 
 NPOs 
 Hotels/Motels 
 Churches & Schools 
 Family and Friends 
 
 
Table A-4: Disaster recovery activities, stakeholders/actors, Government agencies, and community resources 
 
(1) Relief and rehabilitation activities  Actors/Stakeholders Community resources 
 Restoration of access to impacted area  Police department 
 Fire department 
 Department of public works 
 Police officers 
 Fire fighters personnel 
 Volunteers 
 Re-establishment of economic activities (commercial 
and industrial) 
 Business organizations  Businesses organizations 
 Provision of housing, clothing, and food for the victims  NGOs, e.g. Red Cross 
 FBOs, e.g. Salvation Army 
 NPOs 
 Family and Friends 
 NGOs 
 FBOs 
 NPOs 
 Family and Friends 
 Restoration of critical facilities within the community  Utility company 
 Department of public works 
 Utility employees 
 Volunteers 
 Restoration of essential government  or community 
services 
 Federal, State, and Local governments 
 Local population 
 Local population 
(2) Reconstruction activities    
 Rebuilding of major structure e.g. public buildings, 
roads, bridges, and dams 
 Federal, State, and Local governments 
 Department of public works 
 
 Local population 
 Revitalizing the economic system  Local government 
 Economic groups or Business 
 Businesses organizations 
 Reconstruction of residential housing   Federal, State, and Local governments 
 Insurance companies 
 Construction companies 
 Family and Friends 
 Household income 
 Property insurance 
 Family and Friends 
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Table B-1(a): Social capital indicators for measuring hazard mitigation resilience sub-index 
 
Generic Indicators Mitigation  Activity 
Component Indicator 
(1) Volunteerism Registered nonprofit organizations  
(2) Sociability Recreational centers (bowling, fitness, golf clubs) and  sport organizations 
Registered voters 
Civic and political organizations 
(3) Civic and political participation 
Census response rate 
(4) Religious participation Religious organizations 
(5) Community attachment Owner-occupied housing units 
Professional organizations 
 Building dams, levees, dikes, and 
floodwalls  
 Landuse planning to prevent 
development in hazardous areas 
 Building codes and building 
standards,  
 Acquiring and relocating damaged 
structures 
 Purchasing undeveloped floodplains 
and making them open spaces 
 Acquisition of development rights 
 Zoning regulations 
 Preserving the natural environment 
to serve as a buffer against hazard 
impacts 
 Educating the public about hazards 
and ways to reduce risk 
(6) Connections in work place 
Business organizations 
 
 
Table B-1(b): Economic capital indicators for measuring hazard mitigation resilience sub-index 
 
Generic  Indicators Mitigation  Activity 
Component Indicator 
Per capita income  (1) Income 
 Median household income  
(2) Employment Population in labour force, employed 
(3) Home value Median value  of owner-occupied housing units  
(4) Business  Business establishments 
 Building dams, levees, dikes, and 
floodwalls 
  Landuse planning to prevent 
development in hazardous areas 
 Building codes and building standards 
  Acquiring and relocating damaged 
structures 
 Purchasing undeveloped floodplains 
and making them open spaces 
 Acquisition of development rights 
 Zoning regulations 
 Preserving the natural environment to 
serve as a buffer against hazard impacts 
 Educating the public about hazards 
and ways to reduce risk 
(5) Health insurance Population with health insurance 
 
Table B-1 (c): Physical capital indicators for measuring hazard mitigation resilience sub-index 
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Specific Indicators Mitigation  Activity 
Component Indicator 
Building construction establishments 
Heavy and civil engineering constructions 
Highway, street, and bridge construction establishments 
(1) Construction services 
Architecture and engineering establishments 
Environmental consulting establishments (2) Environment 
Environment and conservation organizations 
Land subdivision establishments 
Legal services establishments 
(3) Land and building 
regulations 
Building inspection establishments 
(4) Planning Landscape architecture and planning establishments 
 Building dams, levees, dikes, and floodwalls  
 Landuse planning to prevent development in 
hazardous areas 
 Building codes and building standards 
 Acquiring and relocating damaged 
structures 
 Purchasing undeveloped floodplains and 
making them open spaces 
 Acquisition of development rights 
 Zoning regulations 
 Preserving the natural environment to serve 
as a buffer against hazard impacts 
 Educating the public about hazards and 
ways to reduce risk 
(5) Property insurance Property and causality insurance companies 
 
 
Table B-1(d): Human capital indicators for measuring hazard mitigation resilience sub-index 
 
Generic Indicators Mitigation  Activity 
Component Indicator 
(1) Education  Population with more than high school education 
Physicians (2) Health 
Population employed in health care support occupations 
Specific Indicators 
Component Indicator 
Population employed in building construction establishments 
Population employed in heavy and civil engineering constructions 
Population employed in Highway, Street, and Bridge construction establishments 
(3) Construction services 
Population employed in architecture and engineering establishments 
Population employed in environmental consulting services (4) Environment 
Population employed in environment and conservation organizations 
Population employed in land subdivision services 
Population employed in legal services 
(5) Land and building 
regulations 
Population employed in building inspection services 
(6) Planning Population employed  in landscape architecture and planning services 
(7) Property  insurance Population employed in property and causality insurance services 
(8) Mitigation plan Population covered  by comprehensive plans 
Population covered  by zoning regulations 
Population covered  by building codes 
Population covered by FEMA approved mitigation plans 
 Building dams, levees, dikes, and 
floodwalls  
 Landuse planning to prevent 
development in hazardous areas 
 Building codes and building 
standards,  
 Acquiring and relocating damaged 
structures 
 Purchasing undeveloped floodplains 
and making them open spaces 
 Acquisition of development rights 
 Zoning regulations 
 Preserving the natural environment 
to serve as a buffer against hazard 
impacts 
 Educating the public about hazards 
and ways to reduce risk 
 
FEMA community rating system(CRS) scores 
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Table B-2 (a): Social capital indicators for measuring Disaster preparedness resilience sub-index 
 
Generic Indicators Preparedness  Activity 
Component Indicator 
(1) Volunteerism Registered nonprofit organizations  
(2) Sociability Recreational centers (bowling, fitness, golf clubs) and  sport organizations 
Registered voters  
Civic and political organizations 
(3) Civic and political participation 
Census response rate 
(4) Religious participation Religious organizations 
(5) Community attachment Owner-occupied housing units  
Professional organizations 
 Development of response 
procedures 
 Design and installation of warning 
systems, detection and monitoring 
systems e.g. radar detection and 
tracking severe storms 
 Developing plans for evacuation  
 Exercise to test emergency 
operations 
(Exercise & Drills) 
 Training of emergency personnel 
 Stockpiling of resources e.g. 
medical supplies 
(6) Connections in work place 
Business organizations 
 
 
Table B-2 (b): Economic capital indicators for measuring disaster preparedness resilience sub-index 
 
Generic Indicators Preparedness  Activity 
Component Indicator 
Per capita income  (1) Income 
 Median household income  
(2) Employment Population in labour force, employed 
(3) Home value Median value  of owner-occupied housing units  
(4) Business  Business establishments 
 
 Development of response procedures 
 Design and installation of warning 
systems, detection and monitoring 
systems e.g. radar detection and 
tracking severe storms 
 Developing plans for evacuation  
 Exercise to test emergency operations 
(Exercise & Drills) 
 Training of emergency personnel 
 Stockpiling of resources e.g. medical 
supplies 
(5) Health insurance Population with health insurance 
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Table B-2(c): Physical capital indicators for measuring disaster preparedness resilience sub-index 
 
Specific indicators Preparedness  Activity 
Component Indicator 
(1) Research Scientific research and development services 
(2) Colleges Colleges, universities, and professional schools 
 
 Development of response procedures 
 Design and installation of warning 
systems, detection and monitoring 
systems e.g. radar detection and 
tracking severe storms 
 Developing plans for evacuation  
 Exercise to test emergency operations 
(Exercise & Drills) 
 Training of emergency personnel 
 Stockpiling of resources e.g. medical 
supplies 
(3) Planning Landscape architecture and planning services 
 
Table B-2 (d): Human capital indicators for measuring disaster preparedness  resilience sub-index 
 
Generic Indicators Preparedness  Activity 
Component Indicator 
(1) Education  Population with more  than high school education 
(2) Health Physicians 
Specific Indicators 
Component Indicator 
(3) Protective services Population employed as  fire fighting, prevention, or  law enforcement workers 
(4) Planning Population employed in landscape  architecture and planning services 
(5) Research Population employed in scientific research and development services 
(6) Colleges Population employed in colleges, universities, and professional schools 
 Development of response procedures 
 Design and installation of warning 
systems, detection and monitoring 
systems e.g. radar detection and 
tracking severe storms 
 Developing plans for evacuation  
 Exercise to test emergency operations 
(Exercise & Drills) 
 Training of emergency personnel 
 Stockpiling of resources e.g. medical 
supplies (7) communication Population who speak english language very well 
 
Table B-3(a): Social capital indicators for measuring disaster response resilience sub-index 
Generic Indicators Response Activity 
Component Indicator 
(1) Volunteerism Registered  nonprofit organizations   
(2) Sociability Recreational centers (bowling, fitness, golf clubs) and  sport organizations 
Registered voters  
Civic and  political organizations 
(3) Civic and Political participation 
Census response rate 
(4 Religious participation Religious organizations 
(5) Community attachment Owner-occupied housing units  
Professional organizations 
 Securing the impacted area 
 Warning 
 Evacuation 
 Search & Rescue 
 Provision of  medical care 
 Sheltering the evacuees 
(6) Connections in work place 
Business organizations 
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Table B-3(b): Economic capital indicators for measuring disaster response resilience sub-index 
 
Generic Indicators Response Activity 
Component Indicator 
Per capita income  (1) Income 
 Median household income  
(2) Employment Population in labour force, employed 
(3) Home value Median value  of owner-occupied housing units  
(4) Business  Business establishments 
 Securing the  impacted area 
 Warning 
 Evacuation 
 Search & Rescue 
 Provision of medical care 
 Sheltering the evacuees (5) Health insurance Population with health insurance  
 
 
 
Table B-3(c): Physical capital indicators for measuring disaster response resilience sub-index 
 
Generic  Indicators Response Activity 
Component Indicator 
Housing units (1) Housing services 
Vacant housing units 
Hospitals 
Hospital beds 
Ambulances 
Fire stations 
Schools 
Licensed child care facilities 
Nursing homes 
(2) Critical facilities 
Hotels and motels 
Occupied housing units with vehicle available 
Special need transportation services 
(3) Transportation services 
School and employee buses 
Housing units with telephone service available 
Newspaper publishers 
Radio stations 
Television broadcasting 
(4) Communication  services 
Internet service providers 
Temporary shelters 
Community housing  
 Securing  the impacted  area 
 
 Warning 
 
 Evacuation 
 
 Search & Rescue 
 
 Provision of  medical care 
 
 Sheltering the evacuees 
(5) Emergency shelters & relief services 
Community food service facilities 
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Table B-3(d): Human capital indicators for measuring disaster response resilience sub-index 
 
Generic Indicators Response Activity 
Component Indicator 
(1) Education  Population  with more than high school education 
(2) Health Physicians 
Specific Indictors 
Component Indicator 
(3) Protective services Population employed as  fire fighting, prevention, or  law enforcement workers 
(4) Communication  Population who speak english language very well 
(5)Transportation  Population employed in special  need transportation services 
 Securing the  impacted area  
 Warning 
 Evacuation 
 Search & Rescue 
 Provision of medical care 
 Sheltering the evacuees 
(6) Planning Population employed in landscape architecture and planning services 
 
 
Table B-4(a): Social capital indicators for measuring disaster recovery resilience sub-index 
 
Generic Indicators Recovery Activity 
Component Indicator 
(1) Volunteerism Registered nonprofit organizations   
 
(2) Sociability Recreational centers (bowling, fitness, golf clubs) and  
sport organizations 
Registered voters  
 
(3) Civic and Political participation 
Civic and  political organizations 
 
 Census response rate 
 
(4) Religious participation Religious organizations 
 
(5) Community attachment Owner-occupied housing units 
 
Professional organizations 
 
(i) Relief & rehabilitation 
 Restoration of access to impacted area 
 Re-establishment of economic activities  
 Provision of housing, clothing, and food  
 Restoration of critical facilities 
 Restoration of essential community services 
 
(ii) Reconstruction 
 Rebuilding of major structure e.g. public buildings, 
roads, bridges, and dams 
 Revitalizing the economic system 
 Reconstruction of housing 
(6) Connections in work place 
Business organizations 
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Table B-4(b): Economic capital indicators for measuring disaster recovery resilience sub-index 
 
Generic Indicators Recovery activity 
Component Indicator 
Per capita income  (1) Income 
Median household income  
(2) Employment Population in labour force, employed 
(3) Home value Median value  of owner-occupied housing units  
(4) Business  Business establishments 
(i) Relief & rehabilitation 
 Restoration of access to impacted area 
 Re-establishment of economic activities  
 Provision of housing, clothing, and food  
 Restoration of critical facilities 
 Restoration of essential community services 
(ii) Reconstruction 
 Rebuilding of major structure e.g. public buildings, 
roads, bridges, and dams 
 Revitalizing the economic system 
 Reconstruction of housing 
(5) Health insurance Population with health insurance 
 
 
 
Table B-4(c): Physical capital indicators for measuring disaster recovery resilience sub-index 
 
Specific Indicators Recovery Activity 
Component Indicator 
Building construction establishments 
Utility systems construction establishments 
Architecture and engineering establishments 
(i) Relief & rehabilitation 
 Restoration of access to impacted area 
 Re-establishment of economic activities  
 Provision of housing, clothing, and food  
 Restoration of critical facilities 
 Restoration of essential community services 
(ii) Reconstruction 
 Rebuilding of major structure e.g. public buildings, roads, 
bridges, and dams 
 Revitalizing the economic system 
 Reconstruction of housing 
Construction services 
Heavy highway construction establishments 
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Table B-4(d): Human capital indicators for measuring disaster recovery sub-index 
 
Generic Indicators Recovery Activity 
Component Indicator 
(1) Education  Population with more than high school education 
(2) Health Physicians 
Specific Indicators 
Component Indicator 
(3) Communication language Population who speak english language very well 
Population employed in building construction  industry 
Population employed in heavy highway construction establishments 
Population employed in highway, street, and bridge construction 
establishments 
Population employed in building inspection services 
(4) Construction services 
Population employed in architecture and engineering establishments 
(i) Relief & rehabilitation 
 Restoration of access to 
impacted area 
 Re-establishment of economic 
activities  
 Provision of housing, clothing, 
and food  
 Restoration of critical facilities 
 Restoration of essential 
community services 
(ii) Reconstruction 
 Rebuilding of major structure 
e.g. public buildings, roads, 
bridges, and dams 
 Revitalizing the economic 
system 
 Reconstruction of housing 
(5) Community and social  services Population employed in community and social services 
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APPENDIX C 
 
DATA TYPE AND DATA SOURCES 
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Table C-1: Social capital indicators and data sources 
 
Indicator Description Source of data 
(1) Registered nonprofit organizations  Number of non-profit organization registered with IRS per 1000 persons. County Business Patterns, 2005 
(2) Recreational centers (bowling, fitness, golf clubs) 
and  sport organizations 
Number of recreational centers (bowling, fitness, golf clubs) and  sport 
organizations per 1000 persons 
County Business Patterns, 2005 
(3) Registered voters Number of registered voters who voted for 2004 presidential election per 
1000 persons 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2000, U.S. Counties 
 
(4) Civic and political organizations Number of civic and political organizations per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
(5) Census response rate Census response rate U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 
(6) Religious organizations Number of religious organizations per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
(7) Owner-occupied housing units Number of  owner-occupied housing units per 1000 persons U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 
(8) Professional organizations Number of professional organizations per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
(9) Business organizations Number of business organizations per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
 
Table C-2: Economic capital indicators and data sources 
 
Indicator Description Source of data 
(1) Per capita income  Per capita income U.S. Census Bureau, 2000, U.S. Counties 
(2) Median household income  Median household income  U.S. Census Bureau, 2000, U.S. Counties 
(3) Population in labour force, employed Civilian population, 16 years and over in labour force, employed per 
1000 person 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2000, U.S. Counties 
(4) Median value  of owner-occupied housing units  Median value  of owner-occupied housing units  U.S. Census Bureau, 2000, U.S. Counties 
(5) Business establishments Number of  business establishments per 1000 persons U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 
(6)Population with health insurance Percentage of population with health insurance U.S. Census Bureau, 2000, U.S. Counties 
 
Table C-3:  Physical capital indicators and data sources 
 
Indicator Description Source of data 
(1) Building construction establishments Number of building construction establishments per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
(2) Heavy and civil engineering construction establishments Number of heavy and civil engineering construction establishments per 
1000 persons 
County Business Patterns, 2005 
 
(3) Highway, street, and bridge construction establishments Number of highway, street, and bridge construction establishments per 
1000 persons 
County Business Patterns, 2005 
 
(4) Architecture and engineering establishments Number of architecture and engineering establishments per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
(5) Land subdivision establishments Number of land subdivision establishments per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
(6) Legal services establishments Number of legal services establishments per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
(7) Property and causality insurance companies Number of property and causality insurance companies per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
(8) Building inspection establishments Number of building inspection establishments per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
(9) Landscape Architecture and planning establishments Number of landscape architecture and planning establishments per 1000  
persons 
County Business Patterns, 2005 
 
(10) Environmental consulting establishments Number of environmental consulting establishments per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
(11) Environment and conservation organizations Number of environment and conservation organizations per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
(12) Scientific research and development services Number of scientific research and development services per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
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(13) Colleges, universities, and professional schools Number of colleges, universities, and professional schools per 1000 
persons 
County Business Patterns, 2005 
(14) Housing units Number of housing units per 1000 persons U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 
(15) Vacant housing units (15) Number of vacant housing units per 1000 persons U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 
(16) Hospitals Number of  hospitals per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
(17) Hospital beds Number of hospital beds per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
(18) Ambulances Number of ambulances per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
(19) Fire stations Number of fire stations per 1000 people FEMA, U.S. Fire Administration 
(20) Nursing homes Number of nursing homes per 1000 persons U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 
(21) Hotels and motels Number of hotels and motels per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
(22) Occupied housing units with vehicle available Number of occupied housing units with vehicle available per 1000 persons U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 
(23) Special need transportation services Number of special need transportation services per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
(24) School and employee buses Number of  school and employee buses per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
(25) Owner-occupied housing units with telephone service  Number of owner-occupied housing units with telephone service  per 1000 
persons 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 
(26) Newspaper publishers Number of newspaper publishers per 1000 people County Business Patterns, 2005 
(27) Radio stations Number of  radio stations per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
(28) Television broadcasting Number of television broadcasting per 1000 persons County Business Patterns , 2005 
(29) Internet service providers Number of internet service providers per 1000 persons County Business Patterns , 2005 
(30) Temporary shelters Number of temporary shelters per 1000 persons County Business Patterns , 2005 
(31) Community housing  Number of community housing  per 1000 persons County Business Patterns , 2005 
(32) Community food service facilities Number of community food service facilities per 1000 persons County Business Patterns , 2005 
(33) Schools Number of schools per 1000 persons U.S. Department of Education 
(34) Licensed child care facilities Number of licensed child care facilities per 1000 persons National Child Care Information Center 
(NCCIC) 
(35) Utility systems construction establishments Number of utility systems construction establishments per 1000 persons County Business Patterns, 2005 
 
Table C-4:  Human capital indicators and data sources 
 
Indicator Description Source of data 
(1) Population with more than high school education Population with more than high school education (per 1000 persons) U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 
(2) Physicians Number of physicians per 1000 persons U.S. Census Bureau, 2000, U.S. Counties 
(3) Population employed in health care support  Population employed in health care support (per 1000 persons) U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 
(4) Population employed in building construction 
establishments 
Population employed in building construction establishments (per 
1000 persons) 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 
(5) Population employed in heavy and civil engineering 
constructions 
Population employed in heavy and civil engineering constructions (per 
1000 persons) 
County Business Patterns , 2005 
(6) Population employed in Architecture and engineering 
establishments 
Population employed in architecture and engineering establishments 
(per 1000 persons) 
County Business Patterns , 2005 
(7) Population employed in environmental consulting 
services 
Population employed in environmental consulting services (per 1000 
persons) 
County Business Patterns , 2005 
(8) Population employed in environment and conservation 
organizations 
Population employed in environment and conservation organizations( 
per 1000 persons) 
County Business Patterns , 2005 
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(9) Population employed in land subdivision services Population employed in land subdivision services (per 1000 persons) County Business Patterns , 2005 
(10) Population employed in building inspection services Population employed in building inspection services (per 1000 
persons) 
County Business Patterns , 2005 
(11) Population employed  in landscape Architecture and 
planning establishments 
Population employed  in landscape architecture and planning services 
(per 1000 persons) 
County Business Patterns , 2005 
(12) Population employed in property and causality 
insurance companies 
Population employed in property and causality insurance companies 
(per 1000 persons) 
County Business Patterns , 2005 
(13) Population employed in highway, street, and bridge 
construction  
Population employed in highway, street, and bridge construction  (per 
1000 persons) 
County Business Patterns , 2005 
(14) Population employed in legal services Population employed in legal services (per 1000 persons) County Business Patterns , 2005 
(15) Population covered  by comprehensive plan Percent of  population covered  by comprehensive plan  County/city website 
(16) Population covered  by zoning regulations Percent of population covered  by zoning regulations per 1000 persons County/city website 
(17) Population covered  by building codes Percent of population covered  by building codes International Code Council (ICC) 
(18) Population covered by FEMA approved mitigation 
plan 
Percent of population covered by FEMA approved mitigation plan FEMA  
(19) Community rating system(CRS) score Community rating system(CRS) score FEMA 
(20) Population employed as  fire fighting , prevention, or  
law enforcement workers 
Population employed as  fire fighting , prevention, or  law 
enforcement workers (per 1000 persons) 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 
 
(21) Population employed in scientific research and 
development services 
Population employed in scientific research and development services 
(per 1000 persons) 
County Business Patterns ,2005 
(22) Population employed in Colleges, Universities, and 
Professional schools 
Population employed in Colleges, Universities, and Professional 
schools (per 1000 persons) 
County Business Patterns ,2005 
(23) Population who speak english language very well Population who speak english language very well (per 1000 persons) U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 
(24) Population employed in special need transportation 
services 
Population employed in special need transportation services (per 1000 
persons) 
County Business Patterns , 2005 
(25) Population employed in community and social 
services 
Population employed in community and social services ( per 1000 
persons) 
County Business Patterns , 2005 
 
 
Table C-5:  External criteria and data sources 
Indicator Description Source of data 
(1) Deaths Number of  deaths due to flooding and cataclysmic storm (2000-2005) CDC 
(2) Total property damage Total property damage due to  weather related disasters  adjusted to 2005 U.S. dollar value SHELDUS version 6.2 
(3) Insured flood property damage Total payments made to flood property damage claim (2000-2005) FEMA 
(4) Uninsured flood property damage Total property damage minus total payment made to flood property damage (2000-2005) FEMA 
(5) Wind risk Total wind risk scores based on wind categories The Coastal Risk Atlas (CRA) 
(6) Flood risk Total flood risk scores based on the likelihood of the area to flood The Coastal Risk Atlas (CRA) 
(7) Surge risk Total surge risk scores based on the hurricane categories The Coastal Risk Atlas (CRA) 
(8)Total risk Total Wind risk scores plus total flood risk scores plus total surge risk scores The Coastal Risk Atlas (CRA) 
(9) Social vulnerability Index Social Vulnerability Index score Hazard and Vulnerability Research 
Institute (HVRI) 
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APPENDIX D 
 
CDRI MEAN SCORE BY COUNTY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
231 
Table D-1: CDRI_1 Ranking Score by County 
 
Rank County State CDRI_1 
Score  
 Rank County State CDRI_1 
Score 
1 Monroe               Florida     1.44  73 George               Mississippi -0.05 
2 Leon                 Florida     1.12  74 Pike                 Mississippi -0.06 
3 Collier              Florida     1.03  75 Clarke               Alabama     -0.07 
4 Sarasota             Florida     1.02  76 Orange               Texas       -0.07 
5 Franklin             Florida     0.90  77 Gilchrist            Florida     -0.08 
6 Lee                  Florida     0.72  78 Matagorda            Texas       -0.08 
7 East Baton Rouge     Louisiana   0.69  79 Pearl River          Mississippi -0.09 
8 Baldwin              Alabama     0.68  80 Liberty              Florida     -0.10 
9 Fayette              Texas       0.68  81 Marion               Mississippi -0.11 
10 Okaloosa             Florida     0.67  82 Decatur              Georgia     -0.12 
11 Walton               Florida     0.66  83 Sumter               Florida     -0.13 
12 Bay                  Florida     0.61  84 Geneva               Alabama     -0.14 
13 Hillsborough         Florida     0.61  85 Plaquemines          Louisiana   -0.14 
14 St. Tammany          Louisiana   0.61  86 St. Bernard          Louisiana   -0.14 
15 Pinellas             Florida     0.58  87 Tangipahoa           Louisiana   -0.14 
16 Manatee              Florida     0.56  88 Stone                Mississippi -0.14 
17 Lafayette            Louisiana   0.56  89 Jasper               Texas       -0.14 
18 Austin               Texas       0.51  90 Jefferson Davis      Louisiana   -0.15 
19 Lake                 Florida     0.50  91 Vermilion            Louisiana   -0.15 
20 Fort Bend            Texas       0.49  92 Gadsden              Florida     -0.16 
21 Washington           Texas       0.49  93 St. James            Louisiana   -0.16 
22 Charlotte            Florida     0.46  94 Cameron              Louisiana   -0.17 
23 Lavaca               Texas       0.44  95 Iberia               Louisiana   -0.17 
24 Goliad               Texas       0.41  96 St. Mary             Louisiana   -0.17 
25 Citrus               Florida     0.40  97 St. John the Baptist Louisiana   -0.18 
26 Santa Rosa           Florida     0.39  98 Escambia             Alabama     -0.19 
27 Gulf                 Florida     0.35  99 Sabine               Louisiana   -0.19 
28 Hernando             Florida     0.34  100 Pointe Coupee        Louisiana   -0.2 
29 Colorado             Texas       0.31  101 East Feliciana       Louisiana   -0.21 
30 Victoria             Texas       0.31  102 Holmes               Florida     -0.22 
31 Wakulla              Florida     0.30  103 Madison              Florida     -0.23 
32 Jefferson            Louisiana   0.30  104 Live Oak             Texas       -0.23 
33 Jefferson            Florida     0.28  105 Calhoun              Florida     -0.25 
34 St. Charles          Louisiana   0.27  106 Grady                Georgia     -0.25 
35 Pasco                Florida     0.26  107 Amite                Mississippi -0.25 
36 Galveston            Texas       0.26  108 Assumption           Louisiana   -0.26 
37 Escambia             Florida     0.25  109 Monroe               Alabama     -0.27 
38 Polk                 Florida     0.24  110 Kleberg              Texas       -0.27 
39 Rapides              Louisiana   0.24  111 DeSoto               Florida     -0.28 
40 Hancock              Mississippi 0.23  112 Acadia               Louisiana   -0.31 
41 Thomas               Georgia     0.22  113 San Patricio         Texas       -0.31 
42 Mobile               Alabama     0.20  114 Washington           Alabama     -0.32 
43 Marion               Florida     0.20  115 Hendry               Florida     -0.32 
44 Lamar                Mississippi 0.18  116 Lafayette            Florida     -0.33 
45 Harris               Texas       0.18  117 Liberty              Texas       -0.33 
46 Ascension            Louisiana   0.17  118 Washington           Louisiana   -0.36 
47 Waller               Texas       0.17  119 St. Helena           Louisiana   -0.37 
48 Covington            Alabama     0.16  120 Iberville            Louisiana   -0.38 
49 Calcasieu            Louisiana   0.14  121 St. Landry           Louisiana   -0.38 
50 Harrison             Mississippi 0.14  122 St. Martin           Louisiana   -0.38 
51 Aransas              Texas       0.14  123 Tyler                Texas       -0.38 
52 Chambers             Texas       0.11  124 Walthall             Mississippi -0.39 
53 Brazoria             Texas       0.09  125 Avoyelles            Louisiana   -0.41 
54 Levy                 Florida     0.08  126 Glades               Florida     -0.43 
55 Refugio              Texas       0.07  127 Hardee               Florida     -0.44 
56 Orleans              Louisiana   0.06  128 Jim Wells            Texas       -0.44 
57 West Baton Rouge    Louisiana   0.06  129 Brooks               Texas       -0.45 
58 Jefferson            Texas       0.06  130 Dixie                Florida     -0.46 
59 Jackson              Florida     0.05  131 Jim Hogg             Texas       -0.46 
  
232 
60 Suwannee             Florida     0.05  132 Evangeline           Louisiana   -0.51 
61 Nueces               Texas       0.05  133 Wilkinson            Mississippi -0.53 
62 Washington           Florida     0.04  134 Newton               Texas       -0.56 
63 Terrebonne           Louisiana   0.04  135 West Feliciana       Louisiana   -0.61 
64 Jackson              Mississippi 0.03  136 Kenedy               Texas       -0.61 
65 Taylor               Florida     0.01  137 Vernon               Louisiana   -0.67 
66 Livingston           Louisiana   0.01  138 Webb                 Texas       -0.68 
67 Wharton              Texas       0.00  139 Cameron              Texas       -0.72 
68 Beauregard           Louisiana   -0.01  140 Bee                  Texas       -0.73 
69 Jackson              Texas       -0.01  141 Hidalgo              Texas       -0.81 
70 Calhoun              Texas       -0.03  142 Duval                Texas       -0.92 
71 DeWitt               Texas       -0.04  143 Willacy              Texas       -0.98 
72 Lafourche            Louisiana   -0.05  144 Starr                Texas       -1.32 
 
Table D-2: CDRI_2 Ranking Score by County 
 
Rank County State CDRI_2 
Score  
 Rank County State CDRI_2 
Score 
1 Monroe               Florida     1.39  73 Jefferson Davis      Louisiana   -0.07 
2 Franklin             Florida     1.24  74 Madison              Florida     -0.07 
3 Sarasota             Florida     1.13  75 Chambers             Texas       -0.08 
4 Collier              Florida     1.08  76 Plaquemines          Louisiana   -0.08 
5 Walton               Florida     0.94  77 Wharton              Texas       -0.10 
6 Okaloosa             Florida     0.85  78 Jasper               Texas       -0.10 
7 Leon                 Florida     0.82  79 Stone                Mississippi -0.11 
8 Baldwin              Alabama     0.75  80 Pike                 Mississippi -0.12 
9 Lee                  Florida     0.71  81 Calhoun              Florida     -0.12 
10 East Baton Rouge     Louisiana   0.71  82 Beauregard           Louisiana   -0.13 
11 Lafayette            Louisiana   0.67  83 DeWitt               Texas       -0.13 
12 Bay                  Florida     0.66  84 Matagorda            Texas       -0.13 
13 St. Tammany          Louisiana   0.63  85 Marion               Mississippi -0.13 
14 Hillsborough         Florida     0.60  86 Cameron              Louisiana   -0.13 
15 Gulf                 Florida     0.59  87 Orange               Texas       -0.15 
16 Manatee              Florida     0.57  88 Pearl River          Mississippi -0.15 
17 Lake                 Florida     0.56  89 Lafourche            Louisiana   -0.16 
18 Pinellas             Florida     0.53  90 Decatur              Georgia     -0.16 
19 Charlotte            Florida     0.42  91 East Feliciana       Louisiana   -0.16 
20 Wakulla              Florida     0.41  92 Clarke               Alabama     -0.17 
21 Hancock              Mississippi 0.41  93 Tangipahoa           Louisiana   -0.17 
22 Santa Rosa           Florida     0.39  94 Live Oak             Texas       -0.17 
23 Citrus               Florida     0.38  95 Gadsden              Florida     -0.18 
24 Rapides              Louisiana   0.33  96 Holmes               Florida     -0.19 
25 Orleans              Louisiana   0.33  97 Iberia               Louisiana   -0.21 
26 Fort Bend            Texas       0.32  98 St. Mary             Louisiana   -0.21 
27 Escambia             Florida     0.30  99 Pointe Coupee        Louisiana   -0.21 
28 Austin               Texas       0.29  100 Jim Hogg             Texas       -0.21 
29 Jefferson            Louisiana   0.29  101 Brooks               Texas       -0.22 
30 Gilchrist            Florida     0.29  102 Escambia             Alabama     -0.25 
31 Waller               Texas       0.28  103 DeSoto               Florida     -0.25 
32 Galveston            Texas       0.27  104 Hendry               Florida     -0.26 
33 Pasco                Florida     0.25  105 Vermilion            Louisiana   -0.27 
34 Fayette              Texas       0.24  106 St. John the Baptist Louisiana   -0.28 
35 Washington           Texas       0.23  107 Lafayette            Florida     -0.28 
36 George               Mississippi 0.23  108 St. Bernard          Louisiana   -0.29 
37 Harris               Texas       0.22  109 St. James            Louisiana   -0.29 
38 Mobile               Alabama     0.21  110 Sabine               Louisiana   -0.29 
39 Marion               Florida     0.21  111 Grady                Georgia     -0.29 
40 Polk                 Florida     0.20  112 San Patricio         Texas       -0.29 
41 Hernando             Florida     0.19  113 St. Landry           Louisiana   -0.30 
42 Aransas              Texas       0.19  114 Tyler                Texas       -0.30 
43 Jackson              Florida     0.19  115 Washington           Louisiana   -0.31 
44 Lavaca               Texas       0.16  116 West Feliciana       Louisiana   -0.31 
45 Covington            Alabama     0.16  117 Assumption           Louisiana   -0.32 
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46 Jefferson            Florida     0.14  118 Liberty              Texas       -0.32 
47 Thomas               Georgia     0.14  119 Avoyelles            Louisiana   -0.32 
48 Harrison             Mississippi 0.14  120 Amite                Mississippi -0.33 
49 Liberty              Florida     0.14  121 Iberville            Louisiana   -0.33 
50 Taylor               Florida     0.13  122 Kleberg              Texas       -0.34 
51 Washington           Florida     0.12  123 Dixie                Florida     -0.36 
52 Colorado             Texas       0.11  124 Wilkinson            Mississippi -0.36 
53 Victoria             Texas       0.10  125 Monroe               Alabama     -0.38 
54 Ascension            Louisiana   0.10  126 Washington           Alabama     -0.38 
55 St. Charles          Louisiana   0.09  127 St. Helena           Louisiana   -0.38 
56 West Baton Rouge    Louisiana   0.09  128 Glades               Florida     -0.38 
57 Nueces               Texas       0.08  129 Acadia               Louisiana   -0.39 
58 Brazoria             Texas       0.05  130 St. Martin           Louisiana   -0.40 
59 Jefferson            Texas       0.05  131 Newton               Texas       -0.43 
60 Calcasieu            Louisiana   0.04  132 Walthall             Mississippi -0.46 
61 Refugio              Texas       0.02  133 Bee                  Texas       -0.46 
62 Levy                 Florida     0.01  134 Evangeline           Louisiana   -0.47 
63 Suwannee             Florida     0.00  135 Vernon               Louisiana   -0.48 
64 Lamar                Mississippi -0.01  136 Jim Wells            Texas       -0.50 
65 Sumter               Florida     -0.01  137 Hardee               Florida     -0.59 
66 Goliad               Texas       -0.03  138 Cameron              Texas       -0.71 
67 Jackson              Texas       -0.04  139 Webb                 Texas       -0.76 
68 Terrebonne           Louisiana   -0.05  140 Hidalgo              Texas       -0.77 
69 Jackson              Mississippi -0.05  141 Kenedy               Texas       -0.80 
70 Livingston           Louisiana   -0.05  142 Duval                Texas       -0.87 
71 Geneva               Alabama     -0.05  143 Willacy              Texas       -0.98 
72 Calhoun              Texas       -0.07  144 Starr                Texas       -1.27 
 
Table D-3: CDRI_3 Ranking Score by County 
 
Rank County State CDRI_3 
Score  
 Rank County State CDRI_3 
Score 
1 Monroe               Florida     1.56  73 Beauregard           Louisiana   -0.06 
2 Collier              Florida     1.25  74 Plaquemines          Louisiana   -0.08 
3 Sarasota             Florida     1.21  75 DeWitt               Texas       -0.08 
4 Leon                 Florida     1.11  76 Pike                 Mississippi -0.09 
5 Franklin             Florida     0.88  77 Sumter               Florida     -0.10 
6 Baldwin              Alabama     0.84  78 Geneva               Alabama     -0.10 
7 Lee                  Florida     0.83  79 Jefferson Davis      Louisiana   -0.10 
8 Okaloosa             Florida     0.81  80 Matagorda            Texas       -0.10 
9 Walton               Florida     0.79  81 Marion               Mississippi -0.10 
10 East Baton Rouge     Louisiana   0.79  82 Orange               Texas       -0.10 
11 St. Tammany          Louisiana   0.75  83 Jasper               Texas       -0.11 
12 Lafayette            Louisiana   0.67  84 Stone                Mississippi -0.11 
13 Hillsborough         Florida     0.66  85 Clarke               Alabama     -0.12 
14 Manatee              Florida     0.63  86 Pearl River          Mississippi -0.13 
15 Lake                 Florida     0.63  87 Cameron              Louisiana   -0.16 
16 Fayette              Texas       0.63  88 Tangipahoa           Louisiana   -0.16 
17 Pinellas             Florida     0.61  89 Decatur              Georgia     -0.17 
18 Bay                  Florida     0.60  90 Iberia               Louisiana   -0.17 
19 Fort Bend            Texas       0.57  91 St. Bernard          Louisiana   -0.18 
20 Austin               Texas       0.52  92 St. John the Baptist Louisiana   -0.19 
21 Charlotte            Florida     0.50  93 Pointe Coupee        Louisiana   -0.20 
22 Santa Rosa           Florida     0.49  94 Madison              Florida     -0.21 
23 Washington           Texas       0.44  95 Vermilion            Louisiana   -0.21 
24 Gulf                 Florida     0.43  96 Gadsden              Florida     -0.22 
25 Citrus               Florida     0.41  97 St. Mary             Louisiana   -0.22 
26 Wakulla              Florida     0.38  98 Escambia             Alabama     -0.22 
27 Jefferson            Louisiana   0.38  99 St. James            Louisiana   -0.23 
28 Goliad               Texas       0.36  100 East Feliciana       Louisiana   -0.24 
29 Hancock              Mississippi 0.35  101 Live Oak             Texas       -0.25 
30 Lavaca               Texas       0.35  102 Liberty              Florida     -0.26 
31 Galveston            Texas       0.33  103 Grady                Georgia     -0.26 
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32 Hernando             Florida     0.31  104 Holmes               Florida     -0.27 
33 Escambia             Florida     0.29  105 Sabine               Louisiana   -0.27 
34 St. Charles          Louisiana   0.29  106 Calhoun              Florida     -0.28 
35 Pasco                Florida     0.28  107 Assumption           Louisiana   -0.29 
36 Rapides              Louisiana   0.27  108 San Patricio         Texas       -0.31 
37 Colorado             Texas       0.27  109 Amite                Mississippi -0.31 
38 Waller               Texas       0.26  110 DeSoto               Florida     -0.32 
39 Harris               Texas       0.24  111 Monroe               Alabama     -0.32 
40 Marion               Florida     0.24  112 Hendry               Florida     -0.33 
41 Mobile               Alabama     0.23  113 Liberty              Texas       -0.34 
42 Victoria             Texas       0.23  114 Washington           Alabama     -0.35 
43 Ascension            Louisiana   0.23  115 Lafayette            Florida     -0.37 
44 Polk                 Florida     0.21  116 Iberville            Louisiana   -0.37 
45 Aransas              Texas       0.19  117 Kleberg              Texas       -0.38 
46 Thomas               Georgia     0.17  118 Acadia               Louisiana   -0.38 
47 Covington            Alabama     0.16  119 Tyler                Texas       -0.39 
48 Jefferson            Florida     0.16  120 Washington           Louisiana   -0.40 
49 Harrison             Mississippi 0.16  121 St. Martin           Louisiana   -0.40 
50 Brazoria             Texas       0.15  122 St. Landry           Louisiana   -0.41 
51 Lamar                Mississippi 0.14  123 Walthall             Mississippi -0.42 
52 Calcasieu            Louisiana   0.13  124 Jim Hogg             Texas       -0.43 
53 Orleans              Louisiana   0.12  125 Avoyelles            Louisiana   -0.44 
54 West Baton Rouge    Louisiana   0.11  126 Brooks               Texas       -0.46 
55 Chambers             Texas       0.09  127 St. Helena           Louisiana   -0.49 
56 Gilchrist            Florida     0.08  128 Glades               Florida     -0.49 
57 Washington           Florida     0.07  129 Dixie                Florida     -0.50 
58 George               Mississippi 0.06  130 Jim Wells            Texas       -0.53 
59 Jackson              Florida     0.05  131 West Feliciana       Louisiana   -0.54 
60 Nueces               Texas       0.05  132 Wilkinson            Mississippi -0.54 
61 Jefferson            Texas       0.05  133 Newton               Texas       -0.54 
62 Refugio              Texas       0.05  134 Hardee               Florida     -0.57 
63 Levy                 Florida     0.05  135 Evangeline           Louisiana   -0.58 
64 Jackson              Mississippi 0.05  136 Vernon               Louisiana   -0.65 
65 Livingston           Louisiana   0.04  137 Bee                  Texas       -0.69 
66 Wharton              Texas       0.03  138 Kenedy               Texas       -0.70 
67 Taylor               Florida     0.01  139 Cameron              Texas       -0.82 
68 Terrebonne           Louisiana   0.01  140 Webb                 Texas       -0.82 
69 Suwannee             Florida     -0.01  141 Hidalgo              Texas       -0.91 
70 Jackson              Texas       -0.01  142 Duval                Texas       -1.03 
71 Calhoun              Texas       -0.05  143 Willacy              Texas       -1.11 
72 Lafourche            Louisiana   -0.05  144 Starr                Texas       -1.49 
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Table E-1: Social Capital Sub-index Ranking Score by County 
 
Rank County State Social 
capital 
Score  
 Rank County State Social 
capital 
Score 
1 Goliad               Texas       1.97  73 St. James            Louisiana   -0.06 
2 Leon                 Florida     1.91  74 Chambers             Texas       -0.07 
3 Fayette              Texas       1.65  75 Iberia               Louisiana   -0.07 
4 Lavaca               Texas       1.19  76 Monroe               Alabama     -0.08 
5 Austin               Texas       0.97  77 West Baton Rouge    Louisiana   -0.09 
6 Washington           Texas       0.91  78 Harrison             Mississippi -0.10 
7 East Baton Rouge     Louisiana   0.84  79 Jackson              Mississippi -0.10 
8 Citrus               Florida     0.82  80 Assumption           Louisiana   -0.10 
9 Colorado             Texas       0.81  81 Taylor               Florida     -0.11 
10 Monroe               Florida     0.76  82 Holmes               Florida     -0.11 
11 Hernando             Florida     0.75  83 Brooks               Texas       -0.11 
12 Franklin             Florida     0.73  84 Lamar                Mississippi -0.12 
13 Gulf                 Florida     0.68  85 Terrebonne           Louisiana   -0.13 
14 Sarasota             Florida     0.67  86 Pearl River          Mississippi -0.13 
15 Lake                 Florida     0.61  87 Decatur              Georgia     -0.13 
16 Baldwin              Alabama     0.55  88 Madison              Florida     -0.13 
17 Refugio              Texas       0.54  89 Gadsden              Florida     -0.16 
18 Lee                  Florida     0.52  90 Lafayette            Florida     -0.16 
19 Levy                 Florida     0.50  91 Live Oak             Texas       -0.17 
20 Collier              Florida     0.47  92 Calhoun              Florida     -0.17 
21 DeWitt               Texas       0.47  93 Washington           Alabama     -0.17 
22 Wharton              Texas       0.46  94 Ascension            Louisiana   -0.18 
23 Charlotte            Florida     0.44  95 Grady                Georgia     -0.19 
24 Marion               Mississippi 0.44  96 Livingston           Louisiana   -0.20 
25 Covington            Alabama     0.42  97 Orange               Texas       -0.20 
26 Aransas              Texas       0.34  98 East Feliciana       Louisiana   -0.20 
27 Walton               Florida     0.33  99 Wilkinson            Mississippi -0.20 
28 Santa Rosa           Florida     0.32  100 Brazoria             Texas       -0.21 
29 Okaloosa             Florida     0.30  101 Iberville            Louisiana   -0.21 
30 Manatee              Florida     0.30  102 Gilchrist            Florida     -0.22 
31 Pike                 Mississippi 0.30  103 Tangipahoa           Louisiana   -0.23 
32 Pasco                Florida     0.29  104 St. Mary             Louisiana   -0.25 
33 Washington           Florida     0.29  105 Acadia               Louisiana   -0.26 
34 Jefferson            Florida     0.28  106 Tyler                Texas       -0.26 
35 Marion               Florida     0.27  107 Nueces               Texas       -0.27 
36 Rapides              Louisiana   0.25  108 Pointe Coupee        Louisiana   -0.27 
37 Victoria             Texas       0.25  109 Kleberg              Texas       -0.27 
38 Pinellas             Florida     0.24  110 Washington           Louisiana   -0.27 
39 St. Charles          Louisiana   0.24  111 Hardee               Florida     -0.29 
40 Thomas               Georgia     0.23  112 Stone                Mississippi -0.30 
41 Beauregard           Louisiana   0.23  113 San Patricio         Texas       -0.30 
42 St. Tammany          Louisiana   0.20  114 George               Mississippi -0.35 
43 Mobile               Alabama     0.20  115 Avoyelles            Louisiana   -0.35 
44 Hillsborough         Florida     0.19  116 St. Helena           Louisiana   -0.35 
45 Escambia             Florida     0.19  117 St. Bernard          Louisiana   -0.36 
46 Jackson              Florida     0.17  118 St. John the Baptist Louisiana   -0.36 
47 Lafayette            Louisiana   0.16  119 DeSoto               Florida     -0.37 
48 Bay                  Florida     0.15  120 Cameron              Louisiana   -0.39 
49 Clarke               Alabama     0.13  121 Orleans              Louisiana   -0.40 
50 Hancock              Mississippi 0.12  122 Evangeline           Louisiana   -0.40 
51 Calcasieu            Louisiana   0.12  123 Harris               Texas       -0.43 
52 Jefferson            Texas       0.10  124 St. Landry           Louisiana   -0.43 
53 Wakulla              Florida     0.09  125 Plaquemines          Louisiana   -0.46 
54 Sumter               Florida     0.08  126 Jim Wells            Texas       -0.48 
55 Waller               Texas       0.07  127 Liberty              Texas       -0.50 
56 Suwannee             Florida     0.07  128 Hendry               Florida     -0.51 
57 Jefferson Davis      Louisiana   0.06  129 Newton               Texas       -0.53 
58 Matagorda            Texas       0.06  130 Kenedy               Texas       -0.54 
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59 Amite                Mississippi 0.06  131 St. Martin           Louisiana   -0.55 
60 Walthall             Mississippi 0.02  132 Dixie                Florida     -0.55 
61 Jackson              Texas       0.01  133 Bee                  Texas       -0.61 
62 Calhoun              Texas       0.00  134 Jim Hogg             Texas       -0.63 
63 Lafourche            Louisiana   0.00  135 Glades               Florida     -0.63 
64 Vermilion            Louisiana   0.00  136 Willacy              Texas       -0.80 
65 Fort Bend            Texas       -0.01  137 Liberty              Florida     -0.88 
66 Polk                 Florida     -0.01  138 Cameron              Texas       -0.90 
67 Jasper               Texas       -0.01  139 Hidalgo              Texas       -1.02 
68 Escambia             Alabama     -0.01  140 Webb                 Texas       -1.03 
69 Galveston            Texas       -0.03  141 West Feliciana       Louisiana   -1.04 
70 Geneva               Alabama     -0.03  142 Duval                Texas       -1.06 
71 Jefferson            Louisiana   -0.04  143 Vernon               Louisiana   -1.07 
72 Sabine               Louisiana   -0.05  144 Starr                Texas       -1.40 
 
Table E-2: Economic Capital Sub-index Ranking Score by County 
Rank County State Economic 
capital Score  
 Rank County State Economic 
capital  
Score 
1 Monroe               Florida     2.90  73 Beauregard           Louisiana   -0.13 
2 Collier              Florida     2.59  74 Covington            Alabama     -0.14 
3 Fort Bend            Texas       2.01  75 Suwannee             Florida     -0.15 
4 Sarasota             Florida     1.99  76 St. James            Louisiana   -0.17 
5 St. Tammany         Louisiana   1.68  77 Matagorda            Texas       -0.18 
6 Lee                  Florida     1.50  78 Franklin             Florida     -0.20 
7 Baldwin              Alabama     1.40  79 St. Mary             Louisiana   -0.20 
8 Hillsborough         Florida     1.36  80 Vermilion            Louisiana   -0.21 
9 Leon                 Florida     1.30  81 Clarke               Alabama     -0.23 
10 Pinellas             Florida     1.24  82 Decatur              Georgia     -0.23 
11 Okaloosa             Florida     1.20  83 Liberty              Texas       -0.23 
12 Lafayette            Louisiana   1.19  84 Grady                Georgia     -0.24 
13 Manatee              Florida     1.16  85 Jasper               Texas       -0.25 
14 Jefferson            Louisiana   1.10  86 Taylor               Florida     -0.26 
15 Ascension            Louisiana   1.05  87 Levy                 Florida     -0.27 
16 
East Baton 
Rouge     Louisiana   1.00  88 St. Martin           Louisiana   -0.28 
17 St. Charles          Louisiana   0.99  89 Geneva               Alabama     -0.31 
18 Harris               Texas       0.99  90 Gulf                 Florida     -0.33 
19 Santa Rosa           Florida     0.98  91 Refugio              Texas       -0.33 
20 Fayette              Texas       0.92  92 Washington           Florida     -0.33 
21 Lamar                Mississippi 0.91  93 Gilchrist            Florida     -0.33 
22 Galveston            Texas       0.90  94 Escambia             Alabama     -0.36 
23 Lake                 Florida     0.89  95 San Patricio         Texas       -0.36 
24 Bay                  Florida     0.85  96 Monroe               Alabama     -0.37 
25 Austin               Texas       0.83  97 Pike                 Mississippi -0.39 
26 Brazoria             Texas       0.83  98 Jefferson Davis     Louisiana   -0.39 
27 Charlotte            Florida     0.82  99 Sabine               Louisiana   -0.40 
28 Chambers             Texas       0.81  100 Assumption           Louisiana   -0.40 
29 Walton               Florida     0.74  101 Hendry               Florida     -0.40 
30 Washington          Texas       0.67  102 Gadsden              Florida     -0.41 
31 Victoria             Texas       0.63  103 Washington           Alabama     -0.42 
32 Wakulla              Florida     0.57  104 DeWitt               Texas       -0.45 
33 Livingston           Louisiana   0.57  105 Acadia               Louisiana   -0.48 
34 Harrison             Mississippi 0.52  106 Kenedy               Texas       -0.51 
35 Jackson              Mississippi 0.51  107 DeSoto               Florida     -0.52 
36 Polk                 Florida     0.46  108 East Feliciana       Louisiana   -0.53 
37 Calcasieu            Louisiana   0.44  109 Marion               Mississippi -0.54 
38 Hancock              Mississippi 0.41  110 Jackson              Florida     -0.57 
39 
West Baton 
Rouge     Louisiana   0.39  111 Sumter               Florida     -0.58 
40 Pasco                Florida     0.38  112 Live Oak             Texas       -0.59 
41 Waller               Texas       0.37  113 Amite                Mississippi -0.63 
42 Terrebonne           Louisiana   0.37  114 Kleberg              Texas       -0.63 
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43 Escambia             Florida     0.36  115 Iberville            Louisiana   -0.68 
44 St. Bernard          Louisiana   0.35  116 Holmes               Florida     -0.69 
45 Mobile               Alabama     0.34  117 Jim Wells            Texas       -0.70 
46 Plaquemines         Louisiana   0.30  118 Glades               Florida     -0.70 
47 Hernando             Florida     0.28  119 Walthall             Mississippi -0.75 
48 Marion               Florida     0.28  120 Madison              Florida     -0.76 
49 Lafourche            Louisiana   0.27  121 St. Landry           Louisiana   -0.76 
50 Nueces               Texas       0.26  122 Webb                 Texas       -0.78 
51 
St. John the 
Baptist Louisiana   0.26  123 Hardee               Florida     -0.79 
52 Colorado             Texas       0.23  124 Vernon               Louisiana   -0.79 
53 Thomas               Georgia     0.20  125 Washington           Louisiana   -0.81 
54 Orange               Texas       0.18  126 Tyler                Texas       -0.83 
55 Lavaca               Texas       0.17  127 West Feliciana       Louisiana   -0.83 
56 Citrus               Florida     0.14  128 Lafayette            Florida     -0.86 
57 Jefferson            Florida     0.10  129 Calhoun              Florida     -0.91 
58 Rapides              Louisiana   0.10  130 Newton               Texas       -0.91 
59 Goliad               Texas       0.08  131 Avoyelles            Louisiana   -0.93 
60 Stone                Mississippi 0.08  132 Dixie                Florida     -0.94 
61 Jackson              Texas       0.04  133 Liberty              Florida     -0.95 
62 Wharton              Texas       0.02  134 Jim Hogg             Texas       -0.96 
63 Aransas              Texas       0.02  135 St. Helena           Louisiana   -0.97 
64 Jefferson            Texas       0.00  136 Cameron              Texas       -1.10 
65 Calhoun              Texas       -0.03  137 Evangeline           Louisiana   -1.12 
66 Cameron              Louisiana   -0.03  138 Hidalgo              Texas       -1.29 
67 Tangipahoa           Louisiana   -0.05  139 Wilkinson            Mississippi -1.49 
68 Pearl River          Mississippi -0.06  140 Bee                  Texas       -1.51 
69 George               Mississippi -0.06  141 Duval                Texas       -1.51 
70 Orleans              Louisiana   -0.07  142 Brooks               Texas       -1.61 
71 Pointe Coupee       Louisiana   -0.10  143 Willacy              Texas       -1.85 
72 Iberia               Louisiana   -0.11  144 Starr                Texas       -2.31 
 
Table E-3: Physical Capital Sub-index Ranking Score by County 
Rank County State Physical 
capital  
Score  
 Rank County State Physical 
capital  
Score 
1 Franklin             Florida     1.72  73 Calhoun              Florida     -0.06 
2 Monroe               Florida     1.43  74 Jefferson            Louisiana   -0.09 
3 Walton               Florida     0.96  75 Galveston            Texas       -0.10 
4 Leon                 Florida     0.75  76 Holmes               Florida     -0.10 
5 Bay                  Florida     0.69  77 Calhoun              Texas       -0.11 
6 Sarasota             Florida     0.68  78 Matagorda            Texas       -0.11 
7 Lafayette            Louisiana   0.66  79 Escambia             Alabama     -0.11 
8 Collier              Florida     0.64  80 Kleberg              Texas       -0.11 
9 Okaloosa             Florida     0.57  81 Pearl River          Mississippi -0.12 
10 Baldwin              Alabama     0.51  82 Orleans              Louisiana   -0.12 
11 Lee                  Florida     0.50  83 Lamar                Mississippi -0.13 
12 Covington            Alabama     0.49  84 Goliad               Texas       -0.13 
13 Lavaca               Texas       0.46  85 St. Landry           Louisiana   -0.13 
14 Pinellas             Florida     0.39  86 Harris               Texas       -0.14 
15 Jim Hogg             Texas       0.36  87 Terrebonne           Louisiana   -0.14 
16 Rapides              Louisiana   0.35  88 Jefferson            Texas       -0.14 
17 Liberty              Florida     0.35  89 Avoyelles            Louisiana   -0.14 
18 Colorado             Texas       0.34  90 Wilkinson            Mississippi -0.14 
19 Hillsborough         Florida     0.33  91 West Baton Rouge    Louisiana   -0.15 
20 Thomas               Georgia     0.33  92 Tangipahoa           Louisiana   -0.16 
21 Jefferson            Florida     0.33  93 Gadsden              Florida     -0.16 
22 Gulf                 Florida     0.33  94 DeSoto               Florida     -0.16 
23 Fayette              Texas       0.32  95 Orange               Texas       -0.17 
24 Lake                 Florida     0.32  96 East Feliciana       Louisiana   -0.17 
25 Taylor               Florida     0.31  97 Vermilion            Louisiana   -0.18 
26 Manatee              Florida     0.29  98 Monroe               Alabama     -0.18 
27 East Baton Rouge     Louisiana   0.28  99 Sumter               Florida     -0.18 
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28 Charlotte            Florida     0.26  100 Washington           Louisiana   -0.18 
29 Citrus               Florida     0.25  101 Pointe Coupee        Louisiana   -0.19 
30 Victoria             Texas       0.23  102 Grady                Georgia     -0.19 
31 Refugio              Texas       0.22  103 Evangeline           Louisiana   -0.19 
32 St. Tammany          Louisiana   0.21  104 Fort Bend            Texas       -0.20 
33 Waller               Texas       0.18  105 Chambers             Texas       -0.20 
34 Clarke               Alabama     0.18  106 Wharton              Texas       -0.20 
35 Washington           Texas       0.17  107 Beauregard           Louisiana   -0.20 
36 Aransas              Texas       0.17  108 Jim Wells            Texas       -0.20 
37 DeWitt               Texas       0.17  109 St. James            Louisiana   -0.21 
38 Escambia             Florida     0.16  110 Hendry               Florida     -0.21 
39 George               Mississippi 0.16  111 Ascension            Louisiana   -0.22 
40 Brooks               Texas       0.15  112 St. Charles          Louisiana   -0.22 
41 Wakulla              Florida     0.14  113 Iberia               Louisiana   -0.23 
42 Hernando             Florida     0.13  114 Amite                Mississippi -0.23 
43 Nueces               Texas       0.13  115 Dixie                Florida     -0.23 
44 Austin               Texas       0.11  116 Lafourche            Louisiana   -0.24 
45 Jackson              Texas       0.11  117 St. Martin           Louisiana   -0.25 
46 Hancock              Mississippi 0.08  118 Acadia               Louisiana   -0.25 
47 Live Oak             Texas       0.07  119 Walthall             Mississippi -0.25 
48 Santa Rosa           Florida     0.05  120 Lafayette            Florida     -0.27 
49 Pasco                Florida     0.05  121 San Patricio         Texas       -0.28 
50 Marion               Florida     0.05  122 Jackson              Mississippi -0.29 
51 Pike                 Mississippi 0.04  123 Plaquemines          Louisiana   -0.29 
52 Marion               Mississippi 0.04  124 Hidalgo              Texas       -0.29 
53 Jackson              Florida     0.04  125 Washington           Alabama     -0.30 
54 Polk                 Florida     0.02  126 Livingston           Louisiana   -0.31 
55 St. Helena           Louisiana   0.02  127 Liberty              Texas       -0.32 
56 Cameron              Louisiana   0.01  128 Glades               Florida     -0.32 
57 Jasper               Texas       0.01  129 Brazoria             Texas       -0.34 
58 Geneva               Alabama     0.00  130 Assumption           Louisiana   -0.36 
59 Calcasieu            Louisiana   -0.01  131 Cameron              Texas       -0.36 
60 Jefferson Davis      Louisiana   -0.01  132 Iberville            Louisiana   -0.38 
61 Decatur              Georgia     -0.03  133 Vernon               Louisiana   -0.40 
62 Harrison             Mississippi -0.04  134 Newton               Texas       -0.41 
63 Mobile               Alabama     -0.04  135 Webb                 Texas       -0.42 
64 Suwannee             Florida     -0.04  136 
St. John the 
Baptist Louisiana   -0.43 
65 Levy                 Florida     -0.04  137 Bee                  Texas       -0.44 
66 Sabine               Louisiana   -0.04  138 Hardee               Florida     -0.48 
67 Madison              Florida     -0.04  139 Kenedy               Texas       -0.49 
68 Stone                Mississippi -0.05  140 Duval                Texas       -0.49 
69 St. Mary             Louisiana   -0.06  141 West Feliciana       Louisiana   -0.50 
70 Washington           Florida     -0.06  142 Willacy              Texas       -0.51 
71 Gilchrist            Florida     -0.06  143 St. Bernard          Louisiana   -0.54 
72 Tyler                Texas       -0.06  144 Starr                Texas       -0.63 
 
Table E-4: Human Capital Sub-index Ranking Score by County 
Rank County State Human 
capital 
Score  
 Rank County State Human 
capital 
Score 
1 Franklin             Florida     1.34  73 Pearl River          Mississippi -0.04 
2 Liberty              Florida     1.09  74 Lavaca               Texas       -0.07 
3 Orleans              Louisiana   0.81  75 Decatur              Georgia     -0.07 
4 Bay                  Florida     0.73  76 DeSoto               Florida     -0.07 
5 Sarasota             Florida     0.73  77 Kleberg              Texas       -0.09 
6 Gulf                 Florida     0.71  78 Glades               Florida     -0.09 
7 Monroe               Florida     0.65  79 West Feliciana       Louisiana   -0.09 
8 East Baton Rouge     Louisiana   0.64  80 Matagorda            Texas       -0.10 
9 Okaloosa             Florida     0.61  81 Tangipahoa           Louisiana   -0.10 
10 Walton               Florida     0.59  82 Orange               Texas       -0.10 
11 Hillsborough         Florida     0.55  83 Chambers             Texas       -0.11 
12 Leon                 Florida     0.53  84 Colorado             Texas       -0.12 
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13 Jackson              Florida     0.53  85 Dixie                Florida     -0.12 
14 Polk                 Florida     0.49  86 Plaquemines          Louisiana   -0.12 
15 Manatee              Florida     0.47  87 Covington            Alabama     -0.13 
16 Collier              Florida     0.43  88 Refugio              Texas       -0.15 
17 Pinellas             Florida     0.43  89 Hendry               Florida     -0.16 
18 Jefferson            Florida     0.41  90 St. Mary             Louisiana   -0.18 
19 Wakulla              Florida     0.40  91 Assumption           Louisiana   -0.18 
20 Citrus               Florida     0.39  92 Fayette              Texas       -0.19 
21 Lee                  Florida     0.35  93 St. Helena           Louisiana   -0.19 
22 St. Tammany          Louisiana   0.35  94 Washington           Louisiana   -0.19 
23 Hancock              Mississippi 0.33  95 St. John the Baptist Louisiana   -0.19 
24 Pasco                Florida     0.32  96 Hardee               Florida     -0.19 
25 Mobile               Alabama     0.32  97 Pike                 Mississippi -0.20 
26 Charlotte            Florida     0.31  98 St. James            Louisiana   -0.20 
27 Suwannee             Florida     0.30  99 Amite                Mississippi -0.20 
28 Gilchrist            Florida     0.29  100 Jackson              Texas       -0.22 
29 Harris               Texas       0.29  101 Live Oak             Texas       -0.22 
30 Jefferson            Texas       0.29  102 Geneva               Alabama     -0.22 
31 Escambia             Florida     0.28  103 St. Landry           Louisiana   -0.22 
32 Galveston            Texas       0.28  104 Avoyelles            Louisiana   -0.22 
33 Lafayette            Louisiana   0.25  105 Vermilion            Louisiana   -0.22 
34 Baldwin              Alabama     0.25  106 Lafourche            Louisiana   -0.22 
35 Washington           Florida     0.25  107 Brooks               Texas       -0.25 
36 Jefferson            Louisiana   0.25  108 Cameron              Louisiana   -0.25 
37 Rapides              Louisiana   0.24  109 Iberville            Louisiana   -0.25 
38 Hernando             Florida     0.23  110 Jefferson Davis      Louisiana   -0.26 
39 Washington           Texas       0.22  111 Pointe Coupee        Louisiana   -0.26 
40 Santa Rosa           Florida     0.19  112 Sabine               Louisiana   -0.27 
41 Marion               Florida     0.19  113 Wilkinson            Mississippi -0.27 
42 Harrison             Mississippi 0.18  114 Acadia               Louisiana   -0.27 
43 Fort Bend            Texas       0.18  115 Iberia               Louisiana   -0.28 
44 Lake                 Florida     0.17  116 Liberty              Texas       -0.28 
45 Sumter               Florida     0.17  117 Jasper               Texas       -0.29 
46 Levy                 Florida     0.15  118 Stone                Mississippi -0.29 
47 Calhoun              Florida     0.15  119 Escambia             Alabama     -0.29 
48 Thomas               Georgia     0.14  120 Goliad               Texas       -0.29 
49 Victoria             Texas       0.14  121 Wharton              Texas       -0.29 
50 Austin               Texas       0.12  122 San Patricio         Texas       -0.30 
51 Taylor               Florida     0.11  123 Evangeline           Louisiana   -0.32 
52 Terrebonne           Louisiana   0.09  124 Bee                  Texas       -0.35 
53 Gadsden              Florida     0.09  125 Clarke               Alabama     -0.36 
54 West Baton Rouge    Louisiana   0.08  126 DeWitt               Texas       -0.36 
55 St. Charles          Louisiana   0.08  127 Tyler                Texas       -0.36 
56 Nueces               Texas       0.07  128 Jim Wells            Texas       -0.37 
57 Brazoria             Texas       0.06  129 Newton               Texas       -0.37 
58 Aransas              Texas       0.05  130 Washington           Alabama     -0.38 
59 George               Mississippi 0.05  131 Grady                Georgia     -0.39 
60 Lamar                Mississippi 0.05  132 Marion               Mississippi -0.40 
61 East Feliciana       Louisiana   0.05  133 St. Martin           Louisiana   -0.43 
62 Beauregard           Louisiana   0.05  134 Vernon               Louisiana   -0.43 
63 Waller               Texas       0.04  135 Monroe               Alabama     -0.44 
64 Calcasieu            Louisiana   0.03  136 Webb                 Texas       -0.51 
65 Madison              Florida     0.03  137 Cameron              Texas       -0.52 
66 Ascension            Louisiana   0.02  138 Walthall             Mississippi -0.57 
67 Calhoun              Texas       0.01  139 Jim Hogg             Texas       -0.62 
68 Holmes               Florida     0.00  140 Hidalgo              Texas       -0.64 
69 Jackson              Mississippi 0.00  141 Duval                Texas       -0.64 
70 St. Bernard          Louisiana   -0.01  142 Willacy              Texas       -0.75 
71 Livingston           Louisiana   -0.02  143 Kenedy               Texas       -0.92 
72 Lafayette            Florida     -0.03  144 Starr                Texas       -0.92 
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Table F-1: Mitigation Sub-index Ranking Score by County 
 
Rank County State Mitigation 
Sub-index 
Score  
 Rank County State Mitigation 
Sub-index 
Score 
1 Monroe               Florida     1.38  73 Wharton              Texas       -0.07 
2 Collier              Florida     1.28  74 Marion               Mississippi -0.07 
3 Leon                 Florida     1.25  75 Pearl River          Mississippi -0.08 
4 Sarasota             Florida     1.24  76 George               Mississippi -0.09 
5 Franklin             Florida     0.89  77 Clarke               Alabama     -0.09 
6 Walton               Florida     0.87  78 Sumter               Florida     -0.10 
7 Lee                  Florida     0.87  79 Matagorda            Texas       -0.10 
8 East Baton Rouge     Louisiana   0.86  80 St. Bernard          Louisiana   -0.12 
9 Baldwin              Alabama     0.86  81 Orange               Texas       -0.12 
10 Hillsborough         Florida     0.79  82 Geneva               Alabama     -0.12 
11 Okaloosa             Florida     0.78  83 Vermilion            Louisiana   -0.12 
12 St. Tammany          Louisiana   0.77  84 Calhoun              Texas       -0.13 
13 Lafayette            Louisiana   0.76  85 Tangipahoa           Louisiana   -0.13 
14 Fayette              Texas       0.72  86 Jefferson Davis      Louisiana   -0.14 
15 Manatee              Florida     0.69  87 Iberia               Louisiana   -0.14 
16 Bay                  Florida     0.63  88 Liberty              Florida     -0.15 
17 Lake                 Florida     0.63  89 Jackson              Florida     -0.15 
18 Austin               Texas       0.62  90 St. James            Louisiana   -0.17 
19 Pinellas             Florida     0.61  91 Cameron              Louisiana   -0.17 
20 Fort Bend            Texas       0.61  92 St. John the Baptist Louisiana   -0.19 
21 Gulf                 Florida     0.58  93 DeWitt               Texas       -0.19 
22 Santa Rosa           Florida     0.49  94 St. Mary             Louisiana   -0.20 
23 Charlotte            Florida     0.48  95 Amite                Mississippi -0.20 
24 Citrus               Florida     0.47  96 Gadsden              Florida     -0.21 
25 Washington           Texas       0.47  97 Pointe Coupee        Louisiana   -0.21 
26 Lavaca               Texas       0.43  98 Jasper               Texas       -0.21 
27 Jefferson            Louisiana   0.41  99 Assumption           Louisiana   -0.22 
28 Waller               Texas       0.40  100 Live Oak             Texas       -0.23 
29 Hernando             Florida     0.38  101 Decatur              Georgia     -0.24 
30 Jefferson            Florida     0.31  102 Escambia             Alabama     -0.26 
31 Wakulla              Florida     0.31  103 Kleberg              Texas       -0.28 
32 Galveston            Texas       0.31  104 St. Martin           Louisiana   -0.28 
33 St. Charles          Louisiana   0.30  105 DeSoto               Florida     -0.30 
34 Polk                 Florida     0.29  106 Hendry               Florida     -0.30 
35 Escambia             Florida     0.28  107 Sabine               Louisiana   -0.32 
36 Harris               Texas       0.26  108 Monroe               Alabama     -0.32 
37 Marion               Florida     0.26  109 Madison              Florida     -0.34 
38 Victoria             Texas       0.26  110 San Patricio         Texas       -0.34 
39 Lamar                Mississippi 0.25  111 Calhoun              Florida     -0.35 
40 Pasco                Florida     0.24  112 East Feliciana       Louisiana   -0.35 
41 Mobile               Alabama     0.24  113 Brooks               Texas       -0.36 
42 Ascension            Louisiana   0.24  114 Liberty              Texas       -0.36 
43 Aransas              Texas       0.23  115 Grady                Georgia     -0.36 
44 Colorado             Texas       0.23  116 Holmes               Florida     -0.38 
45 Rapides              Louisiana   0.21  117 Iberville            Louisiana   -0.39 
46 Goliad               Texas       0.21  118 Acadia               Louisiana   -0.39 
47 West Baton Rouge    Louisiana   0.18  119 St. Landry           Louisiana   -0.41 
48 Harrison             Mississippi 0.16  120 Washington           Alabama     -0.42 
49 Thomas               Georgia     0.16  121 Hardee               Florida     -0.45 
50 Covington            Alabama     0.15  122 Washington           Louisiana   -0.46 
51 Terrebonne           Louisiana   0.14  123 Avoyelles            Louisiana   -0.47 
52 Calcasieu            Louisiana   0.14  124 Lafayette            Florida     -0.48 
53 Brazoria             Texas       0.13  125 Tyler                Texas       -0.49 
54 Chambers             Texas       0.11  126 Jim Wells            Texas       -0.50 
55 Levy                 Florida     0.09  127 Walthall             Mississippi -0.51 
56 Jackson              Mississippi 0.09  128 Glades               Florida     -0.52 
57 Livingston           Louisiana   0.08  129 Dixie                Florida     -0.52 
58 Hancock              Mississippi 0.07  130 Evangeline           Louisiana   -0.58 
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59 Jefferson            Texas       0.07  131 St. Helena           Louisiana   -0.60 
60 Nueces               Texas       0.06  132 Jim Hogg             Texas       -0.61 
61 Suwannee             Florida     0.04  133 Webb                 Texas       -0.64 
62 Washington           Florida     0.02  134 Wilkinson            Mississippi -0.65 
63 Refugio              Texas       0.01  135 West Feliciana       Louisiana   -0.67 
64 Orleans              Louisiana   0.00  136 Newton               Texas       -0.67 
65 Plaquemines          Louisiana   0.00  137 Cameron              Texas       -0.72 
66 Lafourche            Louisiana   -0.02  138 Vernon               Louisiana   -0.77 
67 Beauregard           Louisiana   -0.03  139 Hidalgo              Texas       -0.79 
68 Gilchrist            Florida     -0.04  140 Kenedy               Texas       -0.79 
69 Jackson              Texas       -0.04  141 Bee                  Texas       -0.83 
70 Taylor               Florida     -0.05  142 Duval                Texas       -1.04 
71 Stone                Mississippi -0.05  143 Willacy              Texas       -1.07 
72 Pike                 Mississippi -0.06  144 Starr                Texas       -1.30 
 
Table F-2: Preparedness Sub-index Ranking Score by County 
Rank County State Preparedness 
Sub-index 
Score  
 Rank County State Preparedness 
Sub-index 
Score 
1 Monroe               Florida     2.01  73 Lafourche            Louisiana   -0.10 
2 Collier              Florida     1.39  74 Brooks               Texas       -0.10 
3 Sarasota             Florida     1.38  75 East Feliciana       Louisiana   -0.11 
4 Okaloosa             Florida     1.12  76 Covington            Alabama     -0.13 
5 Leon                 Florida     1.10  77 Hendry               Florida     -0.13 
6 Hancock              Mississippi 1.09  78 Jasper               Texas       -0.14 
7 Franklin             Florida     0.90  79 Terrebonne           Louisiana   -0.15 
8 Baldwin              Alabama     0.90  80 Beauregard           Louisiana   -0.15 
9 
East Baton 
Rouge     Louisiana   0.88  81 St. Bernard          Louisiana   -0.15 
10 St. Tammany         Louisiana   0.84  82 Iberia               Louisiana   -0.15 
11 Hillsborough         Florida     0.80  83 
St. John the 
Baptist Louisiana   -0.15 
12 Pinellas             Florida     0.74  84 Suwannee             Florida     -0.16 
13 Lee                  Florida     0.72  85 Pointe Coupee       Louisiana   -0.16 
14 Lafayette            Louisiana   0.72  86 Refugio              Texas       -0.18 
15 Fort Bend            Texas       0.67  87 Pearl River          Mississippi -0.18 
16 Orleans              Louisiana   0.67  88 Grady                Georgia     -0.18 
17 Manatee              Florida     0.64  89 Orange               Texas       -0.21 
18 Bay                  Florida     0.62  90 DeWitt               Texas       -0.21 
19 Lake                 Florida     0.61  91 Tangipahoa           Louisiana   -0.24 
20 Walton               Florida     0.54  92 Jackson              Texas       -0.25 
21 Gulf                 Florida     0.47  93 Marion               Mississippi -0.25 
22 Santa Rosa           Florida     0.47  94 Clarke               Alabama     -0.25 
23 Charlotte            Florida     0.47  95 Stone                Mississippi -0.26 
24 Wakulla              Florida     0.46  96 St. James            Louisiana   -0.26 
25 Harris               Texas       0.46  97 San Patricio         Texas       -0.26 
26 Pasco                Florida     0.45  98 Plaquemines          Louisiana   -0.27 
27 Jefferson            Louisiana   0.44  99 Escambia             Alabama     -0.27 
28 Fayette              Texas       0.41  100 West Feliciana       Louisiana   -0.27 
29 Rapides              Louisiana   0.41  101 Calhoun              Texas       -0.28 
30 Escambia             Florida     0.39  102 Vermilion            Louisiana   -0.30 
31 Austin               Texas       0.38  103 Gadsden              Florida     -0.30 
32 Gilchrist            Florida     0.37  104 Lafayette            Florida     -0.30 
33 Galveston            Texas       0.36  105 Holmes               Florida     -0.32 
34 Mobile               Alabama     0.36  106 Iberville            Louisiana   -0.32 
35 Goliad               Texas       0.33  107 St. Mary             Louisiana   -0.33 
36 Citrus               Florida     0.32  108 Monroe               Alabama     -0.33 
37 St. Charles          Louisiana   0.32  109 Sabine               Louisiana   -0.34 
38 Washington          Texas       0.31  110 Cameron              Louisiana   -0.35 
39 Waller               Texas       0.30  111 Amite                Mississippi -0.35 
40 Harrison             Mississippi 0.27  112 Washington           Louisiana   -0.35 
41 Polk                 Florida     0.22  113 Calhoun              Florida     -0.37 
42 Marion               Florida     0.21  114 Washington           Alabama     -0.38 
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43 Jackson              Florida     0.21  115 Vernon               Louisiana   -0.38 
44 Hernando             Florida     0.19  116 Live Oak             Texas       -0.39 
45 Aransas              Texas       0.18  117 Assumption           Louisiana   -0.40 
46 Wharton              Texas       0.18  118 Liberty              Texas       -0.40 
47 Ascension            Louisiana   0.17  119 St. Landry           Louisiana   -0.40 
48 
West Baton 
Rouge     Louisiana   0.14  120 Walthall             Mississippi -0.40 
49 Lavaca               Texas       0.13  121 Tyler                Texas       -0.42 
50 Victoria             Texas       0.13  122 Acadia               Louisiana   -0.44 
51 Brazoria             Texas       0.13  123 DeSoto               Florida     -0.45 
52 Nueces               Texas       0.13  124 Avoyelles            Louisiana   -0.47 
53 Madison              Florida     0.13  125 St. Martin           Louisiana   -0.50 
54 Taylor               Florida     0.10  126 Glades               Florida     -0.50 
55 Thomas               Georgia     0.09  127 Kleberg              Texas       -0.51 
56 Calcasieu            Louisiana   0.06  128 Dixie                Florida     -0.51 
57 Colorado             Texas       0.03  129 St. Helena           Louisiana   -0.51 
58 Jefferson            Texas       0.02  130 Wilkinson            Mississippi -0.51 
59 Washington          Florida     0.02  131 Newton               Texas       -0.52 
60 Sumter               Florida     0.02  132 Evangeline           Louisiana   -0.54 
61 Jackson              Mississippi -0.01  133 Liberty              Florida     -0.58 
62 Matagorda            Texas       -0.01  134 Kenedy               Texas       -0.58 
63 Lamar                Mississippi -0.02  135 Jim Wells            Texas       -0.59 
64 Livingston           Louisiana   -0.02  136 Hardee               Florida     -0.60 
65 Jefferson Davis     Louisiana   -0.02  137 Bee                  Texas       -0.66 
66 Jefferson            Florida     -0.03  138 Jim Hogg             Texas       -0.73 
67 George               Mississippi -0.03  139 Cameron              Texas       -0.80 
68 Decatur              Georgia     -0.03  140 Webb                 Texas       -0.86 
69 Chambers             Texas       -0.06  141 Hidalgo              Texas       -0.95 
70 Pike                 Mississippi -0.06  142 Duval                Texas       -1.01 
71 Geneva               Alabama     -0.07  143 Willacy              Texas       -1.07 
72 Levy                 Florida     -0.10  144 Starr                Texas       -1.50 
 
Table F-3: Response Sub-index Ranking Score by County 
Rank County State Response 
Sub-index 
Score  
 Rank County State Response 
Sub-
index 
Score 
1 Monroe               Florida     1.58  73 Waller               Texas       -0.06 
2 Franklin             Florida     1.24  74 Sumter               Florida     -0.06 
3 Sarasota             Florida     1.07  75 Livingston           Louisiana   -0.06 
4 Collier              Florida     1.03  76 Terrebonne           Louisiana   -0.06 
5 Leon                 Florida     1.02  77 Geneva               Alabama     -0.07 
6 Lee                  Florida     0.75  78 Lafourche            Louisiana   -0.07 
7 Baldwin              Alabama     0.68  79 Jasper               Texas       -0.07 
8 Fayette              Texas       0.64  80 Orange               Texas       -0.07 
9 St. Tammany          Louisiana   0.59  81 Jackson              Texas       -0.08 
10 Pinellas             Florida     0.59  82 Holmes               Florida     -0.10 
11 Manatee              Florida     0.59  83 Decatur              Georgia     -0.11 
12 Okaloosa             Florida     0.58  84 East Feliciana       Louisiana   -0.11 
13 Walton               Florida     0.58  85 Escambia             Alabama     -0.11 
14 East Baton Rouge     Louisiana   0.56  86 Lafayette            Florida     -0.11 
15 Charlotte            Florida     0.55  87 Marion               Mississippi -0.12 
16 Goliad               Texas       0.54  88 Sabine               Louisiana   -0.12 
17 Lake                 Florida     0.53  89 Iberia               Louisiana   -0.13 
18 Bay                  Florida     0.51  90 Pearl River          Mississippi -0.13 
19 Lafayette            Louisiana   0.49  91 St. James            Louisiana   -0.14 
20 Hillsborough         Florida     0.48  92 Gadsden              Florida     -0.15 
21 Citrus               Florida     0.47  93 Stone                Mississippi -0.16 
22 Lavaca               Texas       0.42  94 St. Bernard          Louisiana   -0.17 
23 Santa Rosa           Florida     0.41  95 Tangipahoa           Louisiana   -0.17 
24 Fort Bend            Texas       0.40  96 St. Mary             Louisiana   -0.17 
25 Washington           Texas       0.40  97 
St. John the 
Baptist Louisiana   -0.18 
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26 Gulf                 Florida     0.37  98 Monroe               Alabama     -0.19 
27 Hernando             Florida     0.37  99 Cameron              Louisiana   -0.19 
28 Colorado             Texas       0.35  100 Calhoun              Florida     -0.19 
29 Austin               Texas       0.33  101 Grady                Georgia     -0.20 
30 Galveston            Texas       0.33  102 Vermilion            Louisiana   -0.20 
31 Rapides              Louisiana   0.30  103 Jefferson Davis      Louisiana   -0.21 
32 Thomas               Georgia     0.30  104 Tyler                Texas       -0.21 
33 Jefferson            Louisiana   0.29  105 Madison              Florida     -0.22 
34 Victoria             Texas       0.28  106 St. Helena           Louisiana   -0.22 
35 Pasco                Florida     0.27  107 Pointe Coupee        Louisiana   -0.23 
36 Escambia             Florida     0.24  108 Live Oak             Texas       -0.23 
37 Jefferson            Florida     0.24  109 Liberty              Florida     -0.23 
38 Wakulla              Florida     0.23  110 Walthall             Mississippi -0.25 
39 Taylor               Florida     0.22  111 Acadia               Louisiana   -0.25 
40 Marion               Florida     0.21  112 Amite                Mississippi -0.26 
41 Aransas              Texas       0.21  113 Washington           Alabama     -0.26 
42 St. Charles          Louisiana   0.18  114 Plaquemines          Louisiana   -0.27 
43 Polk                 Florida     0.16  115 Washington           Louisiana   -0.28 
44 Calcasieu            Louisiana   0.16  116 Liberty              Texas       -0.32 
45 George               Mississippi 0.16  117 Wilkinson            Mississippi -0.32 
46 Covington            Alabama     0.15  118 Avoyelles            Louisiana   -0.33 
47 Mobile               Alabama     0.13  119 DeSoto               Florida     -0.34 
48 Hancock              Mississippi 0.12  120 Assumption           Louisiana   -0.36 
49 Harrison             Mississippi 0.11  121 Dixie                Florida     -0.36 
50 Ascension            Louisiana   0.09  122 Iberville            Louisiana   -0.37 
51 Brazoria             Texas       0.09  123 St. Landry           Louisiana   -0.37 
52 Calhoun              Texas       0.09  124 Glades               Florida     -0.37 
53 Jackson              Florida     0.08  125 San Patricio         Texas       -0.40 
54 Levy                 Florida     0.07  126 Kleberg              Texas       -0.40 
55 Lamar                Mississippi 0.06  127 Brooks               Texas       -0.41 
56 Refugio              Texas       0.05  128 Newton               Texas       -0.42 
57 DeWitt               Texas       0.05  129 Hendry               Florida     -0.45 
58 West Baton Rouge    Louisiana   0.04  130 St. Martin           Louisiana   -0.46 
59 Jefferson            Texas       0.04  131 West Feliciana       Louisiana   -0.47 
60 Wharton              Texas       0.03  132 Jim Wells            Texas       -0.47 
61 Jackson              Mississippi 0.03  133 Kenedy               Texas       -0.49 
62 Chambers             Texas       0.03  134 Jim Hogg             Texas       -0.50 
63 Pike                 Mississippi 0.03  135 Evangeline           Louisiana   -0.51 
64 Suwannee             Florida     0.02  136 Hardee               Florida     -0.56 
65 Harris               Texas       -0.01  137 Bee                  Texas       -0.60 
66 Washington           Florida     -0.02  138 Vernon               Louisiana   -0.62 
67 Clarke               Alabama     -0.02  139 Cameron              Texas       -0.85 
68 Orleans              Louisiana   -0.03  140 Webb                 Texas       -0.88 
69 Gilchrist            Florida     -0.03  141 Duval                Texas       -0.96 
70 Nueces               Texas       -0.03  142 Hidalgo              Texas       -0.97 
71 Beauregard           Louisiana   -0.03  143 Willacy              Texas       -1.03 
72 Matagorda            Texas       -0.05  144 Starr                Texas       -1.55 
 
Table F-4: Recovery Sub-index Ranking Score by County 
Rank County State Recovery 
Score  
 Rank County State Recovery 
Score 
1 Collier              Florida     1.29  73 Stone                Mississippi 0.03 
2 Monroe               Florida     1.27  74 Gilchrist            Florida     0.01 
3 Walton               Florida     1.18  75 Orange               Texas       0.01 
4 Sarasota             Florida     1.13  76 Lafourche            Louisiana   0.00 
5 Leon                 Florida     1.08  77 Beauregard           Louisiana   -0.02 
6 Lee                  Florida     0.96  78 Wharton              Texas       -0.03 
7 Baldwin              Alabama     0.91  79 Jasper               Texas       -0.04 
8 East Baton Rouge     Louisiana   0.87  80 Jefferson Davis      Louisiana   -0.04 
9 St. Tammany          Louisiana   0.79  81 Liberty              Florida     -0.06 
10 Okaloosa             Florida     0.78  82 Tangipahoa           Louisiana   -0.09 
11 Fayette              Texas       0.75  83 Clarke               Alabama     -0.13 
12 Lake                 Florida     0.74  84 Geneva               Alabama     -0.14 
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13 Austin               Texas       0.74  85 Pearl River          Mississippi -0.14 
14 Lafayette            Louisiana   0.72  86 Live Oak             Texas       -0.15 
15 Bay                  Florida     0.66  87 St. Mary             Louisiana   -0.16 
16 Fort Bend            Texas       0.63  88 Orleans              Louisiana   -0.18 
17 Manatee              Florida     0.59  89 Assumption           Louisiana   -0.19 
18 Santa Rosa           Florida     0.59  90 Calhoun              Florida     -0.20 
19 Hillsborough         Florida     0.58  91 DeSoto               Florida     -0.20 
20 Washington           Texas       0.57  92 Taylor               Florida     -0.22 
21 Pinellas             Florida     0.50  93 Gadsden              Florida     -0.22 
22 Wakulla              Florida     0.50  94 Vermilion            Louisiana   -0.22 
23 Charlotte            Florida     0.49  95 Pointe Coupee        Louisiana   -0.22 
24 Franklin             Florida     0.48  96 San Patricio         Texas       -0.23 
25 Colorado             Texas       0.45  97 Matagorda            Texas       -0.24 
26 Covington            Alabama     0.45  98 Sumter               Florida     -0.24 
27 Lavaca               Texas       0.44  99 Iberia               Louisiana   -0.24 
28 Ascension            Louisiana   0.41  100 St. John the Baptist Louisiana   -0.24 
29 Waller               Texas       0.40  101 Escambia             Alabama     -0.25 
30 Citrus               Florida     0.39  102 Liberty              Texas       -0.26 
31 Jefferson            Louisiana   0.38  103 Pike                 Mississippi -0.27 
32 Goliad               Texas       0.37  104 Decatur              Georgia     -0.28 
33 St. Charles          Louisiana   0.35  105 Holmes               Florida     -0.29 
34 Galveston            Texas       0.34  106 St. Bernard          Louisiana   -0.29 
35 Refugio              Texas       0.33  107 Sabine               Louisiana   -0.30 
36 Jackson              Texas       0.31  108 Grady                Georgia     -0.30 
37 Gulf                 Florida     0.30  109 Washington           Alabama     -0.32 
38 Hernando             Florida     0.30  110 St. James            Louisiana   -0.34 
39 Lamar                Mississippi 0.29  111 Kleberg              Texas       -0.34 
40 Chambers             Texas       0.29  112 St. Martin           Louisiana   -0.36 
41 Marion               Florida     0.28  113 East Feliciana       Louisiana   -0.38 
42 Escambia             Florida     0.26  114 Madison              Florida     -0.42 
43 Victoria             Texas       0.25  115 Iberville            Louisiana   -0.42 
44 Harris               Texas       0.25  116 Acadia               Louisiana   -0.44 
45 Washington           Florida     0.25  117 Amite                Mississippi -0.44 
46 Brazoria             Texas       0.24  118 Monroe               Alabama     -0.45 
47 George               Mississippi 0.22  119 St. Landry           Louisiana   -0.45 
48 Plaquemines          Louisiana   0.21  120 Tyler                Texas       -0.46 
49 Pasco                Florida     0.18  121 Hendry               Florida     -0.46 
50 Mobile               Alabama     0.18  122 Avoyelles            Louisiana   -0.50 
51 Rapides              Louisiana   0.17  123 Washington           Louisiana   -0.51 
52 Polk                 Florida     0.17  124 Walthall             Mississippi -0.52 
53 Calcasieu            Louisiana   0.17  125 Newton               Texas       -0.54 
54 Livingston           Louisiana   0.15  126 Glades               Florida     -0.56 
55 Aransas              Texas       0.14  127 Jim Wells            Texas       -0.57 
56 Hancock              Mississippi 0.14  128 Lafayette            Florida     -0.58 
57 Thomas               Georgia     0.13  129 St. Helena           Louisiana   -0.61 
58 Terrebonne           Louisiana   0.13  130 Dixie                Florida     -0.61 
59 Jefferson            Florida     0.12  131 Bee                  Texas       -0.64 
60 Calhoun              Texas       0.12  132 Hardee               Florida     -0.67 
61 Levy                 Florida     0.12  133 Wilkinson            Mississippi -0.68 
62 Jim Hogg             Texas       0.12  134 Evangeline           Louisiana   -0.68 
63 Harrison             Mississippi 0.11  135 West Feliciana       Louisiana   -0.77 
64 West Baton Rouge    Louisiana   0.10  136 Vernon               Louisiana   -0.81 
65 Jefferson            Texas       0.09  137 Webb                 Texas       -0.88 
66 Jackson              Mississippi 0.07  138 Cameron              Texas       -0.90 
67 DeWitt               Texas       0.05  139 Kenedy               Texas       -0.94 
68 Marion               Mississippi 0.05  140 Hidalgo              Texas       -0.95 
69 Cameron              Louisiana   0.05  141 Brooks               Texas       -0.97 
70 Suwannee             Florida     0.04  142 Duval                Texas       -1.11 
71 Jackson              Florida     0.03  143 Willacy              Texas       -1.27 
72 Nueces               Texas       0.03  144 Starr                Texas       -1.60 
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